Three Essays on Economics and Information Shocks by Carlson, Kyle Ian
Three essays on economics and information shocks
Thesis by
Kyle Carlson
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, California
2015
(Defended 5/15/2015)
ii
c 2015
Kyle Carlson
All Rights Reserved
iii
Acknowledgments
Numerous people helped make this work possible and otherwise contributed to the time I spent at Caltech.
Colin Camerer supported and encouraged all the projects in this thesis (and more) from the most nascent
stages to the final changes requested by reviewers. If not for Colin, my time here would have been more
fraught and much less interesting. I am thankful that we still have more research to do. He also con-
tributed by assembling and mentoring, in an outstandingly earnest, rigorous, and intellectually curious way,
an amazing and amazingly varied group of researchers in his lab. Each week we had the opportunity to
discuss research with Colin, and, in an important sense, see him doing research. This form of interaction
is incredibly valuable. It is very unfortunate that this arrangement is not a widely held norm. By working
with Colin I also had the great chance to meet and collaborate with numerous other people, including Alice,
Annamaria, Josh, Stephen, and Zach. Other lab members I had the fortune to meet are Alec, Deb, Gidi,
Klavdia, Mathieu, Matt, Meghana, Rahul, Romann, and Taisuke. Deb and Rahul were great office mates.
Gui generously gave me advice on serval occasions. Thanks to Laurel for cutting me some slack and keeping
everything running (along with Barbara).
Matt Shum encouraged me to do the second chapter in particular. When I was unsure whether I should or
not, he said to just do it. Fortunately, I listened because it turned out to be my first publication. Otherwise,
Matt was very generous with his time and advice. I thank Erik Snowberg for accepting my invitation to
attend my second year talk where I presented an early version of the second chapter (to a small audience).
Much thanks go to Michael Ewens for generously providing thoughts on the thesis.
I would never have been here without the support of Lorenz, a great researcher who refuses to do
anything the easy way. Others mentors who encouraged me include Suzanne along with Bill, Cyril, David,
Julie, K.K., and Volodymyr.
I am grateful that Carl very carefully read the second chapter and critiqued it with the full force of his
economics training. More importantly I finally made it to dinner with his family. I greatly appreciate that
Ali and Kata traveled from very far away to visit me in Pasadena. Thanks to my parents for unwavering
support. Innumerable thanks to Cheryl.
iv
Abstract
A person living in an industrialized society has almost no choice but to receive information daily
with negative implications for himself or others. His attention will often be drawn to the ups and
downs of economic indicators or the alleged misdeeds of leaders and organizations. Reacting to
new information is central to economics, but economics typically ignores the affective aspect of
the response, for example, of stress or anger. These essays present the results of considering how
the affective aspect of the response can influence economic outcomes.
The first chapter presents an experiment in which individuals were presented with information
about various non-profit organizations and allowed to take actions that rewarded or punished those
organizations. When social interaction was introduced into this environment an asymmetry be-
tween rewarding and punishing appeared. The net effects of punishment became greater and more
variable, whereas the effects of reward were unchanged. The individuals were more strongly influ-
enced by negative social information and used that information to target unpopular organizations.
These behaviors contributed to an increase in inequality among the outcomes of the organizations.
The second and third chapters present empirical studies of reactions to negative information
about local economic conditions. Economic factors are among the most prevalent stressors, and
stress is known to have numerous negative effects on health. These chapters document localized,
transient effects of the announcement of information about large-scale job losses. News of mass
layoffs and shut downs of large military bases are found to decrease birth weights and gestational
ages among babies born in the affected regions. The effect magnitudes are close to those estimated
in similar studies of disasters.
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1Overview
Discussion of the motivation
Each of these three papers reveals a new relationship between variables of long-standing economic
interest. Two of them show links between mass job losses and government policy, on the one
hand, and health at birth, on the other. The first paper shows how the introduction of a new
media technology influences third-party punishment and the relative success of different non-profit
organizations. The existence of these relationships was in each case suggested by considering
how new pieces of economic information (information shocks) could generate strong emotional
reactions. In one case the health and psychology literature said news of job losses should generate
stress in the people near the site of job losses, which should in turn decrease birth weights and
gestational age. In the other case, the research on punishment, anger, gossip, and communication
suggested that the deployment of social media technology could increase punishment. It should be
noted that in none of the studies is the emotion itself the direct object of study. First, data on the
emotions themselves is valuable but often not available. Second, that data is not always necessary
to make a connection of economic interest. The approach of using the literature on emotion to
make a connection between non-emotion data is the one used profitably in these papers.1
1Other economics papers use a similar approach. One example is the study of clock games by Kang et al. (2010),
in which the basic features of anxiety are used to predict how a game’s form will affect behavior in the game. Standard
economic theory predicts no effect, but a clear prediction about the direction of the effect can be obtained by consid-
ering anxiety to be a psychological flow cost that is incurred as long as some salient economic uncertainty remains
unresolved. That prediction can be obtained whether or not some otherwise valuable, emotion-related measurement
is obtained during the experiment. Studies comparing the strategy method and direct-response method rely on similar
thinking (see, for example, Brosig et al. 2003).
A second example is the model of surprise and suspense developed by Ely et al. (2013). They suppose that an agent
has preferences over his own experiences of the emotions of surprise and suspense. However, the authors suggest
testing this model by examining the relationship between the design of a surprise-suspense good—a book, movie, or
sport—and the consumption (audience) of the good.
2Economists have studied emotion before2, but, as noted by Loewenstein (2000), they have
focused on the anticipation of emotions to be experienced in the future. Loewenstein (2000) ad-
vises economists to pay more attention to what he calls immediate emotions (or visceral factors),
especially negative ones. Such emotions include those considered in these papers.
Loewenstein (2000) argues that the dominance of visceral factors in human behavior is one of
the most important reasons that economists are so reluctant to consider them. Visceral factors can
override deliberation to generate behavior that is contrary to long-run self-interest. He prescribes
models with state-dependent preferences. This scheme allows, for example, an otherwise money-
interested person to become angry over another’s unfairness and prefer to throw away his own
money simply to hurt the offender. However, even in situations where no economic model exists,
we can still propose and test important economic relationships or develop simple empirical models
by considering emotional reactions.
Emotional reactions and economic news fit together in ways that give the researcher several
advantages. These advantages add up to tell the researcher when and where to look for some
interesting behavior, what that behavior should be, and that, with some luck, there should be a lot
of it.
First, the emotional reaction occurs at a time that can be identified with a useful degree of
precision. That is, the reaction occurs just after the information arrives because emotional reactions
occur quickly and without effort or volition.3 Emotional reactions are also transient, so they can
be reasonably assumed to begin and end at some point. This advantage is exploited in the two
chapters on health and job losses.
Second, the emotional reaction to any given type of situation or information is fairly regular
(Frijda 1988). For example, being cheated out of a desired goal almost invariably gives rise to
anger. Therefore, the type of emotion experienced by the subjects of research may be understood
by generalizing findings from related research and, to some extent, by introspection or theory of
mind. In addition, those people who experience an emotion often express it openly. The third
chapter makes use of data on lobbying messages sent by community members to policy makers,
which provides information about the intensity and valence of the emotional reaction to news about
2In particular, the early economists Jeremy Bentham and Adam Smith devoted substantial attention to emotion.
3However, there is always the possibility that some people may be privy to important information before it becomes
publicly known.
3a local change in economic policy.
Third, emotions have well-studied and regular behavioral and physiological effects (Frijda
1988). For example, anger gives rise to the desire to hurt the agent whose behavior triggered the
anger. This regularity, which effectively characterizes emotions, is referred to as an “action ten-
dency” or “action readiness.” The experience of stress is accompanied by an extensively-studied
physiological reaction discussed in chapters 2 and 3. The advantage of the regularity in both the
input and output sides of emotion is that the researcher can consider a helpfully stable mapping
between the information shock and observable outcomes (behavior or otherwise).
Fourth, the combination of the first three advantages gives the researcher some justification for
suspecting that the reaction will be present in a detectable amount. Due to the speed and input-
regularity of emotions, the same form of emotional reaction will often be experienced by a large
group of people at the same time. In addition, the reactors often tend to have the same interests and
characteristics (common environment and homophily). For example, everyone in a town has an
interest in the general economic conditions of the town. Alternatively, some people may express
their reaction and persuade others to agree with them (social influence). These factors tend to
concentrate the effects of the emotional reaction, or even amplify the effects, which may make the
effects easier to detect and study. This last advantage plays a key role in all three chapters.
These advantages serve as a counterargument to the view that emotions are unimportant be-
cause they are transient. One piece of the counterargument, already articulated by Loewenstein
(2000), is that visceral factors can influence people to take “extreme actions” (p. 429). But, poten-
tially more importantly, emotional reactions may also influence many people to all take an extreme
action at the same time. The regular input-output mapping involved in behavior, along with corre-
lated individual characteristics, means that any emotionally-charged broadcast to a group of people
is likely to generate highly correlated behaviors. In one such example, Deaton (2012) suggests that
during the recent financial crisis, the stock market indices may have been an especially salient
form of information about economic conditions, which then generated a strong correlation be-
tween market movements and self-reported, subjective well-being as measured by daily surveys.
Social interactions may also serve to amplify and prolong the reaction. Finally, the chapters on
birth outcomes suggest that even transient responses may have permanent effects on the next gen-
eration. These points show that emotional reactions may be especially important when an authority
4considers how it will release (broadcast) information to a large audience.
The remainder of the section discusses some additional and more domain-specific ways in
which incorporating emotional reactions contributed to the papers.
The second and third chapters were first inspired by an observation made by Matthew Rabin
in his short course at Caltech in 2011. He commented that in economic models the loss of a
job has almost no effect on the worker’s the present discounted value of lifetime earnings yet in
reality many people are terrified of job loss. This same puzzle is tackled in an extensive study
by Davis and von Wachter (2011). They show that even very recent, sophisticated models of the
labor market generate earnings losses far less than those seen in actual data. Using representative
survey data, they also document that workers’ worries about their economic futures are highly
attuned to economic conditions. Davis and von Wachter’s (2011) take-away is a great disconnect
between the standard models and the attention that unemployment receives: Unemployment is of
little consequence to a worker in a model, but it is among the most concerning issues in politics and
economics. Along the same lines, the strength of the emotional reaction to unemployment should
be a warning to anyone who would discount the costs of job loss, even if the emotion is regarded
as an inconsequential by-product—where there’s smoke, there’s fire.
The notion that something about the costs of job loss failed to add up is not new. In his short
paper “The Private and Social Costs of Unemployment,” Feldstein (1978) worked through a simple
numerical example in which he shows that, due to tax policies and benefits, unemployment would
have only a small negative effect on the net income of a worker. Regarding this “low private cost
of unemployment” (p. 156) as proven, he speculated that unemployment would be higher if not
for some puzzling force (possibly, social norms) dissuading people from taking transfer payments.
However, at that time research on the links between economic conditions and physical and
mental health was well under way. The short review “Health and Social Costs of Unemployment”
(Liem and Rayman 1982) covers the research in the 1970s and early 1980s with particular attention
on stressful life events and mental health. This line of research grew into a very large literature
with contributions from researchers in economics, health, and psychology. A recent meta-analysis
included over 300 studies on unemployment and mental health outcomes such as distress, de-
pression, anxiety, and subjective well-being (Paul and Moser 2009). Stress features prominently
in Sullivan and von Wachter’s (2009) report of enormous effects of job loss on mortality. Thus,
5aside from the debate over the magnitude of earnings losses, this research indicates that there are
substantial psychological and physiological costs to job loss.
Finally, we turn to the chapter on punishment and social media. Being a relatively new technol-
ogy, social media is the subject of only a nascent literature. A variety of “real-life” events suggested
the importance of punishment. Appendix Table 1.10 (on page 56 of the main matter) describes 48
selected cases of punishment and public shaming that substantially involved the Internet. These
examples show social media being used to pressure prominent leaders, demand changes in business
practices, and to publicly shame individuals for small transgression. Executives have been forced
to resign, and companies have been shut down. These examples are not isolated incidents but
rather pieces of a pattern to which businesses are now responding. For example, the online review
site Yelp has adapted its moderating operations and scans for potentially viral news events in order
to mitigate the problem of attacks against specific restaurants, which have frequently overwhelmed
legitimate reviews (McKeever 2015). Yelp’s business model depends on voluntary contributions to
a public good, which forces the company to handle a double-edged sword: cooperative individuals
are also highly punitive against those who violate norms (Falk et al. 2005).
These events are characterized by very intense, rapidly-forming, punitive responses by a large
number of individuals. The responses often arise from relatively inconsequential or localized viola-
tions. It is difficult to reconcile this behavior with theories based entirely on stable, self-interested
preferences. However, the speed, intensity, and sociality of the responses strongly suggest that
emotion is critical.
The literature on punishment, even in economics, often attributes the behavior to anger or a
similar emotion, for example, indignation. These findings appear in self-reported data (Fehr and
Ga¨chter 2002) and in experimental manipulations (Grimm and Mengel 2011). However, without
some theory of what makes people angry, it is difficult to make predictions based on the relationship
between anger and punishment. The first chapter instead makes use of research showing that
communication and social media are also linked to anger. Anger spreads especially well through
social media (Fan et al. 2014; Berger andMilkman 2012; Berger 2011). Moreover, individuals who
see an antisocial behavior tend to experience negative emotions and can relieve those emotions by
sharing information about the antisocial behavior with a third-party (Feinberg et al. 2012b).
Putting these findings together suggests that introducing social media will have some facilitat-
6ing effect on punishment. The experiment found support for this prediction by exposing individuals
to new information about organizations (information shocks) either with or without social media.
The apparent asymmetry between punishing and rewarding behavior seems especially unlikely to
have been predicted without reflecting on the research about emotional motivations. Like the other
two chapters, a substantive economic relationship between two variables was found without having
to measure emotions. Nevertheless, better measurements of emotion-related variables would add
greatly to any similar studies conducted in the future.
Discussion of what was learned
The previous section lists several reasons why studying emotion-mediated effects is promising.
However, despite those reasons and the fact that economy-related stress may be the top stressor
among Americans, the effects reported in chapters 2 and 3 are fairly modest. The announcement
of a very large job loss event is associated with a decrease in the mean birth weight of less than
1 percent. These effects show little sign of extending beyond the county of the employer. In one
sense the effects are large and in another small. The effects from announcements of job losses
appear large when we note that they are similar in size to effects estimated in studies of natural and
man-made disasters (see Figure 2.3). This finding adds another piece of evidence that the costs of
job loss and economic change are greater than once thought.
In contrast, all of these seemingly extreme shocks appear to have smaller effects than several
more mundane factors, for example, maternal smoking and black race (also in Figure 2.3). How-
ever, it should not be concluded that the effects of shocks are unimportant. First, the largest effects
on birth weight (all losses > 100 grams) are associated with exposures measured at the individual
level, for example, the mother smoking, the mother being black, or birth after the father has lost
employment. The average effects in the area-wide shock studies probably mask large degrees of
heterogeneity.
Second, the effects on birth outcomes are just one piece of the (population-wide) stress re-
sponse. The fact that many papers in economics look at birth outcomes reflects the easy availabil-
ity of high quality birth data and economists’ long-standing interest in intergenerational mobility
7and human capital.4 A more complete accounting of the costs of any shock or stressor requires
considering more outcomes. Furthermore, these other outcomes or costs of a shocks may not be
highly correlated with the effects on birth outcomes. Figure 2.3 shows effects from a wide variety
of shocking events yet the birth weight losses are surprisingly similar. A very recent working paper
reports a few grams of lost birth weight in association Super Bowl wins—likely due to increased
tobacco and alcohol consumption (Duncan et al. 2015). Thus, one might conclude from the liter-
ature that almost any emotionally charged event with widespread attention will arrive along with
a small (a few grams or low double-digit grams) decrease in average birth weight within the af-
fected area regardless of the wider material and social consequences of the shock. This apparent
invariance is itself a puzzle to be explained.
An additional problem with studying average effects on birth outcomes is that these effects
are small relative to differences between different locations—even within the same country—and
unexplained time-trends (Donahue et al. 2010). Separating interesting effects from these large and
murky sources of variation can be statistically difficult. Finally, estimating these average effects is
of limited practical use. It is impractical to advise people to avoid disasters. Health care workers
might be usefully warned of an increase in the risk of poor birth outcomes in the aftermath of a
shock. But, it would be far more useful to provide information on which individuals are at the
greatest risk of a bad outcome and how they might avoid one.
These issues could be addressed with finer data on individuals’ responses. The traditional
way of collecting such data is a survey. However, when the event of interest is a surprise, a
prospective survey is almost impossible. A retrospective survey will be subject to recall errors.
Either case will suffer from the typical problems with self-reported data, which may be exacerbated
by stressful situations. Surveys are also expensive, and large sample sizes may be needed to find
the individuals that have strong responses to the stressor. One promising approach to understand
these responses—and the inputs to fetal development more broadly—is to collect relatively cheap,
high resolution data through mobile devices. Methods are being developed to allow inference
of emotional states from smartphone usage, for example, typing rates and shaking movements
4The enormous number of papers written based on birth data from the U.S. and elsewhere demonstrates the value
of systematically collecting data that covers every instance of some important phenomenon (in this case births). The
coverage of the data allows it to be merged with any other data source without worrying about selection. This has
allowed researchers document a great variety of different factors that influence birth outcomes.
8(Graham-Rowe 2012). Instrumented mobile devices may also allow researchers to understand how
pollution and other environmental exposures interact with stress and economic circumstances.5
Birth data may eventually be linked with large amounts of high-resolution data on activity, location,
noise levels, pollution, and other personal variables, but privacy concerns will certainly emerge.
One take-away from the last two chapters is that the effects of large-scale shocks on average
measurements of health may be smaller than expected. We see something similar in the chapter
on social media and punishment. One might predict that introducing social interaction would lead
to an enormous increase in punishing (or rewarding) behavior. However, the social condition only
had about 21 percent more instances of individuals inflicting punishment and 12 percent more
instances of reward, and neither difference is statistically significant. However, on average, the
net losses generated by punishment almost doubled. This increase depended on the emergence
of unpopular organizations that, due to social information, received concentrated punishment and
relatively few rewards. The social condition showed some evidence of an increase in the net effects
of rewards. Together these effects generated large increases in inequality across the organizations.
The substantial effects on the distribution of points but modest effect on the overall propensity
to punish or reward gives away the fact that attention is the main mechanism. The social effects
on rewarding behavior appear to result almost entirely from the attention-manipulating algorithm
used to dynamically construct the web page. Punishing behavior has some social influence that
goes beyond the algorithm, but these effects appear to relate largely to helping potential punishers
seek out unpopular organizations. The social condition also had no significant effect on the average
degree of self-reported anger. It is—at least in this setting—much easier to manipulate people’s
attention and where they direct their efforts than to persuade them to do more or less of some
action. Attention-related choices, to the extent that they can be called choices, are made under
weak incentives. The value of any potential object of attention cannot even be determined until
some attention has been directed to it. Without any information to distinguish the various objects
on a screen, attention will be determined by very weak influences, for example, small differences
in effort costs related to manipulating the window. Since potentially important choices follow
from where attention is directed, the ultimate consequences of small influences on attention may
5Small, inexpensive mobile devices for measuring pollution exposure are in development (Handwerk 2015), which
could help understand the effects of pre-natal exposure to air pollution (Currie et al. 2009) and the interaction of
maternal pollution exposure and poverty (Vishnevetsky et al. 2015).
9be disproportionate.
The role of attention also suggests an interpretation of two common tropes about the Internet
and society that seem incompatible: One is that social media has caused people to spend an in-
creasing amount of time looking at viral trivia like baby videos and humorous listicles. The other
is that social media encourages unending outrage and abuse (Thompson 2014). The results of
this experiment suggest instead that social media may function mostly to concentrate attention and
thereby increase the intensity and salience of any reaction, be it favorable or unfavorable. A more
subtle conclusion is that Internet use involves numerous choices made rapidly with little reflection
and little directly at stake, which makes factors like search costs—even miniscule ones—and vi-
sual presentation (“display effects”) relatively important and gives substantial influence to those
who design online interfaces and algorithms. The distribution of behavior will be shaped by the
incentives of the designers, the incentives and psychological characteristics of the users, and how
these variables interact to determine the design of online mechanisms. But, the importance of un-
predictable social events and interactions means the realizations of behavior may still be highly
variable and difficult for a designer to control.6
An important methodological lesson from the social media experiment is that it is possible
to create an experimental model of a complex media environment that is surprisingly realistic in
several ways. A couple of technical features stand out. First, the click rates of items on the page
show a pattern that is very similar to real Facebook data reported by Bakshy et al. (2015). Second,
the social treatment increased the total amount of time spent on the news page and increased the
probability that a participant would visit more than one news story. The business case for social
media is that it should increase the engagement of users. A failure to find this effect in the exper-
iment would raise doubts about whether the participants experienced experimental social media
in the same way they do real social media. Third, the participants’ behavior is broadly consistent
with related research. More educated participants viewed more news stories, which is a pattern
that also exists in the general population. College-educated participants were also more likely to
punish, a result also reported by Carpenter and Seki (2011) and Carpenter et al. (2004) (based
on Japanese fishermen and Thai and Vietnamese slum dwellers, respectively). Overall, about 50
6For example, in the setting of the experiment here, a designer wishing to increase average page views would
implement the social media condition rather than the independent condition. This choice would, as a “side effect,”
increase the mean and the variance of the distribution of net punishment.
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percent of participants in the present study punished at all during the experiment, which compares
well to the results from Fehr and Fischbacher (2004a), where about 45–60 percent of a sample of
Zurich college students punished.7 As discussed above, anger is thought to be an important cause
of punishment, and the participants in this experiment who reported experiencing more anger were
also more likely to have punished during the experiment.8 Finally, the participants who reported
engaging in some kind of protest activity before were more likely to inflict punishment in the
experiment.
This success is important because algorithms that infer preferences and guide choices are ubiq-
uitous and a topic of growing research (Kramer et al. 2014, for example,). However, few re-
searchers have sufficient access to social media data to conduct research, and the algorithms them-
selves are often secret (Lazer 2015). Chapter 1 demonstrates that simple tools and participants
recruited inexpensively can be used to create a useful model of these situations. The behavior
of the model agrees with important aspects of behavior in social media, in lab experiments, and
among the general population.
7However, see Guala (2012) for extensive discussion about the rate of punishers.
8Anthropological evidence shows a positive relation between market integration and the propensity to punish (Hen-
rich et al. 2010). An analogue to their market integration variable in industrialized societies is not obvious. However,
the present experiment’s results do show a suggestive (but not statistically significant) association between propen-
sity to punish and owning a smartphone, which might be thought of as a tool allowing much easier access to many
economic services.
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Chapter 1
Punishing and rewarding in an
experimental media environment
Abstract
The economic and political outcomes of organizations and leaders can be affected positively or
negatively by media coverage. The existing economics literature on media production and bias
treats media firms as producers and the public as consumers. However, social media technology
incorporates consumer behavior directly into the production of news coverage. The interactions
and preferences of numerous individuals can attract attention to specific events and frame the
coverage in a way that is helpful or harmful to the subject of coverage. This study experimentally
investigates individual choices to monetarily reward or punish non-profit organizations in response
to media coverage and how those choices influence the aggregate outcomes of the organizations.
In the control condition all participants are independent and receive news content from a static,
centralized source. The manipulation introduces a stylized form of social media in which (1)
the most attention-getting news content is made even more salient and (2) individuals’ reward-or-
punish behavior is made public. The introduction of social media is found to increase inequality
across the organizations along with the net effect and variability of punishment. These effects
are strongly driven by the attention-manipulating effects of the page construction algorithm which
tend to concentrate positive and negative actions. However, social information about punishment
generates additional effects by allowing participants to effectively target unpopular organizations.
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1.1. Introduction
Leaders, companies, and other organizations can be adversely affected by negative media cover-
age. Exposure of corrupt politicians can damage their electoral prospects (Ferraz and Finan 2008).
Hermitage Capital Management successfully pursues a “shaming” strategy to pressure corpora-
tions to correct governance violations (Dyck et al. 2008). The Catholic church’s sexual abuse
scandal caused substantial numbers of members to leave (Hungerman 2013). Media firms’ behav-
ior reflects an understanding of these effects. For example, media firms bias their coverage in favor
of the advertisers on which they depend for revenue (Di Tella and Franceschelli 2011; Gurun and
Butler 2012). Thus, to understand the prospects of influential leaders and organizations, we must
understand the production of media coverage. In particular, we should know how media processes
cause a particular organization to (1) receive more or less attention from the public and (2) be de-
picted in a more positive or negative way. Social media is a new technology with great capacity to
draw attention to events and shape discussion about them. This study experimentally investigates
how introducing a stylized form of social media into a news environment affects the organizations
which are subject to coverage. The topic of technological development in the media market is first
on the list of promising research agendas in Prat and Stro¨mberg’s (2011) survey of the political
economy of media. Their survey notes specifically the lack of research on news media and the
Internet.
Research on media and political economy predominantly takes the approach of treating media
outlets as producers and members of the public as consumers. Often, in addition to choosing media
consumption, each consumer has some other decision to make related to policy outcomes, e.g.,
voting. A common concern is bias, that is, selection by a media outlet of what issues are covered,
what aspects of the issues are covered, how facts are framed, and how to comment on issues (Prat
and Stro¨mberg 2011). This framework gives the decision about bias to the firm, although it will be
subject to equilibrium effects.
However, the standard framework is challenged by the Internet media market with social media.
Decisions about bias are no longer solely the domain of the media outlet. Consumers and large
portals, e.g., aggregators and social networks, are integral parts of the Internet media market, and
they influence all aspects of bias listed above. In this context, we can identify two important
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features that are missing from the standard framework.
First, consumers’ behavior directly enters into the production function of web news. That is,
consumers contribute to media products by adding commentary to content on news websites or to
links posted on social networks. These comments typically add a positive or negative perspective.
Some sites provide features designed to allow users to display their opinion, for example, “Likes”
on Facebook or voting on Reddit. In addition, many media sites publicly display aggregate mea-
sures of their users’ behavior, e.g., by publishing “trending” topics or listing the most-viewed or
most-shared stories. Audience data is also used to dynamically change particular pieces of content
or their salience on the site. For example, a popular news story may be made more salient by
increasing its size and changing its position on the site. Features which draw attention to certain
items and make them easy to encounter are especially important because the amount of content
produced is far greater than anyone can consume. When numerous options are available, the visual
accessibility of the options is known to influence attention and choice (display effects) (Reutskaja
et al. 2011).
Second, media consumers often access media content suggested by third parties, which can
influence the relative attention given to different events or perspectives. News sites receive about
20 percent of their traffic from links on Facebook, which are posted by users or displayed by
a “personalized” recommender system (Somaiya 2014). This dynamic reduces the news site’s
ability to influence the audience’s attention. Instead, the audience’s attention will be influenced by
social sharing of links and complex, opaque algorithms. The sharing behavior depends on millions
of interacting individuals, making it potentially much more complicated than bias produced by a
single firm.
These facts mean that to understand the political and economic roles of the media, we must
understand how social media technology and individual behavior interact. The relevant consumer
behaviors are often made subject to unusual types of motivations that are difficult to model or
predict. That is, the choice to share or consume a piece of news content is subject to emotions,
such as surprise, anger, or boredom and also concerns for social image, political preferences, and
social norms (Berger and Milkman 2012; Berger 2011; Barasch and Berger 2014). In particu-
lar, negative news coverage of leaders and organizations often generates consumer responses that
resemble third-party punishment as studied in the social preferences literature, which further in-
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volves emotional and social motivations (Carpenter and Matthews 2012; Fehr and Fischbacher
2004a; Coffman 2011).
This study aims to shed light on the role of social media technology using model societies that
are simple enough to remain tractable yet still incorporate several important features of the actual
media market. First, each model society is composed of numerous individuals with access to me-
dia content. Second, each society includes prominent organizations which are subject to coverage
in the media. Third, in addition to consuming media content, each consumer can take actions that
have positive or negative effects on the organizations. The experimental manipulation introduces
a stylized form of social media with two features: (1) the behavior of users determines the relative
salience of the pieces of news content, and (2) the users’ positive and negative actions towards each
organization are made public. In addition, the study runs multiple instances of each society with
identical initial conditions but a different random sample of participants. This method, dubbed
“multiple worlds” by Salganik et al. (2006), allows examination of the distribution of aggregate
outcomes. By experimenting on these model societies, the study addresses several questions. First,
how does the technology used to provide media content influence the outcomes of the organiza-
tions? Second, how does the technology influence the behavior of the individual consumers? Third,
how does individual behavior interact with technology? In particular, the study helps us understand
differences between positive and negative behaviors towards the organizations.
The results reveal that the addition of social information into the media environment has two
main effects. First, the organizations covered by the news content become more unequal in their
outcomes. This effect occurs mainly because the social condition concentrates positive and nega-
tive actions. Organizations that have been affected by positive or negative behavior are more likely
to be the subject of further actions. At the individual level this herding-like behavior is mostly
driven by the page-construction algorithm, which sorts the most viewed stories to the top of the
page where they receive more attention. The social effects of punishment and reward are almost en-
tirely eliminated once the effect of the sorting algorithm is accounted for. Second, under the social
condition the net effects of punishment in a given world tend to be greater on average but also more
variable. At the individual level two behaviors contribute to the increase in net punishment. Social
information allows individuals to seek out and target relatively unpopular organizations even when
they are rare in comparison to popular organizations. In addition, negative social information has
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some strong effects that go beyond the sorting algorithm. Participants that view any given story are
significantly more likely to punish and less like to reward if that story was punished by previous
participants. A similar social effect of reward is not found, which suggests that negative actions
can have special social effects.
1.2. Background
1.2.1. Mechanisms of media influence
Media may influence behavior through several mechanisms. The most obvious is a simple infor-
mation and learning effect. Media coverage provides new information to an individual who then
updates their beliefs and behaves differently. Another similar mechanism, which can be difficult to
distinguish, is persuasion. Persuasion can be modeled with rational, Bayesian agents (Kamenica
and Gentzkow 2011), which is not distinct from an information and learning mechanism. Per-
suasion as a distinct mechanism is sometimes considered to be learning that is erroneous in some
way, for example, by failing to correctly account for the incentives or bias of a persuader (Cain
et al. 2005; DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007). Persuasion can also be conceptualized as a change in
preferences (see, for example, Yanagizawa-Drott 2014). Another mechanism is limited attention.
Individuals may have a limited capacity to be influenced by new information, and the media may
bias attention towards certain pieces of information and away from others.
Rational learning and persuasion are two candidate mechanisms for media influence, particu-
larly in the political economy literature. However, definitively distinguishing the two mechanisms
is difficult. DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) exploit geographic variation in the rollout of Fox News
to show that access before the year 2000 resulted in greater vote share for Republican candidates.
They attribute this effect chiefly to ideological persuasion. In a small field experiment Gerber
et al. (2009) document an ideologically leftward shift when the voter is offered a free newspaper
subscription. Their evidence is more consistent with a learning effect than persuasion. Pure in-
formation or learning mechanisms also appear in research on financial markets and the timing of
local media coverage (Engelberg and Parsons 2011). Research in finance has also looked at the
“sentiment” of media content—the positive or negative orientation of the text—which may operate
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in a similar way to learning and persuasion (see, for example, Tetlock 2007). Finally, Stro¨mberg
(2004) show that U.S. counties with greater radio broadcast audiences received more federal fund-
ing under the New Deal. This effect may reflect self-interested policy makers perceiving radio
listeners as being more informed.
The attentional mechanism is also supported by numerous studies. In an event-based design,
Eisensee and Stro¨mberg (2007) study the effects of competition between newsworthy events for
public attention. Using two empirical designs, they show that disasters receive less aid from the
United States when they face greater competition for television airtime. Gentzkow (2006) argues
that the introduction of television, “crowded out” consumption of local radio and newspapers,
which in turn decreased turnout in local elections. The nationwide marketing of the New York
Times may have had similar effects (George and Waldfogel 2006). Olkean (2009) reports that
improved television access decreased social capital and community activities in Javan villages.
These effects may be viewed as manifestations of limited attention. Research in finance documents
similar effects. Even highly incentivized and experienced investors have limited attention. Market
behavior is sensitive to the timing of important announcements made at publicly known times
(Dellavigna and Pollet 2009; Hirshleifer et al. 2009). Shifting the attention of investors appears
to be one of the important roles of media coverage in financial markets (Barber and Odean 2008).
Huberman and Regev (2001) document a stark case in which a news article drew attention to
previously published cancer research and thereby generated enormous effects in biotech trading.
Unlike the present experiment, these studies do not consider whether positive and negative news
might have different effects on attention.
1.2.2. Negative publicity
Research indicates that negative media coverage can generate substantial effects across a variety of
political and economic domains, including elected and autocratic leaders, corporations, and non-
profit organizations. Negative publicity is often interpreted in terms of ethics or morality. However,
media coverage may also simply convey negative information about the quality of a product. The
literature offers limited evidence about whether negative publicity functions by attracting attention,
persuading individuals to take action, or some other mechanism.
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Ferraz and Finan (2008) provide evidence on the effects of publicizing corruption by exploit-
ing a government policy that published randomized audits of elected officials. Officials revealed
as corrupt are significantly and substantially less likely to be re-elected. These effects are ampli-
fied by the presence of local radio broadcasters. The authors attribute this effect to the voters’
new information about the officials, which leads them to punish corrupt officials by voting against
them. The study cannot say whether the voters were motivated by an interest in the quality of
government (potentially purely self-interested) or retribution (social preferences). Several studies
examine the effects of “name and shame” campaigns against human rights abuses by governments.
These campaigns are reported to (1) decrease violence and abuse (Krain 2012; Murdie and Davis
2012), (2) decrease foreign direct investment in the target countries (Barry et al. 2013), (3) increase
the probability of humanitarian intervention (Murdie and Peksen 2014), and (4) increase the prob-
ability of economic sanctions (Murdie and Peksen 2013; Peksen et al. 2014). It should, however,
be noted that these studies do not have exogenous variation on shaming campaigns. Human rights
organizations and media are unlikely to launch randomized shaming campaigns but rather behave
in a strategic manner (Wright and Escriba`-Folch 2009; DeMeritt 2012). Media can also serve to
increase levels of violence. Yanagizawa-Drott’s (2014) study of the Rwandan Genocide reports
that villages with better radio reception engaged in greater levels of militia violence, which is at-
tributed to (1) a propaganda-fueled boost in preference for ethnic violence or (2) information about
the (low) likelihood of punishment by authorities. Dellavigna et al. (2014) also report that radio
broadcasts can trigger ethnic hatred.
Dyck et al. (2008) analyze Hermitage Capital Management’s “shaming” attacks against Rus-
sian corporations. They report that Hermitage’s actions drew media attention to corporate gover-
nance violations, which then prompted action by the corporation or the intervention of a regulator.
The mechanism depended on international media coverage, as opposed to domestic, which sug-
gests that the relevant leaders aim to protect their reputations with international lenders or business
partners. These results are robust to using Hermitage’s portfolio as an instrument for shaming
attacks. Another study from the finance literature uses content analysis of Wall Street Journal
analysis to show a link between pessimistic sentiment and decreases in the Dow Jones index (Tet-
lock 2007).
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Hungerman (2013) shows that scandals can also have substantial effects on non-profit organiza-
tions. They report that membership in the Catholic church stopped growing following widespread
allegations of child sexual abuse. Surprisingly, the members shifted predominantly to Baptist
churches. The scandal may have also decreased the number of Catholic schools and enrollment in
them (Dills and Herna´ndez-Julia´n 2012).
Research on consumer goods provides evidence that negative publicity can decrease demand.
Although product reviews generally do not have the ethical or moral component involved in scan-
dals, these results still show that consumers are responsive to negative information (Brown et al.
2012; Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Basuroy et al. 2003; Reinstein and Snyder 2005). However,
Berger et al. (2010) argue that negative publicity can sometimes benefit a company if the effect of
added publicity outweighs the negativity.
1.2.3. Motivations for sharing and punishment
The topic negative publicity is especially important when considering the possibility that infor-
mation transmitted over social media could spur individuals to action. Both social information
transmission and punishment behavior are motivated by negative emotions. Media content with
emotional charge, especially anger, is more likely to be shared (Berger and Milkman 2012), and
anger is especially contagious between social media users (Fan et al. 2014). Generally, emotion
and physical arousal increase sharing of media content (Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan 2013; Berger
2011).
Similarly, research from several angles shows close links between punishment and negative
emotion. In economics experiments, numerous researchers have linked punishment behavior to
negative emotions, especially anger, spite, and indignation (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004b; Bosman
et al. 2001; Bosman and Van Winden 2002; Carpenter and Matthews 2012; Frank 1988; Sanfey
et al. 2003). The strongest evidence of a causal effect comes from adding “cooling off” periods
to punishment games, which reduces the propensity to punish (Grimm and Mengel 2011; Neo
et al. 2013; Wang et al. 2011). Individuals also make trade-offs between costly punishment and
“costless” verbal punishment, indicating that the underlying motivation may be to express negative
emotions about a norm violation or inflict psychological pain on the transgressor (Xiao and Houser
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2005). Dictators (in the dictator game) are also willing to make larger offers in order to avoid being
subjected to verbal punishment by the receiver (Xiao and Houser 2009).
Research in marketing links punitive consumer behaviors, for example, boycotts, to “consumer
outrage,” a reaction involving moral emotions and perceived violations of norms (Lindenmeier
et al. 2012).
Finally, sharing negative information about a particular individual (or organization) can serve
as a form of punishment against that individual. Sharing can be seen simply as increasing the
audience and effectiveness of negative publicity. This interpretation fits well within the literature
on norm enforcement, where gossip can be considered a form of low-cost punishment (Feinberg
et al. 2012a). However, an individual may inflict punishment by spreading negative publicity even
without the intention of actually punishing. Sharing may be motivated by a desire for attention or
to provide useful information to friends. This situation is similar to a news company that publishes
a damaging expose´ or Hermitage Capital Management, both of which are ultimately motivated by
profit. Thus, we might view negative publicity targeting a corrupt leader as a form of collective
action. The collective action problem can be solved as a side effect of news outlets or individuals
responding to private incentives (Olson 1965).
1.3. Experimental design
1.3.1. Motivation
The experiment is designed to capture individuals’ positive and negative behavior toward non-
profit organizations. The environment is tractable but rich enough to involve both attention and
social influence, which are the two main mechanisms identified in the political economic literature
on media. First, limited attention is relevant because the number of participants and stories is fairly
large. Reutskaja et al. (2011) find substantial attention-related effects with 16 options whereas the
present experiment has 24 stories. Second, persuasion is potentially operative because participants
can send positive and negative signals. In addition, the stories were selected to be controversial
and unusual, which leaves room for the participants to be swayed. However, it must be noted
that the experiment is not designed to disentangle the mechanisms involved in social influence and
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attention. That goal would require a set of much narrower and more tightly controlled experi-
ments. Instead the design is intended to test how the introduction of social media affects economic
outcomes when attention and social influence are at work.
The wealth (in points) of the organizations is the main economic outcome. The presence of
these organizations also constitutes an important contribution over studies that examine only the
behavior of media consumers or social media users. The individuals are only allowed to influence
points by punishing or rewarding (by 10 points) or doing nothing. This design is the simplest
one that captures variation in the motivation to take action at all and the polarity of the action.
The points correspond to real monetary payoffs so that the participants are incentivized under
other-regarding preferences. The addition and subtraction of points is conceptualized as a highly
stylized form of reward and punishment. Corresponding naturally-occurring behaviors include
fund-raising campaigns, public praise, politically-motivated patronization of businesses, boycotts,
vigilante activities, harassment, shaming, posting negative reviews, and protesting.
1.3.2. Overview
Participants in the experiment were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Each participant
was informed that completion of the experiment consisted of: (1) viewing a news web page with
headlines of 24 real stories about non-profit organizations, (2) visiting 1–9 of the 24 stories,1 and
(3) completing a brief questionnaire. Subjects could optionally make choices to affect the payoffs
of the 24 distinct non-profit organizations discussed in the stories. However, each subject that
completed the study, which takes about 3–10 minutes, received only a fixed payment of exactly
$0.75.
1.3.3. Payoffs to non-profits
Each of the 24 non-profit organizations was endowed with 300 points. At the end of the experiment
a single organization was selected uniformly at random. That organization’s points were converted
to money at the rate of 10 points = $0.30 and sent to the organization as a donation. The participants
1The most important part of this requirement is that the participant visit at least one story. The upper bound of nine
was intended to prevent any one participant from having a large influence on a given world. Based on pilot testing, the
upper bound was expected to bind for very few participants.
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could change each organization’s amount of points without incurring a cost (other than a very
small amount of time and effort). Specifically, each news story contained a menu which allowed
the reader to optionally add or subtract exactly 10 points from the organization described in the
story. Since each participant was allowed to read up to nine stories, a participant could affect, at
most, the expected payoff of nine organizations. The parameters were designed such that within
any independent session (world) no organization could go below 0 points or above 600 points.
1.3.4. Design of the news website
The stories used in the website were taken from a variety of popular news websites. A preliminary
sample of recent stories about non-profit organizations was collected. These stories were rated by
a separate group on Mechanical Turk on various dimensions, for example, the extent to which the
subject experienced anger and interestingness. These ratings were used to construct the final set
of stories posted on the website. The stories were selected so that interestingness was moderate to
high and within-story anger ratings had moderate to high variance. High within-story variance in
anger ratings is interpreted as an indicator of controversy. Since choices from a visual menu are
strongly influenced by the position of the items, the initial order of the stories was randomized.
Just as at a normal website, subjects could view a news story by clicking the headline. The
full-text of each story would then be displayed.2 Unlike a typical news site, each story was ac-
companied by a sidebar with the name of the non-profit organization and neutral description of the
organization, which was usually adapted from wikipedia.org. Below the description the subject
could click a button to add 10 points or a button to subtract 10 points from the named organization.
Subjects could also cancel or reverse this decision.
The website’s menu bar contained a drop-down display where the participant could check how
many stories he had viewed and how many points he had added and subtracted. After viewing at
least one story, a “Survey” button would become available. This button allowed the participant to
go to the final step of the experiment, which was to complete a questionnaire.
The news website was created using Meteor (https://www.meteor.com/), which is a
cutting-edge framework for developing web applications, and hosted on a DigitalOcean server.
2Some stories were truncated so that the typical length was about 500 words. Truncation was done so as to avoid
changing interpretation of the story.
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FIGURE 1.1: Screenshot of the top of the news website in the social condition.
This approach made it relatively simple to give the site a modern design and high performance.
Users tend to become frustrated and leave websites that have poor design or functionality. There-
fore, good design is important to minimize participant attrition and selection bias. A natural-
looking site is also important for encouraging the participants to behave as they would at a real
news site.
1.3.5. Multiple-worlds structure and experimental conditions
The experiment uses the multiple-worlds structure proposed by Salganik et al. (2006). This struc-
ture puts participants in groups or worlds, but each world is independent of all others. This design
generates independent realizations of random group-level outcomes even when individuals are
allowed to interact. Each world has the same initial conditions (other than the identities of the par-
ticipants). In this case, the conditions are (1) the stories and non-profit organizations on the news
site, (2) the order of the stories on the page, and (3) the endowments of the organizations. Each
world is composed of 30 participants who participant sequentially. There is no temporal overlap
among participants in a given world. If a participant did not complete the study, then their data
would not be incorporated into the world. Effectively they would never have existed as far as other
participants were concerned.3
The experiment contained a social condition and an independent (control) condition. In the
social condition, a participant could see several aspects of the behavior of all previous participants
(within his own world only). Each headline on the website displayed (1) the number of previous
views, (2) the current total points of the organization in the story, (3) the number of points added,
3Nevertheless, the attrition rate was low due to ease, interestingness, and high earnings per unit time.
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and (4) the number of points subtracted. Each subject was also informed about how many partic-
ipants had gone before them. In addition, during the social condition the position of the headlines
on the page was determined by the number of views. The headlines were arranged in decreas-
ing order, so that the most-viewed story was at the top. Ties were broken according to the initial
random ordering. The organizations’ points had no role in ordering the headlines.
In the independent condition no participant received any information about the behavior of
other participants. Each participant was presented with an identical version of the webpage. The
study is based on 12 social worlds and 4 independent worlds.
1.3.6. Similar studies
The design of this experiment draws on that of Salganik et al. (2006). They created a website where
individuals could download music without charge. Their experiment involved a social condition
in which (1) each participant could see how many times each song had been downloaded and (2)
the songs were sorted so that the most popular songs appeared at the top of the screen. In the
independent condition the participants had no information about downloads by other users, and
the order of the songs was randomized for each participant. Multiple instances, or “worlds,” of
the website under both conditions were run independently. The main result is that in the social
condition the popularity of songs was more unequal and unpredictable than in the independent
condition.
The present study provides an extension and addresses a confound in Salganik et al. (2006).
The extension is to allow for both positive and negative behavior (rewarding and punishing) instead
of just a positive behavior (downloading a song). In addition, Salganik et al. (2006) link popularity
to the positive behavior, whereas the present study uses page views as a measure of popularity. My
design is therefore symmetric with respect to the positive and negative behaviors. The confounding
issue in Salganik et al. (2006) is that the visual ordering of the songs within a given world was far
more stable under the social condition than under the independent condition. This occurs because
the social condition sorted songs by popularity whereas the independent condition sorted songs
randomly across subjects. In a social world, most subjects towards the later part of the run saw
the songs in a very similar order. The stability itself can greatly increase inequality across songs
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because a few songs will tend to remain at the top of the page where they will receive more
attention. The present design fixes the news story order across all subjects in the independent
condition. In that way, the design is actually somewhat biased against finding greater inequality in
social condition. Nevertheless, that result still appears.
My design also draws on common features in the experimental economics literature. In typical
experiments on punishment the participants are given an endowment by the experimenter. Pun-
ishment corresponds to a participant destroying the endowment of another (see, for example, Fehr
and Fischbacher 2004a), which is precisely how punishment occurs in this design. Finally, in my
design some players are organizations which have no choice to make. This feature is borrowed
from the “representative dictator game” of Carpenter et al. (2008), in which participants play as a
dictator with a non-profit organization.
1.3.7. Instructions to the participants
Participants were informed that they would view the news site as part of a “group” of 30 individ-
uals. That is, they were told that their points over choices would be summed with those of the
29 others in the group to determine the final total points for each organization. They were fully
informed about the payoff structure for the non-profit organizations.
An important difference from many lab experiments is that the instruction page was identical
for both experimental conditions. In a web experiment the risk of attrition is higher than in a lab,
and participants might select out of the experiment due to the content or length of the instructions.4
To mitigate this problem, all participants saw the same instructions page, which informed them of
(1) the basic nature of the news page, (2) the payoff structure of organizations, (3) the fact that they
were in a group of 30, and (4) the necessary and sufficient conditions to complete the study, that
is, visit 1–9 stories and then complete the questionnaire. Additional information about the social
condition was provided through tooltips attached to the objects that displayed the organizations
points. The social conditional also included a small, collapsible banner explaining succinctly how
the headlines were sorted.
Some participants on Mechanical Turk select out of tasks because they worry that their per-
4A total of 549 users entered the experiment. Of those, 506 reached the news headline page, and 480 subsequently
finished. Therefore, the attrition rate upon reaching the headline page was 5.1 percent.
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formance and pay may be low. This behavior could introduce selection on confidence or risk
preferences. Therefore, the instructions also emphasized that the experiment does not have “right”
or “wrong” answers and that each participant would be paid so long as they completed the basic
requirements. Each subject had to also answer three questions about the instructions to demon-
strate understanding of the payoffs and conditions of completion. Upon proceeding to the news
headline page, a pop-up window reiterated that the subject had only to visit 1–9 stories and that it
was entirely optional to add or subtract points.
1.3.8. Technical aspects of recruitment
Several aspects of the study, including recruitment, were designed so that subjects could not repeat-
edly participate in the study nor begin the study and then complete it at a later time. The purpose
of this design is to make the study resemble a situation where many individuals participate a single
time, each within one brief interval of time.
Several methods were used to control the recruitment process. Amazon’s built-in filter was
used to allow only participants located in the United States. However, some subjects outside the
United States are able to deceive Amazon’s system. Therefore, the server hosting the experiment
also geocoded each participant’s IP address using two different geocoding services. Any visitor
with a foreign IP address was blocked from participating. In addition, most Turkers from outside
the U.S. are based in India. So the study was run only during the day in the U.S., when people in
India were sleeping. Pilot studies and monitoring of the server indicated that these measures were
very effective at preventing illegitimate participation. Inspection of the open-ended responses on
the survey revealed little sign of anyone who was not a native speaker of American English.
Each potential participant at Mechanical Turk was given a one-time use link to the study’s
website. They were advised that if they followed the link, they would not be able to make any
other attempt on the study and would not be able to leave the site and return later. Any subject
that followed the link would have their Amazon Worker ID and IP address logged. Any future
participant with a matching ID or IP address would be prevented from participating.
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1.4. Models and statistical procedures
1.4.1. Model of individual choices
The analysis of choices is conducted using pooled logit models. For expositional simplicity, con-
sider that the dataset generated by a single world is structured as a participant-by-story panel with
Nw K data points, where Nw = 30 is the number of participants in a single world and K = 24
is the number of stories. Note that in the analysis the worlds will be pooled. Let Yik 2 f0; 1g be
a binary outcome variable for the i-th participant in the world. For example, we may have that
Yik indicates if participant i viewed story k. At the time that participant i visits the news headline
page, each headline item k can be characterized by a vector xik potentially consisting of: (1) the
position of the headline on the page, (2) the number of previous views of the corresponding story,
(3) the number of points added, and (4) the number of points subtracted. Each participant i is then
modelled as making 24 binary choices with the characteristics xi = (xik)k=1;:::;24. We specify the
model
P(Yik = 1jxik) = (sk + x0ik); (1.1)
where sk is a story-specific parameter (estimated by including dummy variables in the regression).
A typical component of xik will be the position xi;k;1 of headline k on the news page when
viewed by participant i. The case xi;k;1 = 1 means that story k was at the top of the page when
viewed by i, while xi;k;1 = 24 means the story was at the bottom of the page. Note that the series
fxi;k;1 : i = 1; : : : ; 30g represents the position of a particular story k on the web page over time,
which will potentially change according the the viewing choices of the 30 participants. The coef-
ficient on xi;k;1 represents the influence of the headline’s visual position. We expect that headlines
at the bottom of the page are less likely to be viewed, so the coefficient should be negative. In the
social condition, the positions of the headlines can change from subject to subject depending on
the number of views for each story. This feature allows the effect of position to be identified even
when the story-specific parameters fsk : k = 1; : : : ; 24g are included in the model. However, in
independent condition the stories do not vary in position. Therefore, the position effect cannot be
estimated using only data from the independent condition. This limitation is operative in several
of the models used but does not cause any serious problems.
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The vector of story characteristics xik will also include some components that represent, in
aggregate, the points-related choices of all the participants in the world prior to i. For example,
xi;k;2 might represent the sum of all rewards to story k. That is
xi;k;2 :=
i 1X
j=1
rjk; (1.2)
where rjk = 10 if participant j rewarded the organization in story k (added 10 points).5 A similar
measure can be defined based on the variable pjk, which equals 10 if and only if participant j
punished the organization in story k (subtracted 10 points). The coefficients on these variables are
designed to represent social influences. For example, we would like a positive coefficient on xi;k;2
to reflect that previous decisions to reward k will (causally) influence a subsequent participant
to also reward k. However, in order to have this interpretation, we must include the story-specific
effects sk in the model. If the statistical model omitted these effects, the estimates of the coefficient
on xi;k;2 (or any other points-related effect) might merely reflect the story-specific effect. This bias
would be equivalent to claiming to identify an effect of social influence when in fact the effect is
caused by a common environment. In this context, the “environment” is the news story itself.
One concern is that the model requires that each participant i makes independent choices
(Yi;1; : : : ; Yi;24). However, in this application we might suspect that a participant may sample a
variety of choices. In addition, the requirement that the participant read at least one story may
induce dependence between the choices. To mitigate this concern, we estimate standard errors
which are robust to within-subject clustering. The analysis will show that social influences can be
“diluted,” that is, the social effect of punishment/reward (on any particular story) decreases when
other stories have also been punished or rewarded. To account for this effect many of the models
will include terms that allow for a decay of social effects over the course of the experiment. That
approach can be thought of as modeling the contextual effects on each subject’s choices.
Another concern regards inference when participants interact in groups, which creates depen-
dencies between the participants. The typical solution is to use standard errors clustered by the
group. However, in this design we have only 4, 12, or 16 groups, which does not meet conven-
5In some models we will also use an indicator variable like xi;k;2 := If
Pi 1
j=1 rjk > 0g, which is simply a dummy
variable that indicates if any previous participant rewarded story k.
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tional levels for the quality of the asymptotic approximations. The alternative approach is again to
model the dependencies by incorporating variables accounting for the interactions and then assum-
ing independence conditional on the covariates. Appendix Tables 1.18 and 1.19 compare standard
errors that are clustered by participant and by world. The models are the same ones displayed
in Table 1.4 below. These results show that the standard errors clustered by world can be larger
or smaller than those clustered by participant. In general, standard errors clustered by world are
somewhat larger but similar in magnitude. The second table (1.19) includes page position controls,
which should further control for subject inter-dependencies. That modification makes the two sets
of standard errors even closer, supporting the argument that modeling the dependencies can im-
prove inference. The analysis will use clustering by participant because the two approaches give
similar results and the number of worlds is small.
1.4.2. Statistical procedures for the world-level analysis
1.4.2.1. Motivation of the metrics
We aim to define a few simple metrics that characterize the overall state of the organizations in a
given world. These metrics can be calculated after each participant (“time period”) of a world or
at the end of the world as a final summary outcome. This passage provides some motivation and
intuition for the metrics used in the study. The next sub-section provides mathematical definitions
for the metrics.
An important characteristic of a world is the inequality of the organizations’ points. Salganik
et al. (2006) report a large, positive effect of social information on the inequality of downloads
across songs within a given instance of a market. Their design is similar to this study. The songs
correspond to organizations, and the downloads correspond to points. This suggests that the social
condition should increase inequality. Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of points using a realistic
but stylized data set. The data can be taken to represent (1) the final points after all 30 participants
in the world or (2) an intermediate “snapshot” of the data before the world has been completed.
The case of zero inequality corresponds to a perfectly flat, black line, which indicates that all
organizations have the same number of points. As the black line diverges from zero, the inequality
increases. The measure of inequality used is the Theil index as described below.
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However, Salganik et al.’s (2006) study included only one type of behavior, downloading a
song. The present study has two types of behavior, punishing and rewarding, which can each con-
tribute to inequality. Therefore, we would like to have measures of the overall effects of punishing
and rewarding which relate to inequality. The metrics net punishment and net reward quantify the
contributions of punishment and reward to changes in wealth levels and, therefore, to inequality.6
Another interpretation of the net metrics is that they reflect clustering of behavior with respect
to stories. For example, suppose that reward choices are uniformly distributed over the 24 stories.
If many participants “coordinated” to punish a particular story k, then the net punishment against k
would probably be large because the total points subtracted from k would be larger than the points
added to k. However, if the participants distributed the same number of punishment choices over
many different stories, then it is likely that in many cases the subtractions will be “canceled out”
by the additions. Then the net punishment could be zero.
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FIGURE 1.2: Illustration of the three world-level metrics (stylized data)
6The total amounts of punishment and reward do not reflect how punishment and reward can nullify each other’s
effects. Therefore, the total amounts have an ambiguous relation to inequality.
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1.4.2.2. Definitions of metrics
Let w = 1; : : : ;W index worlds in the experiment and iw = 1; : : : ; 30 index the players in world
w. Let the reward and punishment variables be riw;k and piw;k, respectively. They represent the
amount of points added or subtracted by a subject. The variable riw;k takes the value 10 (ten) if
participant iw rewarded story k and 0 otherwise. The variable piw;k is defined analogously.
Definition 1 The wealth (points) inequality of the organizations in a given world is measured by
the Theil index, which is given by
Th(v) :=
1
24
24X
k=1
vk
v
log
vk
v

; (1.3)
where v = (vk)k=1;:::;24 is the vector of points for each of the 24 organizations. The mean of
points is v = 1
24
P24
k=1 vk. A larger Theil index indicates that the distribution of points among the
organizations is more unequal.
Definition 2 The net reward of story k is given by
Rk :=
 
30X
i=1
riw;k   piw;k
!+
; (1.4)
where the notation (x)+ means the positive part of x. The (interim) net reward after n participants
can be calculated in the same way by summing over i = 1; : : : ; n.
Definition 3 The net punishment of story k is given by
Pk :=
 
30X
i=1
piw;k   riw;k
!+
: (1.5)
Note that for any given story k, at most one of Rk and Pk can be non-zero. The (interim) net
punishment after n participants can be calculated in the same way by summing over i = 1; : : : ; n.
Definition 4 The net reward in world w is given by
Rw :=
24X
k=1
Rk: (1.6)
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Notice that the net reward in a particular world is the net increase in wealth (points) among the
set of stories that were rewarded more than they were punished (story-wise).
Definition 5 The net punishment in world w is given by
Pw :=
24X
k=1
Pk: (1.7)
The net reward is the net loss of wealth (points) among the set of stories that were punished more
than they were rewarded (story-wise).
1.4.2.3. Estimators of world-level metrics
The distribution of aggregate outcomes of independent-condition worlds can be estimated by re-
sampling individual participants. Let there be data forW independent worlds. Then there is a data
set D composed of 30W independent participants. For any world-level metricM let F M be the
distribution ofM generated by drawing a subsample of size 30 from D without replacement.
The re-sampling estimator of the expected value of metricM is computed fromB sub-sampled
worlds fMb : b = 1; : : : ; BgwhereMb iid F M . The estimator is M = 1B
PB
b=1M

b . The estimator
of the variance is 2M =
1
B
PB
b=1(M

b   M)2. The simulation results in the appendix show that,
compared to the conventional estimators, the re-sampling estimator of the mean is somewhat more
efficient and the re-sampling estimator of the variance much more so. The conventional estimator
of the standard error (of the mean) does not apply to the re-sampling estimator. Therefore, the stan-
dard error is estimated by the bootstrap which requires two levels of iteration. That is, J bootstrap
data sets are created by drawing with replacement from the independent-condition participants.
For each bootstrap data set j = 1; : : : ; J , we compute the re-sampling estimate of the mean M;j .
The estimator of the standard error is then\se(M) :=
q
1
J
PJ
j=1(

M;j   M)2.
Since the individuals participating in the social-condition worlds can influence each other, it
is not appropriate to re-sample social-worlds. Therefore, the means and standard deviations of
outcomes in the social worlds are estimated using the conventional estimators: the sample mean
and sample standard deviation treating each world as an independent observation (rather than each
individual).
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To test the null hypothesis that the means of a world-level metric M are equal in the two
conditions, H0 : M;soc = M;ind, I use a simple percentile bootstrap procedure.7 The test statistic
is the difference of the two means
dobs = ^M;soc   M : (1.8)
The null distribution of the statistic is estimated by bootstrapping each of the means. For bootstrap
replicates j = 1; : : : ; J , the social-world mean ^M;soc;j is generated by drawing with replacement
from the 12 social worlds and then computing the mean of M in the replicate sample j. The
bootstrap distribution of M is generated as described above, creating replicate samples of 120
individuals. Each replicate of 120 individuals is then used to compute a realization of the sub-
sampling estimator M;j . The j-th bootstrap realization of the test statistic is
dj := (^

M;soc;j   ^M;soc)  (M;j   M): (1.9)
The two-tailed p-value of the test is then pM := 1J+1

1 +
PJ
j=1fjdj j  dobsg

.
An alternative approach to hypothesis testing follows that of Salganik et al. (2006), in which
the value of a statistic observed in the social worlds is compared to the distribution generated by
re-sampling individuals from the independent worlds (effectively creating synthetic independent
worlds). Let Ms = fMw : w = 1; : : : ; sg represent outcomes of some metric M from s social
worlds. LetMs be a vector of the same metricM in s worlds generated by re-sampling from F M .
Let Ts(Ms) be some statistic, for example, the sample mean or sample standard deviation of the
metric M . For the null hypothesis Ts(Ms)
iid Ts(Ms), we can conduct a test by comparing the
observed value from the social worlds Ts(m) to the distribution of Ts(M) re-sampled from the
independent data. Let ftb : b = 1; : : : ; Bg be a set of B re-sampled realizations of Ts(Ms). Then
we can estimate the probability p that the re-sampling distribution would generate a value at least
as large as the one observed in the social worlds. That estimator is
p^ = 1
B+1
 
1 +
BX
b=1
fTs(ms)  tsg
!
(1.10)
7The advantage of this approach over a bootstrap t-test is that the standard error does not need to be computed for
each bootstrap replicate, which would require an additional level of computationally-intensive iteration.
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wherms is the observed vector of the metricM observed in the s social worlds. This approach to
testing ignores sampling variation in F M itself but is still presented for comparison.
1.5. Results
1.5.1. Analysis at the level of individual participants
1.5.1.1. Characteristics of the sample
Table 1.1 shows summary statistics for the two groups of participants. Some variables are demo-
graphic characteristics reported in the questionnaire, and others are based on recorded behavior
during the experiment. In general, the participants are young, highly educated, and heavily female.
The mean age is about 35.2 with a standard deviation of 11.3. Over half of the participants received
a college degree (56.2 percent). The percentage female is 58.9 percent.
The participants are similar to a representative sample of U.S. households in terms of their
ability to withstand a negative income shock. The variable designated “low wealth” indicates if the
participant answered negatively to the following question: “If you were to lose your main source of
income (e.g., job, government benefits), could you cover your expenses for 3 months by borrowing
money, using savings, selling assets, or borrowing from friends/family?” The question was taken
from a household survey by the Federal Reserve where 42.2 percent of respondents answered that
they could not cover the expenses (Reserve 2014). In the present experiment the subjects reported
being in slightly better condition, with 37 percent and 38 percent of the individual and social groups
being unable to cover expenses.
The variable designated “has smartphone” indicates if the participant answered affirmatively
to the following question: “Do you have a smartphone like an iPhone, Samsung Galaxy phone, or
Windows Phone?” The independent and social groups reported having a smartphone at the rates of
78.5 and 81.6 percent, respectively. The question was adopted from the Pew Internet & American
Life Project Poll, where 65 percent reported having a smartphone (Center 2014).
The variable “engaged in political protest” indicates if the participant answered affirmatively
to the following question: “Have you ever done any of the following forms of political action?
Joining in boycotts, attending peaceful demonstrations, joining strikes.”
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The variable designated “degree of belief in donation” was asked to check whether the subjects
believe that the donations will be paid to the non-profit organizations. The question text was:
“How much confidence do you have that we will pay out the points as explained?” The response
was a scale with the points (1=“No confident at all”), (2=“Not too much confidence”), (3=“Some
confidence”), and (4=“A lot of confidence”). The empirical probabilities are (0.0252, 0.0943,
0.4151, 0.4654). Therefore, the modal participant has “a lot of confidence” in the third-parties’
payoffs.
The summary statistics indicate that many participants found the study interesting. Most par-
ticipants (71 percent) visited more than one news story and therefore spent more time than required
on study (in exchange for no additional earnings). The mean (median) number of stories visited
was 3.25 (2). The maximum number of stories (9) was viewed by 8.75 percent of participants.
The mean (median) amount of time browsing the news site was 5.27 (4.21) minutes. The fact that
participants would spend more time than necessary on the study is not surprising because the study
is designed to replicate a behavior that many people do in their leisure time.
1.5.1.2. Predictors of individual-level behavior
Table 1.2 shows several regressions that quantify how subjects’ characteristics predict their behav-
ior in the experiment. The binary outcomes are modeled using linear probability models, while the
number of stories viewed is modelled using Poisson regression. A broad conclusion is that behav-
ior in the experiment is predicted well by demographic characteristics, while technology adoption
has somewhat less predictive power.
The variable “ever punished” indicates if the participant subtracted points from any of the or-
ganizations. Punishment is predicted by three demographic variables but none of the technological
variables. In particular, engaging in political or economic protest activity is estimated to increase
the probability of punishment by 0.122. Being female and being college-educated increased the
probability of punishment by 0.117 and 0.093, respectively. This suggests that the propensity to
punish in the experiment reflects general characteristics of the individuals rather than a technology-
or domain-specific characteristic.
The variable “ever rewarded” is not strongly linked to any of the observed demographic vari-
ables. The only significant predictor is where the participant uses the social network Twitter.
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TABLE 1.1: Summary statistics of the individual participants
Independent condition Social condition
Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median
Age (years) 35:475 11:641 33 35:192 11:185 33
Male 0:370 0:485 0 0:425 0:495 0
College degree 0:622 0:487 1 0:542 0:499 1
Low wealth 0:370 0:485 0 0:380 0:486 0
Has smartphone 0:782 0:415 1 0:816 0:388 1
Uses Facebook 0:808 0:395 1 0:833 0:373 1
Uses Twitter 0:425 0:496 0 0:378 0:486 0
Has engaged in protest activity 0:227 0:421 0 0:226 0:419 0
Hours/week on MTurk 10:933 10:357 8 12:081 12:263 10
Dollars/week on MTurk 38:437 47:058 25 35:277 43:396 20
Behavior in experiment:
- Stories viewed 2:992 2:413 2 3:339 2:449 3
- Viewed > 1 story 0:633 0:484 1 0:739 0:440 1
- Browsing time (minutes) 4:652 3:368 4 5:471 4:230 4
- Points subtracted 7:667 11:132 0 9:306 12:279 10
- Points added 17:333 16:840 10 19:389 16:662 10
- Ever punished 0:458 0:500 0 0:517 0:500 1
- Ever rewarded 0:792 0:408 1 0:853 0:355 1
- Anger level (1–9) 2:487 1:904 1 2:522 1:919 2
- Degree of belief in donations 3:303 0:720 3 3:327 0:757 3
Observations 120 360
Another important outcome is whether the participant visited more than one news story. Since
each participant was only required to visit one story, any additional visits represent a choice by
the subject to spend more time on the experiment without earning any additional money. Possible
reasons for visiting additional stories include a simple desire to get information about the story, a
desire to add or subtract more points, or an interest in how a story relates to the behavior of others.
The last two factors appear to be important because the social treatment has a statistically signif-
icant positive effect on the probability of reading additional stories. The demographic variables
are also important predictors. College education and previous protest behavior are predictors of
visiting additional stories. However, different variables predict total browsing time. Men spend
on average about 22 percent less time browsing. Older people also spend less time browsing. The
social treatment is associated with a 17.5 percent increase in browsing time.
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TABLE 1.2: Individual characteristics as predictors of behavior in the experiment
Binary measures of behavior
Total stories
viewed
Log total
browsing
time
Read
> 1 story
Ever
punished
Ever
rewarded
College graduate 0:121 0:083 0:113 0:093 0:005
(0:070) (0:062) (0:043) (0:047) (0:035)
Male -0:025 -0:217 0:022 -0:117 0:002
(0:070) (0:065) (0:042) (0:048) (0:035)
Has engaged in protest activity 0:134 -0:056 0:145 0:122 0:057
(0:078) (0:073) (0:044) (0:054) (0:037)
Age 0:003 0:018 0:001 0:000 -0:000
(0:003) (0:003) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002)
Has low wealth 0:090 0:083 0:031 -0:009 0:032
(0:072) (0:065) (0:043) (0:049) (0:034)
Uses Facebook -0:003 -0:017 -0:101 0:076 0:008
(0:085) (0:082) (0:051) (0:061) (0:049)
Uses Twitter 0:035 -0:064 0:050 -0:010 0:113
(0:071) (0:061) (0:041) (0:048) (0:032)
Owns smartphone -0:014 -0:078 0:049 0:064 0:010
(0:093) (0:079) (0:056) (0:061) (0:047)
Social treatment 0:121 0:175 0:113 0:075 0:061
(0:081) (0:069) (0:049) (0:052) (0:042)
Obs. 477 477 477 477 477
Notes. The first two columns show semi-elasticities. The remaining columns show coefficient estimates (average
marginal effects) from linear probability models. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The standard errors in Table 1.2 are heteroscedasticity-robust. The results are in general robust
to clustering the standard errors by world. In some cases this approach provides stronger evi-
dence of effects (see Appendix Table 1.17). For example, clustering the standard errors by world
moderately shrinks the standard errors on the social treatment effect in all 5 models.
Figure 1.3 groups all participants according to their self-reported anger rating, which is in-
tended to capture the degree of anger experienced overall during the experiment. The probabilities
that the user “ever punished” and “ever rewarded” within each bin are displayed. Higher anger
ratings are correlated with increasing probability of ever punishing. However, there is little rela-
tionship between rewarding and anger. Since participants on average visit more than one story,
this result indicates that anger at one story does not tend to decrease the probability that the par-
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ticipant rewards some other organization. That is, emotional spill over effects appear to be fairly
unimportant.
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FIGURE 1.3: Probability that participant ever punished and ever rewarded versus anger rating
1.5.2. Analysis at the level of worlds
As discussed in the methods section, the analysis focuses on the net punishment and net reward
metrics. However, additional world-level outcomes such as the total rewards (total number of
points added) and total punishment are presented in the appendix along with tests for differences
between the groups. These tests provide some weak evidence for positive treatment effects of the
social condition on total reward, total punishment, number of organizations punished on net, and
the efficiency of punishment (with p values in the range 0.10–0.20). There is no evidence of effects
on the number of organizations rewarded nor reward efficiency.8
8Reward efficiency is defined as the ratio of net reward to total reward and must take a value in [0; 1]. Punishment
efficiency is defined analogously.
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Figure 1.4 shows how net punishment and net reward evolved in each of the 12 social worlds
and 4 independent worlds. The two metrics are calculated after each of the 30 participants to
produce the plotted time-series. It is evident that net reward tends to increase approximately lin-
early as individuals participate. However, while net punishment also tends to grow, it exhibits
more variable evolution with more non-monotonicities. Since the punished organizations tend to
be controversial rather than universally despised, there are often individuals willing to reward even
heavily punished organizations, which then decreases the net punishment.
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FIGURE 1.4: Evolution of net reward and punishment in the 16 worlds
The means of the net reward, net punishment, and the Theil index are displayed in Figure 1.5.
Each panel shows the difference in means d and the two-tailed p-value of the percentile bootstrap
test. The null hypothesis is that the means are equal in the social and independent conditions. The
net punishment is higher in the social condition, but the test does not reach statistical significance
at conventional levels (412.5 vs. 354.6, p = 0:148). Mean net punishment is higher in the social
condition (110.0 vs. 64.0, p = 0:067). The most robust difference between the two conditions
is in wealth inequality (Theil index), which is significantly higher in the social condition (0.0040
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TABLE 1.3: Summary statistics for world-level metrics: Social vs. Independent
Independent Social p-value
Mean SD Mean SD U -test t-test Levene’s
Net punishment 64.03 32.09 110.00 65.37 0.080 0.204 0.075
Net reward 354.57 70.60 412.50 66.35 0.101 0.153 0.781
Theil index*100 0.23 0.08 0.40 0.12 0.005 0.017 0.001
Notes. Test results are conventional tests based on the aggregate data.
vs. 0.0023, p = 0:005). The results from using a Mann-Whitney U test on the world-level data
are similar in all three cases. For net punishment, net reward, and the Theil index, respectively,
the test statistics are (U = 12:0; p = 0:080); (U = 13:0; p = 0:101), and (U = 2:0; p = 0:005).
The explanation for this difference can be seen in the net reward and punishment metrics. Under
the social condition, the popular organizations are rewarded more intensely while the unpopular
ones are punished more intensely. This generates greater inequality in the final points totals of the
organizations.
Comparing the variability of the outcomes indicates that the social condition increased the
variability of net punishment and wealth inequality. Differences in the variances of the outcomes
are tested using Levene’s test on the world-level outcomes. The results follow a similar pattern to
the means. No evidence is found for a difference in the variance of net punishment between the two
conditions. The standard deviations of net reward are very similar in the two conditions: 66.4 in
the social condition and 70.6 in the independent condition. However, the standard deviations of net
punishment in the social and independent conditions are 65.4 and 32.1, respectively (p = 0:075).
The standard deviation of the Theil index in the social condition is about 55 percent higher than in
the independent condition (p < 0:01).
Figure 1.6 displays the results of the alternative approach to testing using the re-sampling tests.
This approach tests whether the outcome in the social condition is likely to have been generated
by the distribution created by re-sampling individuals from the independent data. Four different
world-level metrics are examined: (1) mean net reward, (2) standard deviation of net reward,
(3) mean net punishment, and (4) standard deviation of net punishment. The histograms show
the realizations of each metric computed from samples of 12 worlds drawn from the re-sampling
distribution. The actual values computed from the 12 social worlds are marked on each plot with
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FIGURE 1.5: Mean world-level outcomes: Social versus independent conditions
a vertical line. For three of the four metrics, the observed statistic in the social worlds is far
out into the tail of the re-sampling distribution. For example, among the 12 social worlds the
sample standard deviation of net punishment is 65.4. However, this value is larger than any of
those generated by re-sampling 12 independent worlds and then computing the sample standard
deviation from those 12 values. In the fourth metric, standard deviation of net reward, the observed
value in the social worlds is very close to the center of the re-sampling distribution.
1.5.3. Analysis at the level of choices
The final section of the analysis examines how individual participants’ choices result in the ag-
gregate effects observed in the social condition. This analysis uses participant-by-story panel data
where each participant contributes an observation for each of the 24 stories (organizations). The
social condition data has 8,640 observations while the independent condition data has 2,880 ob-
servations. Individuals are modelled as making 24 binary decisions (about each decision type:
punishing, rewarding, and viewing). These decisions are allowed to depend on the features of the
stories at the time that the relevant participant views the news page. The most important features
are the points added and subtracted by previous participants. Functions of these points are included
in the model to allow for social influences of punishment and reward. The initial models simply in-
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FIGURE 1.6: Resampling tests: Social vs. independent
clude binary variables that indicate whether a given story was punished at all or rewarded at all by
the previous participants in the world. However, the results indicate that this binary effect decays
rapidly over the course of a given world. Therefore, the models also include the interaction of the
dummy variables with the logarithm of the participant’s number within the world (from 1 to 30).
This feature is called logarithmic decay. The logit coefficient estimates in Table 1.5 show a signif-
icant negative effect on the interaction variable, which strongly supports a decaying social effect.
A behavioral interpretation of this feature is that social information preferentially attracts attention
to those stories that have been previously punished or rewarded. However, the social information
may not increase the overall propensity of a participant to punish or reward. Such a model would
generate an effect that decays over the course of the experiment as more stories are punished or
rewarded. An example specification with binary effects of points added and subtracted that decay
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logarithmically would have the form
P (i punishes story k) =
(sk + 1PagePositionik
+ 2PagePosition2ik
+ 3 log(Participant #)
+ 1AnyPointsAddedik + 1AnyPointsAddedik  log(Participant #)
+ 2AnyPointsSubtractedik + 2AnyPointsSubtractedik  log(Participant #));
where  is the logistic function. The variable AnyPointsAddedik takes the value one if any par-
ticipant before i added points to (rewarded) organization k and zero otherwise. The variable
AnyPointsSubtractedik takes the value one if any participant before i subtracted points from (pun-
ished) organization k and zero otherwise.
Average marginal effects using the binary definition of social effects appear in Table 1.4. The
logit coefficient estimates appear in Table 1.5. These models do not yet include terms for the page
position of the headlines. Data from only the social condition is used to estimate the models in the
first three columns, which are logit models of the probability of any given participant punishing,
rewarding, or viewing any given story. The point estimates are the average marginal effects of
the social effect variables. All three models show that if a participant punishes or rewards a story,
then subsequent participants are significantly more likely to punish, reward, or view that story.
For example, the average marginal effect of punishment on a given story is to increase, for each
subsequent participant, that story’s (1) probability of punishment by 0:027 0:008, (2) probability
of reward by 0:020  0:008, and (3) probability of being viewed by 0:049  0:012. The average
marginal effect of prior reward is to increase the probability of subsequent punishment by 0:016
0:005 and the probability of subsequent reward by 0:034  0:009. These social effects therefore
tend to concentrate more punishment on stories that have been punished before and more reward on
those that have been rewarded before. This pattern tends to increase inequality across the stories,
which is the result seen in the aggregate data. It may be surprising to see that both punishment
and reward tend to increase later punishment and reward. However, both behaviors strongly draw
additional attention (views), which drives the additional punishment and reward. Later analyses
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TABLE 1.4: Simple effects of punishment/reward on individual behavior (page controls omitted)
Social condition
Individual behavior:
Independent condition
(placebo test)
Individual behavior:
Punish Reward View Punish Reward View
Social effect:
Points sub’ed (dummy) 0:027 0:020 0:049 -0:042 0:009 -0:018
(0:008) (0:008) (0:012) (0:013) (0:017) (0:019)
Points added (dummy) 0:016 0:034 0:059 -0:019 -0:011 -0:022
(0:005) (0:009) (0:011) (0:014) (0:018) (0:020)
Individuals 360 360 360 120 120 120
Obs. 8; 640 8; 640 8; 640 2; 400 2; 760 2; 760
Avg. log-likelihood -0:145 -0:256 -0:367 -0:143 -0:241 -0:340
Notes. Average marginal effects of previous punishment (points sub’ed) and reward (points added) printed. Effects
are specified in binary form with logarithmic decay. Estimates come from a logit model with a dummy variable for
each story but no controls for page position. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by participant. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are clustered by participant.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
show that this attentional effect predominantly accounts for the social effects in the present models.
Table 1.4 also shows the results from estimating identical models using only data from the
independent condition (columns 4–6) as a placebo test. These models reveal little evidence of
social effects, and most of the point estimates are negative. This result starkly shows that the social
condition causes any activity towards a particular story to attract additional attention towards the
same story. This effect is the main underlying mechanism for the increase in points inequality in
the social condition. In particular, these models show that rewards have a relatively large effect on
attracting attention (0:059 0:014).
The placebo tests indicate a significant negative effect of punishment on subsequent punish-
ment. This estimate is not robust to plausible alternative specifications of the social effect that also
fit the data well (Table 1.6). One such case is to treat the social effects as shares of punishment
and reward. This specification explicitly represents the idea of social effects being diluted and
decaying as more stories are punished and rewarded. In this specification, if n stories have been
punished, then the punishment variable for those stories is set to 1
n
. The remaining 24   n stories
will have the punishment variable set to 0. The reward variable is defined analogously. This defi-
nition allows the social effects to be diluted. An interpretation of this definition is that any existing
punishment generates one unit of additional propensity to punish, which is distributed uniformly
44
TABLE 1.5: Coefficient estimates from punish/reward logit models (page controls omitted)
Punishment Reward
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social Independent Social Independent
Points sub’ed (dummy) 2:222 -0:545 -0:670 0:512
(0:562) (1:199) (0:546) (0:858)
Points sub’ed  Log(participant #) -0:661 -0:215 0:375 -0:156
(0:202) (0:445) (0:185) (0:305)
Points added (dummy) 0:621 -2:067 1:360 -0:611
(0:591) (1:379) (0:364) (0:849)
Points added  Log(participant #) -0:070 0:585 -0:373 0:179
(0:218) (0:502) (0:139) (0:297)
Individuals 360 120 360 120
Obs. 8; 640 2; 400 8; 640 2; 760
Avg. log-likelihood -0:14450 -0:14308 -0:25634 -0:24144
Notes. Table displays coefficients from logit models using participant-by-story panel data and no controls for page
position. The points subtracted (added) dummy indicates if the story was punished (rewarded) by any previous partic-
ipant. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by individual.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
over all stories that have been punished. The average marginal effect of such a social variable can
be complicated to interpret. In terms of a social effect of punishment, the marginal effect could
be viewed as the change in the outcome probability for a story when it has been punished and no
other story has been punished. Analogous social and placebo results for the share specification
appear in Table 1.6. These again reveal substantial positive effects of punishment and reward on
all behaviors in the social condition. As expected, no social effects are found in the independent
condition.
Returning attention to the binary specification in Table 1.4, one might note that the average
marginal (social) effects of punishment on punishment and rewarded are similar in magnitude.
It may therefore appear that these effects will cancel out and therefore the effect on net punish-
ment may be difficult to account for. These results highlight the difficulty in understanding the
experiment by looking only at average marginal effects over the entire data set or at model coeffi-
cients. Much of the remaining analysis will present marginal effects in graphical form in order to
understand how the effects vary over the course of a world.
Further understanding the relationship between individual behavior and overall outcomes re-
quires a more subtle analysis along with careful consideration of the punishment and reward pre-
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TABLE 1.6: Share effects of punishment/reward on individual behavior (social vs. independent)
Social condition
Individual behavior:
Independent condition
(placebo test)
Individual behavior:
Punish Reward View Punish Reward View
Social effect:
Points sub’ed (share) 0:055 0:057 0:131 -0:084 0:080 0:035
(0:014) (0:025) (0:033) (0:085) (0:073) (0:099)
Points added (share) 0:086 0:190 0:372 -0:029 -0:027 0:086
(0:023) (0:040) (0:061) (0:102) (0:114) (0:100)
Individuals 360 360 360 120 120 120
Obs. 8; 640 8; 640 8; 640 2; 400 2; 760 2; 760
Avg. log-likelihood -0:145 -0:257 -0:368 -0:146 -0:241 -0:340
Notes. Average marginal effects of previous punishment (points sub’ed) and reward (points added) printed. Effects are
specified in the share form. Estimates come from a logit model with a dummy variable for each story but no controls
for page position. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by participant. Standard errors, in parentheses, are
clustered by participant.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
dictor variables. First, it is possible to further divide the stories into those that have been punished
only and not rewarded. Therefore, alternative models were estimated where the observations are
partitioned into those that have been (1) neither punished nor rewarded, (2) punished only, (3) re-
warded only, or (4) both punished and rewarded, each interacted with a logarithmic decay. The
probabilities of punishment and reward over the course of a world for group 2 (punished only) are
printed in the first panel of Figure 1.7. This result shows that among stories that have been only
punished the probability of subsequent punishment is always greater than or equal to the probabil-
ity of reward. Therefore, among these stories the net punishment will tend to increase. A second
factor to consider is that the average marginal effects in Table 1.4 do not account for the actual pat-
terns of punishment. Since this model is non-linear, the effect of punishment can vary depending
on the values of the covariates (in this case, the story dummy variables). Panel two of Figure 1.7
shows the average marginal effect of punishment on subsequent punishment but with the effects
broken out into two groups: (1) those observations (stories) that were actually punished during the
experiment and (2) those observations that were not punished. That is, the marginal effects were
computed separately over the two corresponding sets of observations in the panel data. This re-
sult shows that the marginal effect of punishment is greater among those stories that were actually
punished, typically by a factor of 2. In effect, the participants selectively targeted the stories where
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punishment would have the greatest effect on motivating subsequent punishment.
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FIGURE 1.7: Additional characteristics of punishment
1.5.4. Number of organizations with leverage on the net metrics
The aim of the next analysis is understand why net punishment tends to evolve differently in
social worlds and independent worlds (as seen in net punishment “paths” plotted in Figure 1.4).
In particular, net punishment tends to keep growing and varying in the social worlds, whereas the
metric tends to stay relatively stable in the independent worlds.
Recall that net punishment is calculated by taking all organizations with wealth < 300 and
summing up their deviations from 300 points. Therefore, net punishment only changes when a
participant (1) punishes an organization with wealth  300 or (2) rewards an organization with
wealth < 300. Any organization with wealth > 300 has zero net punishment and no “leverage” on
the net punishment number. For example, suppose an organization currently has 370 points. If a
new participant punishes that organization, its points will be reduced to 360, which is greater than
300. Since only deviations below 300 points contribute to net punishment, the organization with
370 points has no leverage on the net punishment metric.
Table 1.7 shows this relationship. An organization has leverage on net punishment if it has
wealth  300. Conversely, an organization has leverage on net reward if it has wealth  300.
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TABLE 1.7: Leverage of an organization on the net punishment metric
Effect on net punishment of one more instance of...
Number of points the
organization currently has
Leverage Punishment Reward
< 300 Yes +10 -10
300 Yes +10 0
> 300 No 0 0
Organizations with exactly 300 points have leverage on both net reward and net punishment.
Definition 6 The numbers of organizations with leverage for participant i are given by the expres-
sions
24X
k=1
1fvk;i  300g (number of organizations with leverage on net punishment)
and
24X
k=1
1fvk;i  300g (number of organizations with leverage on net reward)
where vk;i is the wealth (points) of organization k when participant i arrives at the news page.
Consider the independent condition. By the time the 29th participant reaches the news page,
most of the organizations will have wealth > 300 because of rewarding behavior by the earlier
participants. If there are few organizations with wealth  300, then it is unlikely that the 29th
participant would, by chance, view a story with wealth  300 and act on it so as to influence net
punishment. In addition, there is no social information telling the participant which organizations
are low on points. In an abstract sense, it is “difficult” for a participant in this environment to have
an immediate effect on the net punishment metric. Such a “difficult” situation is typical of the later
participants in a world.
However, in the social condition, the participants can see the points of the organizations. This
information allows a participant to seek out those organizations with wealth  300 and add or
subtract points. If participants in reality do this, then participants in the social condition should
be more likely to affect net punishment. In addition, the advantage provided by the social
information matters most when there are few organizations with leverage on net punishment.
We test for this effect in the following analysis.
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To test for this relationship a simple logit model was estimated on the participant-level data
(480 observations).9 The model predicts whether or not the participant had any effect on net
punishment during his visit to the page. Alternatively, we could think of the model as describing
whether the participant made the net punishment path in Figure 1.4 tick up or down. The right-hand
side variables were (1) an indicator for the social condition, (2) a scalar term showing the number
of organizations with leverage on net punishment at the time the participant arrived at the page, and
(3) the interaction of variables 1 and 2. The coefficients from estimating this model appear in Table
1.8. The average marginal effects are plotted in Figure 1.8. The table also includes the analogous
but “inverted” model for net reward. This model replaces the left-hand side with an indicator
for influencing net reward and the second predictor variable with a term showing the number of
organizations with leverage on net reward. The first two columns show coefficient estimates for
affecting net punishment. The scalar term has a positive effect, which means that a participant
is more likely to influence net punishment when there are more organizations with leverage on
net punishment. The other way of viewing this is that a participant is less likely to influence
net punishment when few organizations have leverage on the metric. However, this relationship
is inverted when looking at the social condition. The interaction term is negative and larger in
magnitude than the simple scalar term. In addition, the effect of the social condition dummy is
positive and significant.
The overall result is that when the number of organizations with points  300 is small, the
participants in the social condition are more likely than those in the independent condition to
influence net punishment. This relationship is depicted in Figure 1.8 which shows average marginal
effects of the social condition evaluated at different values of the scalar variable in the regression.
The low end of the x-axis corresponds to the later part of a world. The positive marginal effects
at the low end of the x-axis confirms the idea that social information can help participants to
target actions on the few organizations with leverage. The average marginal effects from the net
reward model are also plotted. These results do not reveal any effect of the social condition on the
probability of influencing net reward. This finding makes sense because there are usually many
9This deliberately simplified for illustrative purposes. The appendix includes a corresponding analysis using the
panel data, where page position and story effects can be incorporated into the model to control for dependencies. See
Appendix Table 1.13. These results provide even stronger evidence that the leverage variable and its interaction with
the social dummy should be in the model along with the social dummy. The joint test of those three variables is
significant at level 0.001.
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TABLE 1.8: Coefficient estimates from models of the participant-wise probabilities of affecting
net punishment and reward
Left-hand side variable (binary):
The participant changed the net
metric listed below during his
visit to the news page.
Net punishment Net reward
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social condition (dummy) 0:552 1:814 0:370 -0:111
(0:219) (0:851) (0:287) (3:415)
State of the news page
when visited by the participant:
Number of organizations w/ points  300 0:061
[i.e., with leverage on net punishment] (0:050)
Social dummy  (# orgs. w/ points  300) -0:086
(0:055)
Number of organizations w/ points  300 -0:064
[i.e., with leverage on net reward] (0:149)
Social dummy  (# orgs. w/ points  300) 0:022
(0:163)
Average marginal effect of social cond. 0:133 0:138 0:047 0:044
Significance of AME of social cond. (p) 0:009 0:006 0:225 0:253
Joint sig. of 3 coefs. above (p) : 0:032 : 0:523
Individuals 480 480 480 480
Notes. Coefficient estimates from logit models with standard errors in parentheses. The average marginal effect is the
average effect on the probability of the modeled outcome. The printed p-value of the AME corresponds to a test with
the null hypothesis that the AME is 0. The joint significance test has the null hypothesis that all 3 coefficients in the
column are zero.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
organizations with leverage on net reward. They are not “difficult” to find, so social information is
less important for finding them. The supports of the data on the x-axis correspond to the heavily
shaded areas of the plot. For example, the number of organizations with leverage on net reward
never dropped below 15.
The consequence of this result at the aggregate level is that as a social world evolves we see
net punishment continue to change (mainly increasing), which leads to the higher levels of net
punishment and higher variance of net punishment observed in the aggregate results. Another way
to interpret this result is to note that net punishment evolves like a random walk with drift. The
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social condition allows this “random walk” to have a greater number of time steps because each
participant has a greater probability of making the walk transition to a new state (as shown in this
analysis). A higher number of steps translates to higher variance at the end of the world. However,
the results for net reward do not show the increasing marginal effect seen for net reward. No
significant advantage is seen for the social condition in changing net reward. This finding agrees
with the world-level results where there is no evidence of a difference between the two conditions
in the variance of net reward.
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
Number of organizations with leverage on the metric
(when the participant arrives at the news page)
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
A
d
v
a
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
th
e
 s
o
ci
a
l 
co
n
d
it
io
n
M
a
rg
in
a
l 
e
ff
e
ct
 o
n
 P
(P
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
t 
ch
a
n
g
e
s 
n
e
t 
m
e
tr
ic
)
Here there are few organizations
with leverage on net punishment,
and participants in the social
condition are more likely to
act on those few organizations.
Social information is useful to
find those few organizations
with wealth  300.
Metric
Net reward ± SE
Net punishment ± SE
p < 0.10
p < 0.05
FIGURE 1.8: Effect of the social condition on choices that affect net punishment/reward
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TABLE 1.9: Social effects on behavior when controlling for page position
Not controlling for page
position
Controlling for page
position
Punish Reward View Punish Reward View
Social effect:
Points sub’ed (dummy) 0:027 0:020 0:049 0:006 -0:016 -0:017
(0:008) (0:008) (0:012) (0:008) (0:008) (0:011)
Points added (dummy) 0:016 0:034 0:059 -0:002 -0:019 -0:020
(0:005) (0:009) (0:011) (0:007) (0:011) (0:013)
Individuals 360 360 360 360 360 360
Obs. 8; 640 8; 640 8; 640 8; 640 8; 640 8; 640
Avg. log-likelihood -0:145 -0:256 -0:367 -0:142 -0:250 -0:356
Notes. Average marginal effects of previous punishment (points sub’ed) and reward (points added) printed. Effects
are specified in the binary form with logarithmic decay. Estimates come from a logit model with a dummy variable
for each story. Page position is controlled for by a quadratic function. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by
participant. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by participant.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
1.5.4.1. Social influence vs. attention manipulation by algorithm
The previous analyses of the effects of points subtracted and added in the social condition did
not include controls for the effect of page position. Therefore, the social effects represented a
combination of any direct social influence and the attentional effect of shifting the location of a
story on the page. That is, because punishing and rewarding imply viewing a story, the social
variables are highly correlated with the story being near the top of the news page, which itself
greatly increases the probability of being viewed. To disentangle these effects I estimated the same
models with the addition of a quadratic control for page position. The results of this exercise
appear in Table 1.9. The estimates from Table 1.4 are reprinted for convenience. Once page
position controls are added, many of the social effects become small and insignificant. This finding
indicates that the mechanical page position effects dominate the social effects. Once they are
accounted for, the participants put little additional weight on points added and subtracted overall.
Negative effects are also consistent with a preference for fairness wherein participants prefer to
reward organizations that have not yet been rewarded.
The evidence indicates that participants are, in some sense, passive and highly subject to the
algorithm that constructs the page (in this case, sorting by views). However, the participants do
not entirely disregard social information. The results indicate that social information does have
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direct effects (controlling for page position), but these effects occur very early in the course of
a world. First, alternative specifications using the share definition of social effects reveal robust
positive effects of points subtracted on subsequent punishment (see Appendix Table 1.12). These
specifications essentially overweight the effects that occur early in a world. Second, these social
effects appear when we explicitly examine average marginal effects over the course of a world.
To explore individual behavior in greater detail I estimated the familiar logit models predicting
punishment, reward, and viewing. Each model again includes story dummies, quadratic page po-
sition controls, linear specifications of the points added and subtracted, and those points variables
interacted with a quadratic function of the log participant number. The exact specification of the
points and the function of the participant number make relatively little difference to the results.
Analogous models using binary points effects are printed in the appendix (see Appendix Figure
1.24).
In addition, a model of each behavior was estimated with quadratic controls for the page po-
sition, linear terms for added and subtracted points, and quadratic logarithmic decay interactions.
This particular specification was chosen based on fit statistics, but a model with binary social ef-
fects gives similar results (see Appendix Table 1.24). The average marginal effects of punishment
and reward were evaluated at each participant number and are displayed in Figure 1.9. Since these
models are based on the entire social data set they are called the unconditional estimates. These
results reveal little evidence of social effects. Punishment and, to some extent, reward are found to
have some negative effects on rewarding among early and middle participants. The negative effects
of reward on rewarding are quantitatively small and not entirely robust to alternative specifications
(see additional results in the appendix). These effects are largely accounted for by the increase in
exploration among participants in the middle range of a world. However, the effects of punishment
show some true social influence. Even controlling for page position, punished organizations are
significantly less likely to be rewarded (by a few percentage points) during the first third of a world.
Figure 1.9 also shows results from models estimated using only the participant-by-story obser-
vations where the participant viewed the story. These models are called “conditional on viewing.”
The estimated coefficients for punishment and reward are printed in Table 1.26. These results
show significant effects on punishment, which increases the probability of punishing (conditional
on viewing) by up to 20 percentage points. The probability of rewarding (conditional on viewing)
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FIGURE 1.9: Effect of previous punishment and reward on individual behavior
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is decreased by a similar amount. The similarity of the two effect magnitudes suggests that punish-
ment may persuade those who would otherwise reward to punish instead. The models’ estimated
coefficients are printed in Table 1.26, which again shows that punishment has effects on punish-
ment and reward that are similar in magnitude but opposite in sign. However, it is likely that, in
addition to persuasive effects, selection also plays a role. Punished stories may attract the attention
of individual participants that have a high propensity to punish and low propensity to reward. The
decaying form of the effect also suggests an important role for selection.
The same conditional-on-viewing models do not show any social effects of reward on subse-
quent reward or punishing. Therefore, punishment seems to be special in generating social effects
that go beyond algorithmic manipulation of attention.
1.6. Conclusion
The experiment revealed that adding social information to the media environment had two main
effects on aggregate outcomes. First, the inequality in points across the organizations became more
unequal. Effectively, the popular organizations tended to be more popular while the unpopular
organizations tended to be more unpopular. Second, the expected net punishment in a given world
became greater but also more variable.
A further investigation of the individual behavior during the experiment provided some answers
about why the aggregate outcomes were affected by social information. The page-construction al-
gorithm, which sorted the most-viewed stories to the top of the headlines page, played a dominant
role in concentrating attention in a herding-like way. That is, participants always had to view a story
before punishing or rewarding. These views tended to push that story to the top of the page where
it was more likely to be viewed, which in turned caused the story to receive more punishment or
reward. This mechanism generated a strong positive correlation between being punished/rewarded
in the past and being punished/rewarded in the future. However, once the models accounted for
the position of the headline on the page, the effects of social information about punishment and
reward were greatly diminished. This result suggests that participants offloaded a substantial por-
tion of their decision making process to the page-constructing algorithm. The actual effect of the
algorithm on choices depends on how well it aligns with the participants’ own preferences. If they
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are perfectly aligned, then the participants would, by some measure, make better choices or make
choices as if they had zero search costs or “thinking aversion” (Ortoleva 2013). Alternatively, if
the participants incur search costs, then the choices of participants could be systematically manip-
ulated by the algorithm. One such example is the herding experiment on an artificial music market
by Salganik and Watts (2008), in which social information about song popularity was deceptively
inverted.
That finding gives a different impression from recent research by Bakshy et al. (2015) on news
consumption through Facebook. Those researchers argue that political bias in news consumption
was driven more by individuals’ own choices than through the Facebook News Feed algorithm. In
practice, the degree of selection through the two sources will be highly dependent on the particular
context and algorithm used. Future research might investigate this topic by varying the page/menu-
construction algorithm in a way somewhat like Salganik and Watts (2008) along with the types
of social information available. The present experiment provided a fairly sparse form of social
information. Richer forms of communication may lead to stronger selection through individual
choice.
The present results also reveal an asymmetry in positive and negative social effects (reward and
punishment). This finding is consistent with research showing that negative events and information
tend to have greater effects than positive (Baumeister et al. 2001). Punishment was found to have
two substantive social effects, whereas reward had little. Participants used social information to
selectively target unpopular organizations (mostly for punishment but also reward). It could be
argued that this result only occurred because unpopular organizations tended to be much rarer than
popular. If popular organizations were rare instead, it is possible that participants would then use
social information to target them. However, a second unique effect of punishment is that it had
a significant social effect even after controlling for the effect of the page-construction algorithm.
When participants viewed a story about a previously punished organization, they were significantly
more likely to punish that organization instead of reward. These findings suggest that, compared
to positive activity, negative activity may be more dependent on herding-like behavior.
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1.7. Appendix of chapter 1
1.7.1. Examples of real Internet punishment
TABLE 1.10: 48 selected cases of punishment and shaming involving the Internet
Case Time Situation Consequences
George & Dragon British Pub,
Orlando, FL1
May 2015 Owner accused of racist threat
with gun.
Angry Yelp reviews posted.
Owner arrested.
Melbourne Man, Melbourne,
Australia2
May 2015 Mother posted photo of man on
Facebook with accusation that
he was sex offender.
Man received death threats but
was cleared by police.
Rubbin Buttz BBQ, Milliken,
CO3
May 2015 Enacted 10% discount for white
people.
Angry Yelp reviews posted.
Discount extended to all
customers.
PLOS ONE4 May 2015 Reviewer asked female authors
to add a male co-author.
Authors posted reviewer reports
on Twitter. Reviewer was
banned by PLOS ONE.
Cigars & Stripes Bar, Berwyn,
IL5
April 2015 Two-way mirror allows looking
into women’s restroom.
Angry Yelp reviews posted.
Police investigated.
Alphagraphics, Suwanee, GA6 April 2015 Refused to print invitations for
a gay wedding.
Angry Yelp reviews posted.
Popeyes Chicken, Channelview,
TX7
April 2015 Fired employee that was
robbed.
Angry Yelp reviews. Employee
was offered job back.
Dieseltec, Grandville, MI8 April 2015 Announced policy of not
serving gay clients.
Angry Yelp reviews posted.
Clorox9 April 2015 Accused of a racist tweet. Attacked by Twitter users.
New York University10 April 2015 Facebook user accused campus
store of having sexist baby
clothing.
Attacked on social media by
students and almuni.
Memories Pizza, Walkerton,
IN11
April 2015 Announced policy of not
serving gay clients.
Attacked on Yelp. GoFundMe
campaign launched in support.
Days Inn, Pine Bluff, AR12 March 2015 Fired employee for speaking to
a reporter about a minimum
wage bill.
Attacked on Yelp and social
media.
F&R Auto Sales, Westport,
MA13
Jan. 2015 Leaked video of argument with
pizza delivery man.
Attacked on Yelp/Google
reviews. Website went down.
Indian men on a bus (Rohtak,
India)14
Dec. 2014 Three men allegedly harassed
two sisters on a bus.
The sisters hit the men with
belts. A cell phone video
spread. The men were arrested.
The sisters were accused of
misrepresenting the incident.
57
Racists Getting Fired15 Dec. 2014 The RGF website found racist
comments on social media and
recruited people to pressure
employers to fire the
commenters. The owner of the
website was tricked by a
fruadulent account and then
counter attacked by 4chan.
RGF owner was forced out by
threats. Site continues to
operate with a different owner.
Daryl Sharma16 Oct. 2014 Sharma groped a woman on the
street in Seattle
Police ignored the woman’s
report, but she tweeted a photo
of the offender (Sharma).
Sharma’s probation officer saw
the photo and arrested him.
Armed clown pranksters
(France)17
Oct. 2014 Teens dressed as clowns
harassed people around France.
Anti-clown vigilantes organized
using social media (Facebook).
CEO of Centerplate Inc.18 Aug. 2014 Security guard recorded the
CEO kicking a dog and posted
the video online.
CEO forced to resign and
donate $100k to animal
non-profit.
Big Earl’s Bait House and Country
Store, Pittsburg, TX19
May 2014 Waitress kicked out gay patrons. Attacked on Yelp/Google
reviews. Website went down.
Comics for Kids, Tishomingo,
MS20
May 2014 Caught by Twitter users giving
donations to a family member.
Non-profit was shut down.
NYPD21 April 2014 Twitter outreach was co-opted
to post photos of NYPD beating
and arresting protestors.
Mozilla Foundation22 March 2014 CEO Brendan Eich’s donation
to support Prop. 8 was
uncovered.
A “Twitter Storm” formed, and
Eich resigned.
Andrea Cardosa23 Feb. 2014 A vice principal sexually
abused two under-age students.
One student posted an
accusation video on YouTube.
The teacher was charged with
16 felonies.
Mid-Michigan Teen Parties,
Flint, MI24
Jan. 2014 Announced “Freedom 2 Twerk”
party with an image of Martin
Luther King, Jr. showing a gang
sign on the poster.
Image spread on social media
and King’s family criticized the
event. The venue management
received many complaints and
cancelled the event.
Shugaland, Glen Burnie, MD25 Jan. 2014 Party-hosting business kicked
children out. Mom posted on
YouTube.
Mall management shut down
Shugaland.
Ani DiFranco26 Dec. 2013 The musician planned an event
at a former plantation.
Many protesters wrote on the
event’s Facebook page to
criticise the venue. The event
was cancelled.
Justine Sacco27 Dec. 2013 Tweeted joke about race and
AIDS.
Became #1 trending topic on
Twitter, and Sacco was fired the
same day.
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Murdoch’s Range & Home
Supply, Evansville, WY28
Dec. 2013 Two employees killed a
raccoon, which was reported on
Facebook.
The two employees resigned.
Specialized Bicycle29 Dec. 2013 Specialized accused a small
bike shop of trademark
infringement.
After social media criticism,
Specialized dropped the suit,
and the CEO personally
apologized to the shop owner.
Duck Dynasty (TV show)30 Dec. 2013 GQ magazine published an
interview in which Robertson
(actor on the show) expressed
anti-gay opinions.
The interview spread on social
media. A&E suspended
Robertson. Duck Dynasty
merchandise was removed from
stores.
Devin Barnes + Red Lobster,
Franklin, TN31
October 2013 Waitress claimed Barnes wrote
a slur on the receipt.
Barnes received death threats.
Waitress received $10,000 in
donations. Barnes sued Red
Lobster and waitress.
FedEx32 July 2013 Video of delivery driver
throwing packages spread on
the web.
Driver was fired.
Golden Corral, Port Orange,
FL33
July 2013 Pictures purported to be of a
dirty kitchen at GC were posted
on Reddit.
GC manager was fired for
improper food handling.
Taco Bell34 June 2013 Picture of employee licking
taco shells (for an internal photo
contest) spread on the net.
The employee was fired.
Sunil Tripathi + Reddit35 April 2013 Reddit users crowdsourcing the
search for the Boston Marathon
bombers mistakenly accused
several people.
The accusations were spread by
mainstream media. Several
innocent people were
threatened and harassed.
Adria Richards36 March 2013 Richards posted a photo of a
man making sexual jokes at a
programming conference in
order to shame him.
The man was fired. Hackers
attacked Richards and her
employer. Richards was fired.
SeaWorld37 2013-2015 Accused of mistreating whales
in a documentary and on social
media.
Attendance and stock price fell.
CEO resigned. Layoffs.
Thai Noodles Etc., Austin,
TX38
Dec. 2012 Restaurant owner posted racist
message on Facebook about the
Sandy Hook shooting.
Attacked on Yelp. Owner
received death threats.
Restaurant deleted Facebook
page.
Lindsey Stone39 Oct. 2012 Stone appeared in an image
giving the middle finger in jest
at the Arlington National
Cemetery.
The image spread on social
media. A Facebook page
appeared with the goal of
having Stone fired. She was
fired.
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George Zimmerman40 2012 Zimmerman fatally shot
Trayvon Martin but was not
charged.
Social media (incl. change.org
petition) and protests were used
to pressure officials to file
charges. Zimmerman was
charged 6 weeks after the
shooting.
Beef Products Inc.41 2012 ABC reported on a beef food
product treated with ammonia
(pink slime).
Public pressure (incl. a
change.org petition) convinced
many buyers to abdandon BPI
products. BPI closed 3 of 4
factories.
Steubenville, Ohio rape case42 2012–2013 Digital evidence of a rape
circulated on social media.
Hackers revealed the identities
and video footage of the alleged
rapists. Two students were
convicted of rape. Several
school officials were charged. A
hacker was indicted on federal
charges.
Domino’s Pizza, Conover, NC43 April 2009 YouTube videos showed
employees doing disgusting
things to pizza ingredients.
The employees were fired and
arrested.
Choi Jin-sil (South Korean
actress)44
October 2008 Rumors spread on the web that
Choi, a superstar South Korean
actress, was a loan shark who
contributed to the suicide of a
debtor.
Choi committed suicide. The
government introduced
legislation to decrease
anonymity online and facilitate
punishment of libel. Suicide
rates allegedly increased by
70% during the month after
Choi’s suicide (“copy cats”).
Patrick Pogan (NYPD)45 July 2008 Officer Pogan pushed a bicyclist
off his bike during a Critical
Mass event. Pogan reported that
the cyclist ran into him.
Video of the incident spread on
YouTube. Pogan was convicted
of filing false documents.
Rocky Mountain Chocolate
Factory, Huntington Beach,
CA46
June 2008 Store refused to allow 5-yo girl
to use the bathroom, who
defecated in her clothes.
The store franchisee’s address
was posted on the web, and she
received death threats. The
CEO apologized to the mother.
“Dog Poop Girl” (Seoul, South
Korea)47
June 2005 A girl allowed her dog to
defecate in the Seoul subway.
Web users (“netizens”) publicly
identified her and her family.
The girl was harassed and left
her university.
Human flesh search engine48 2001– Chinese web users have
revealed and shamed numerous
people for corruption, abuse,
adultery, and other
transgressions.
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1.7.2. Description and images of experimental news site
FIGURE 1.10: Instructions to the participants (social and independent).
62
FIGURE 1.11: Reminder to participants after quiz.
63
FIGURE 1.12: Headlines page (social condition).
64
FIGURE 1.13: One of the news stories.
65
FIGURE 1.14: One of the news stories (after choosing to punish).
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TABLE 1.11: Stories and organizations used in the experiment
Headline: Shooting Clinic for the Blind
Organization: Northeast Passage
Headline: Artist Collective Sues Non-Profit Over “Booklyn” Copyright
Organization: Booklyn Artists Alliance
Headline: Clemson University Stops Mandatory ‘Sex Survey’ After Backlash
Organization: Clemson University
Headline: CU-Boulder scientists speak out on research misconduct claim
Organization: CU-Boulder Department of Chemistry
Headline: U. of I. doctors under scrutiny for surgical robot ad
Organization: University of Illinois Hospital & Health Sciences System
Headline: Federal agency defends use of Ducks Unlimited
Organization: Ducks Unlimited
Headline: Aiming for a bear: 7-year-old Alto boy goes on hunt of a lifetime
Organization: Hunt of a Lifetime
Headline: First LSD Study in 40 Years Finds Therapeutic Potential
Organization: Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies (MAPS)
Headline: Ripple Creator Donates $500k in XRP to Artificial Intelligence Research Charity
Organization: Machine Intelligence Research Institute (MIRI)
Headline: Videos of rat abuse at Petaluma High School prompt outcry
Organization: Petaluma Wildlife Museum
Headline: How to save Dartmoor’s hill ponies? Eat them, says animal conservation group
Organization: Friends of the Dartmoor Hill Pony (Dartmoor Hill Pony Association)
Headline: Prop 46 Calls For Physician Drug Testing, $1.1 Million Lawsuit Cap
Organization: Consumer Watchdog
Headline: So You Want to Live Forever
Organization: Strategies for Engineered Negligible Senescence (SENS) Research Foundation
Headline: Should Humanity Try to Contact Intelligent Aliens?
Organization: SETI Institute
Headline: Should we make animals smarter?
Organization: Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies(IEET)
Headline: A ‘Suicide Club’ Has Been Launched In Britain By Australia’s Dr. Death, To Help People Kill Themselves
Organization: Exit International
Headline: Search-and-rescue drones fly again after court throws out FAA case
Organization: Texas EquuSearch
Headline: What is Tor? A beginner’s guide to the privacy tool
Organization: The Tor Project
Headline: A manifesto for playing god with human evolution
Organization: Humanity+
Headline: Your brain’s electrical activity can predict whether you go for risky sex, UCLA study finds
Organization: Semel Institute for Neuroscience and Human Behavior at the University of California, Los Angeles
Headline: UNESCO to host meeting on controversial ‘memory of water’ research
Organization: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Headline: Nonprofit Group Gives Hundreds Of Veterans Free Marijuana
Organization: Operation Grow4Vets
Headline: The rise of ‘vigilante’ patrols on the streets of New York
Organization: Howard Beach Civilian Observation Patrol (C.O.P.)
Headline: How Web archivists and other digital sleuths are unraveling the mystery of MH17
Organization: Wayback Machine
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1.7.3. Simulation study of the re-sampling estimator
The simulation creates identical, independent agents that make decisions over 24 stories. Each
agent punishes each story with probability 1
48
and rewards each story with probability 2
48
, which
are similar to the observed probabilities. This parametrization gives simulated means and standard
deviations that are close to the actual data. The simulation creates 1,000 data sets composed of
n worlds for each n = 2; 4; 8; 16; 32; 64. Each world is composed of 30 such agents as in the
experiment. The net punishment in each world is calculated as described in the methods section.
The conventional estimators are the sample mean and sample standard deviation. The re-sampling
estimator is computed as described in the paper. In this case, each simulated data set is sub-sampled
400 times to create 400 worlds. The mean and standard deviation of the sub-sampled worlds are the
estimates. The simulation results show that the re-sampling standard deviation estimator has much
less variance (smaller standard error) than the conventional estimator. Fairly precise estimates are
available even for 2 worlds, where the conventional estimator is highly erratic. The bias of the
re-sampling estimator is similar to that of the conventional estimator. The re-sampling estimator of
the mean has somewhat less variance than the sample mean, but the advantage is much less than in
the case of estimating the standard deviation. The re-sampling estimator of the mean has a small
downward bias that decreases with the sample size. The sample mean is, of course, unbiased.
Figure 1.16 shows box and whiskers plots of the results from the 1,000 simulated data sets in
each box. The box shows the interquartile range with a line at the median. The whiskers extend
1.5  (the interquartile range) beyond the box edges. The plus signs are outliers.
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FIGURE 1.15: Net reward: Performance of conventional vs. re-sampling estimator.
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FIGURE 1.16: Net punishment: Performance of conventional vs. re-sampling estimator.
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1.7.4. Additional results
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FIGURE 1.17: Histogram of time spent by participants on the news site
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FIGURE 1.18: Participant age vs. browsing time
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FIGURE 1.19: Headline items’ time on screen by visual position and condition
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FIGURE 1.20: Social:independent odds ratios for viewing stories
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FIGURE 1.21: Distribution of story views for each world
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FIGURE 1.22: Evolution of points actions and views
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FIGURE 1.23: Headline items’ time on screen and click probability by page position
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TABLE 1.12: Alternative specifications of social influence on probability of punishing
Not controlling for
page position
Includes quadratic
in page position
Includes page
position dummy
variables
Social
effect:
Linear
Social
effect:
Quadratic
Social
effect:
Linear
Social
effect:
Quadratic
Social
effect:
Linear
Social
effect:
Quadratic
Social effect:
Points sub’ed 0:055 0:158 0:029 0:106 0:031 0:113
(0:014) (0:033) (0:015) (0:038) (0:015) (0:039)
Points added 0:086 0:149 0:021 0:054 0:018 0:049
(0:023) (0:046) (0:029) (0:055) (0:029) (0:056)
Individuals 360 360 360 360 360 360
Obs. 8; 640 8; 640 8; 640 8; 640 8; 640 8; 640
Avg. log-likelihood -0:145 -0:144 -0:143 -0:142 -0:141 -0:140
Notes. Average marginal effects of previous punishment (points sub’ed) and reward (points added) printed. Effects
are specified in the share form. Estimates come from a logit model with a dummy variable for each story. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are clustered by participant.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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FIGURE 1.24: Binary effect of previous punishment and reward on individual behavior
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TABLE 1.13: Coefficient estimates of models for affecting net outcomes (panel data)
Left-hand side variable (binary):
The participant acted on story k such
that the net outcome was affected
Net punishment Net reward
Social condition (dummy) 1:278 -0:700
(0:776) (1:468)
State of the news page
when visited by the participant:
Number of organizations w/ points  300 0:003
(0:049)
Social dummy  (# orgs. w/ points  300) -0:066
(0:051)
Number of organizations w/ points  300 -0:053
(0:066)
Social dummy  (# orgs. w/ points  300) 0:038
(0:070)
Average marginal effect of social cond. 0:013 0:006
Significance of AME of social cond. (p) 0:090 0:511
Joint sig. of 3 coefs. above (p) 0:001 0:651
Observations 6; 497 9; 860
Individuals 480 480
Notes. Table displays coefficient estimates from pooled logit models and participant-by-story
panel data. The data used for the “punish” model includes only observations where the organization
had wealth  30. The data used for the “reward” model includes only observations where the
organization had wealth  30. Models include dummy variables for each story and a quadratic
effect of page position. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by individual.  p < 0:10, 
p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
79
TABLE 1.14: Effects of social condition on individual behavior and net outcomes
Net punishment Net reward Views (exploration)
Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE
Difficulty
0  0:0132 (0:0222) 0:0069 (0:0219)  0:0085 (0:0229)
1  0:0072 (0:0171) 0:0073 (0:0132)  0:0475 (0:0283)
2  0:0028 (0:0139) 0:0075 (0:0097)  0:0717 (0:0384)
3 0:0009 (0:0117) 0:0076 (0:0094)  0:0752 (0:0417)
4 0:0041 (0:0101) 0:0077 (0:0107)  0:0611 (0:0378)
5 0:0069 (0:0089) 0:0078 (0:0126)  0:0363 (0:0310)
6 0:0094 (0:0081) 0:0079 (0:0146)  0:0079 (0:0255)
7 0:0117 (0:0076) 0:0080 (0:0165) 0:0190 (0:0227)
8 0:0139 (0:0075) 0:0081 (0:0183) 0:0414 (0:0217)
9 0:0159 (0:0075) 0:0081 (0:0199) 0:0579 (0:0213)
10 0:0178 (0:0078) 0:0082 (0:0215) 0:0681 (0:0210)
11 0:0196 (0:0082) 0:0082 (0:0230) 0:0719 (0:0206)
12 0:0212 (0:0087) 0:0083 (0:0243) 0:0695 (0:0201)
13 0:0228 (0:0093) 0:0083 (0:0256) 0:0614 (0:0199)
14 0:0244 (0:0099) 0:0083 (0:0268) 0:0484 (0:0207)
15 0:0258 (0:0105) 0:0084 (0:0280) 0:0319 (0:0229)
16 0:0272 (0:0111) 0:0084 (0:0291) 0:0141 (0:0261)
17 0:0286 (0:0117) 0:0085 (0:0301)  0:0013 (0:0286)
18 0:0299 (0:0124) 0:0085 (0:0311)  0:0089 (0:0301)
19 0:0311 (0:0130) 0:0085 (0:0321)  0:0028 (0:0357)
20 0:0324 (0:0136) 0:0085 (0:0330) 0:0208 (0:0491)
21 0:0335 (0:0142) 0:0086 (0:0339) 0:0610 (0:0601)
22 0:0347 (0:0148) 0:0086 (0:0347) 0:1122 (0:0629)
23 0:0358 (0:0154) 0:0086 (0:0355) 0:1728 (0:0873)
24 0:0369 (0:0160) 0:0086 (0:0363) 0:2569 (0:1633)
Individuals 480 480 473
Obs. 6; 497 9; 860 4; 614
Avg. log-like.  0:171  0:284  0:269
BIC 2458:15 5864:37 2555:97
Notes. Table displays estimated marginal effects of the social condition on the probability of changing net punish-
ment, changing net reward, or viewing a story, respectively. Marginal effects are based on pooled logit models and
participant-by-story panel data. The data used for estimation contains only the observations such that the organization
had wealth 30, wealth 30, and wealth= 30, respectively. Difficulty means the number of observations for a given
participant that were dropped due to the aforementioned conditioning. Models include dummy variables for each story
and a quadratic effect of page position. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by individual.  p < 0:10, 
p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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TABLE 1.15: Effects of social condition on net punishment (conditional on points  30)
Punishment Reward Either
Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE
Difficulty
0  0:0081 (0:0240)  0:3571 (0:3356)  0:0132 (0:0222)
1  0:0022 (0:0169)  0:2310 (0:1931)  0:0072 (0:0171)
2 0:0015 (0:0131)  0:1679 (0:1229)  0:0028 (0:0139)
3 0:0042 (0:0106)  0:1282 (0:0827) 0:0009 (0:0117)
4 0:0063 (0:0089)  0:1002 (0:0577) 0:0041 (0:0101)
5 0:0081 (0:0078)  0:0789 (0:0414) 0:0069 (0:0089)
6 0:0097 (0:0070)  0:0620 (0:0307) 0:0094 (0:0081)
7 0:0110 (0:0065)  0:0479 (0:0239) 0:0117 (0:0076)
8 0:0122 (0:0063)  0:0360 (0:0201) 0:0139 (0:0075)
9 0:0134 (0:0063)  0:0256 (0:0185) 0:0159 (0:0075)
10 0:0144 (0:0064)  0:0165 (0:0183) 0:0178 (0:0078)
11 0:0153 (0:0066)  0:0083 (0:0189) 0:0196 (0:0082)
12 0:0162 (0:0069)  0:0009 (0:0199) 0:0212 (0:0087)
13 0:0170 (0:0072) 0:0059 (0:0211) 0:0228 (0:0093)
14 0:0177 (0:0076) 0:0122 (0:0223) 0:0244 (0:0099)
15 0:0185 (0:0079) 0:0180 (0:0234) 0:0258 (0:0105)
16 0:0191 (0:0083) 0:0234 (0:0246) 0:0272 (0:0111)
17 0:0198 (0:0087) 0:0285 (0:0257) 0:0286 (0:0117)
18 0:0204 (0:0090) 0:0333 (0:0268) 0:0299 (0:0124)
19 0:0210 (0:0094) 0:0379 (0:0279) 0:0311 (0:0130)
20 0:0216 (0:0098) 0:0422 (0:0290) 0:0324 (0:0136)
21 0:0221 (0:0101) 0:0464 (0:0300) 0:0335 (0:0142)
22 0:0226 (0:0105) 0:0503 (0:0311) 0:0347 (0:0148)
23 0:0231 (0:0108) 0:0541 (0:0322) 0:0358 (0:0154)
24 0:0236 (0:0111) 0:0578 (0:0332) 0:0369 (0:0160)
Individuals 480 411 480
Obs. 6; 497 1; 417 6; 497
Avg. log-like.  0:141  0:214  0:171
BIC 1887:10 651:91 2275:11
Notes. Table displays estimated marginal effects of the social condition on the probability of changing net punish-
ment by punishing, rewarding, or either action, respectively. Marginal effects are based on pooled logit models and
participant-by-story panel data. The data used for estimation contains only the observations such that the organization
had wealth 30, wealth < 30, and wealth  30, respectively. Difficulty means the number of observations for a given
participant that were dropped due to the aforementioned conditioning. Models include dummy variables for each story
and a quadratic effect of page position. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by individual.  p < 0:10, 
p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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TABLE 1.16: Effects of social condition on net reward (conditional on points  30)
Punishment Reward Either
Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE
Difficulty
0 0:0321 (0:0154)  0:0036 (0:0214) 0:0069 (0:0219)
1 0:0196 (0:0109) 0:0026 (0:0119) 0:0073 (0:0132)
2 0:0100 (0:0087) 0:0061 (0:0086) 0:0075 (0:0097)
3 0:0017 (0:0080) 0:0085 (0:0083) 0:0076 (0:0094)
4  0:0056 (0:0090) 0:0104 (0:0094) 0:0077 (0:0107)
5  0:0123 (0:0113) 0:0119 (0:0109) 0:0078 (0:0126)
6  0:0185 (0:0142) 0:0131 (0:0123) 0:0079 (0:0146)
7  0:0242 (0:0174) 0:0142 (0:0137) 0:0080 (0:0165)
8  0:0297 (0:0207) 0:0152 (0:0150) 0:0081 (0:0183)
9  0:0348 (0:0241) 0:0160 (0:0161) 0:0081 (0:0199)
10  0:0397 (0:0275) 0:0168 (0:0171) 0:0082 (0:0215)
11  0:0444 (0:0308) 0:0174 (0:0181) 0:0082 (0:0230)
12  0:0489 (0:0342) 0:0181 (0:0190) 0:0083 (0:0243)
13  0:0532 (0:0375) 0:0187 (0:0198) 0:0083 (0:0256)
14  0:0573 (0:0407) 0:0192 (0:0206) 0:0083 (0:0268)
15  0:0613 (0:0439) 0:0197 (0:0213) 0:0084 (0:0280)
16  0:0652 (0:0471) 0:0202 (0:0220) 0:0084 (0:0291)
17  0:0690 (0:0502) 0:0206 (0:0226) 0:0085 (0:0301)
18  0:0726 (0:0532) 0:0210 (0:0232) 0:0085 (0:0311)
19  0:0761 (0:0562) 0:0214 (0:0237) 0:0085 (0:0321)
20  0:0796 (0:0592) 0:0218 (0:0243) 0:0085 (0:0330)
21  0:0829 (0:0621) 0:0221 (0:0248) 0:0086 (0:0339)
22  0:0862 (0:0649) 0:0225 (0:0253) 0:0086 (0:0347)
23  0:0894 (0:0677) 0:0228 (0:0257) 0:0086 (0:0355)
24  0:0925 (0:0704) 0:0231 (0:0262) 0:0086 (0:0363)
Individuals 459 480 480
Obs. 4; 482 9; 860 9; 860
Avg. log-like.  0:147  0:255  0:284
BIC 1369:73 5087:06 5655:68
Notes. Table displays estimated marginal effects of the social condition on the probability of changing net reward by
punishing, rewarding, or either action, respectively. Marginal effects are based on pooled logit models and participant-
by-story panel data. The data used for estimation contains only the observations such that the organization had wealth>
30, wealth30, and wealth 30, respectively. Difficultymeans the number of observations for a given participant that
were dropped due to the aforementioned conditioning. Models include dummy variables for each story and a quadratic
effect of page position. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by individual.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05, 
p < 0:01
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TABLE 1.17: Individual characteristics as predictors of behavior in the experiment (clustering
standard errors by world)
Binary measures of behavior
Total stories
viewed
Log total
browsing
time
Read
> 1 story
Ever
punished
Ever
rewarded
College graduate 0:121 0:083 0:113 0:093 0:005
(0:071) (0:065) (0:030) (0:047) (0:031)
Male -0:025 -0:217 0:022 -0:117 0:002
(0:082) (0:078) (0:046) (0:049) (0:035)
Has engaged in protest activity 0:134 -0:056 0:145 0:122 0:057
(0:089) (0:090) (0:053) (0:056) (0:033)
Age 0:003 0:018 0:001 0:000 -0:000
(0:004) (0:002) (0:003) (0:003) (0:002)
Has low wealth 0:090 0:083 0:031 -0:009 0:032
(0:074) (0:056) (0:044) (0:056) (0:032)
Uses Facebook -0:003 -0:017 -0:101 0:076 0:008
(0:104) (0:105) (0:056) (0:057) (0:049)
Uses Twitter 0:035 -0:064 0:050 -0:010 0:113
(0:053) (0:054) (0:041) (0:040) (0:028)
Owns smartphone -0:014 -0:078 0:049 0:064 0:010
(0:085) (0:068) (0:073) (0:059) (0:066)
Social treatment 0:121 0:175 0:113 0:075 0:061
(0:043) (0:058) (0:042) (0:041) (0:035)
Obs. 477 477 477 477 477
Notes. The first two columns show semi-elasticities. The remaining columns show coefficient estimates (average
marginal effects) from linear probability models. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by world.  p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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TABLE 1.18: Average marginal effects of added and subtracted points (clustering by user vs.
world)
Punish Reward View
User World User World User World
Social effect:
Points sub’ed (share) 0:0268 0:0268 0:0201 0:0201 0:0493 0:0493
(0:0083) (0:0083) (0:0083) (0:0131) (0:0117) (0:0170)
Points added (share) 0:0157 0:0157 0:0336 0:0336 0:0594 0:0594
(0:0055) (0:0039) (0:0091) (0:0104) (0:0110) (0:0123)
N 8640 8640 8640 8640 8640 8640
Notes. Average marginal effects of previous punishment (points sub’ed) and reward (points added)
printed. Effects are specified in binary form with logarithmic decay. Estimates come from a logit
model with a dummy variable for each story but no controls for page position. Standard errors, in
parentheses, are clustered by the variable in the table heading. Standard errors, in parentheses, are
clustered by participant.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
TABLE 1.19: Average marginal effects of added and subtracted points (controlling for page
position, clustering by user vs. world)
Punish Reward View
User World User World User World
Social effect:
Points sub’ed (share) 0:0062 0:0062 -0:0161 -0:0161 -0:0165 -0:0165
(0:0083) (0:0080) (0:0077) (0:0094) (0:0108) (0:0099)
Points added (share) -0:0024 -0:0024 -0:0194 -0:0194 -0:0204 -0:0204
(0:0068) (0:0072) (0:0112) (0:0117) (0:0129) (0:0135)
N 8640 8640 8640 8640 8640 8640
Notes. Average marginal effects of previous punishment (points sub’ed) and reward (points added)
printed. Effects are specified in binary form with logarithmic decay. Estimates come from a
logit model with a dummy variable for each story controls for page position. Standard errors, in
parentheses, are clustered by the variable in the table heading. Standard errors, in parentheses, are
clustered by participant.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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FIGURE 1.25: Probability that participant i punishes story k over the course of a social world
85
TABLE 1.20: Linear effects of prior punishment/reward (cond. on viewing)
Punishment Reward
Effect SE Effect SE
Effect of prior punishment
Participant #
1 0:2779 (0:0341)  0:2767 (0:0875)
2 0:2307 (0:0367)  0:2081 (0:0727)
3 0:1869 (0:0358)  0:1574 (0:0601)
4 0:1490 (0:0325)  0:1190 (0:0493)
5 0:1173 (0:0283)  0:0892 (0:0406)
6 0:0911 (0:0244)  0:0658 (0:0338)
7 0:0695 (0:0214)  0:0472 (0:0287)
8 0:0517 (0:0192)  0:0323 (0:0250)
9 0:0372 (0:0177)  0:0204 (0:0224)
10 0:0254 (0:0166)  0:0109 (0:0204)
11 0:0160 (0:0156)  0:0035 (0:0190)
12 0:0087 (0:0148) 0:0023 (0:0178)
13 0:0031 (0:0140) 0:0067 (0:0168)
14  0:0011 (0:0133) 0:0100 (0:0159)
15  0:0042 (0:0126) 0:0123 (0:0149)
16  0:0063 (0:0119) 0:0139 (0:0141)
17  0:0075 (0:0113) 0:0148 (0:0132)
18  0:0081 (0:0108) 0:0151 (0:0125)
19  0:0081 (0:0104) 0:0149 (0:0118)
20  0:0076 (0:0101) 0:0144 (0:0114)
21  0:0067 (0:0099) 0:0135 (0:0111)
22  0:0055 (0:0100) 0:0123 (0:0111)
23  0:0039 (0:0102) 0:0109 (0:0114)
24  0:0020 (0:0107) 0:0093 (0:0120)
25 0:0000 (0:0113) 0:0074 (0:0128)
26 0:0024 (0:0121) 0:0055 (0:0138)
27 0:0048 (0:0130) 0:0034 (0:0150)
28 0:0075 (0:0140) 0:0011 (0:0163)
29 0:0103 (0:0151)  0:0012 (0:0178)
30 0:0132 (0:0162)  0:0036 (0:0193)
Effect of prior reward
Participant #
1  0:0180 (0:0552) 0:0242 (0:0658)
2  0:0086 (0:0455) 0:0112 (0:0503)
3  0:0015 (0:0375) 0:0027 (0:0392)
4 0:0037 (0:0312)  0:0030 (0:0314)
5 0:0074 (0:0264)  0:0069 (0:0259)
6 0:0100 (0:0228)  0:0094 (0:0220)
7 0:0116 (0:0201)  0:0111 (0:0192)
8 0:0125 (0:0181)  0:0120 (0:0172)
9 0:0129 (0:0165)  0:0124 (0:0158)
10 0:0128 (0:0152)  0:0123 (0:0146)
11 0:0123 (0:0141)  0:0119 (0:0137)
12 0:0116 (0:0131)  0:0113 (0:0128)
13 0:0107 (0:0122)  0:0105 (0:0120)
14 0:0097 (0:0115)  0:0096 (0:0113)
15 0:0086 (0:0107)  0:0085 (0:0107)
16 0:0074 (0:0101)  0:0074 (0:0101)
17 0:0062 (0:0095)  0:0062 (0:0096)
18 0:0049 (0:0090)  0:0049 (0:0091)
19 0:0036 (0:0086)  0:0037 (0:0088)
20 0:0023 (0:0084)  0:0024 (0:0085)
21 0:0010 (0:0082)  0:0011 (0:0084)
22  0:0003 (0:0082) 0:0002 (0:0085)
23  0:0017 (0:0084) 0:0015 (0:0087)
24  0:0030 (0:0087) 0:0029 (0:0090)
25  0:0044 (0:0091) 0:0042 (0:0094)
26  0:0058 (0:0097) 0:0055 (0:0100)
27  0:0071 (0:0103) 0:0068 (0:0106)
28  0:0085 (0:0110) 0:0081 (0:0113)
29  0:0098 (0:0117) 0:0093 (0:0120)
30  0:0111 (0:0125) 0:0106 (0:0128)
Avg. log-like.  0:50844  0:59997
Notes. Table displays estimated marginal effects. Models (1,202 obs., 480 individuals) include dummy variables for each story and a quadratic
effect of page position. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by individual.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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TABLE 1.21: Binary effects of prior punishment/reward (cond. on viewing)
Punishment Reward
Effect SE Effect SE
Effect of prior punishment
Participant #
1 0:6373 (0:1695)  0:4742 (0:2150)
2 0:4744 (0:1409)  0:3532 (0:1654)
3 0:3561 (0:1056)  0:2671 (0:1232)
4 0:2707 (0:0795)  0:2033 (0:0930)
5 0:2080 (0:0627)  0:1546 (0:0731)
6 0:1607 (0:0527)  0:1163 (0:0608)
7 0:1243 (0:0469)  0:0857 (0:0536)
8 0:0959 (0:0433)  0:0607 (0:0494)
9 0:0733 (0:0409)  0:0400 (0:0468)
10 0:0551 (0:0390)  0:0227 (0:0448)
11 0:0403 (0:0374)  0:0082 (0:0431)
12 0:0283 (0:0359) 0:0042 (0:0415)
13 0:0184 (0:0347) 0:0148 (0:0399)
14 0:0103 (0:0337) 0:0239 (0:0384)
15 0:0036 (0:0330) 0:0317 (0:0372)
16  0:0019 (0:0326) 0:0385 (0:0362)
17  0:0063 (0:0326) 0:0444 (0:0355)
18  0:0099 (0:0330) 0:0495 (0:0354)
19  0:0127 (0:0339) 0:0539 (0:0358)
20  0:0149 (0:0352) 0:0577 (0:0368)
21  0:0165 (0:0369) 0:0610 (0:0383)
22  0:0177 (0:0390) 0:0639 (0:0404)
23  0:0184 (0:0414) 0:0664 (0:0428)
24  0:0187 (0:0440) 0:0685 (0:0457)
25  0:0187 (0:0468) 0:0703 (0:0489)
26  0:0185 (0:0498) 0:0718 (0:0524)
27  0:0179 (0:0530) 0:0731 (0:0560)
28  0:0171 (0:0563) 0:0741 (0:0598)
29  0:0161 (0:0597) 0:0749 (0:0638)
30  0:0149 (0:0632) 0:0756 (0:0678)
Effect of prior reward
Participant #
1  0:0601 (0:0884) 0:0950 (0:0942)
2  0:0399 (0:0750) 0:0519 (0:0701)
3  0:0209 (0:0630) 0:0215 (0:0577)
4  0:0066 (0:0551) 0:0004 (0:0518)
5 0:0034 (0:0499)  0:0142 (0:0490)
6 0:0102 (0:0464)  0:0244 (0:0472)
7 0:0147 (0:0437)  0:0313 (0:0457)
8 0:0174 (0:0414)  0:0359 (0:0442)
9 0:0188 (0:0395)  0:0387 (0:0428)
10 0:0194 (0:0380)  0:0402 (0:0414)
11 0:0192 (0:0368)  0:0407 (0:0402)
12 0:0185 (0:0361)  0:0405 (0:0394)
13 0:0174 (0:0358)  0:0396 (0:0389)
14 0:0160 (0:0361)  0:0383 (0:0389)
15 0:0143 (0:0369)  0:0366 (0:0393)
16 0:0124 (0:0382)  0:0345 (0:0403)
17 0:0104 (0:0400)  0:0323 (0:0418)
18 0:0082 (0:0423)  0:0298 (0:0436)
19 0:0059 (0:0448)  0:0272 (0:0459)
20 0:0035 (0:0477)  0:0244 (0:0485)
21 0:0010 (0:0509)  0:0215 (0:0513)
22  0:0015 (0:0542)  0:0186 (0:0544)
23  0:0040 (0:0577)  0:0156 (0:0576)
24  0:0067 (0:0613)  0:0125 (0:0609)
25  0:0093 (0:0651)  0:0094 (0:0644)
26  0:0120 (0:0689)  0:0063 (0:0679)
27  0:0147 (0:0728)  0:0032 (0:0715)
28  0:0174 (0:0768)  0:0000 (0:0752)
29  0:0201 (0:0808) 0:0032 (0:0788)
30  0:0229 (0:0848) 0:0063 (0:0825)
Avg. log-like.  0:50761  0:59845
Notes. Table displays estimated marginal effects. Models (1,202 obs., 480 individuals) include dummy variables for each story and a quadratic
effect of page position. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by individual.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
87
TABLE 1.22: Log effects of prior punishment/reward on individual behavior (cond. on viewing)
Punishment Reward
Effect SE Effect SE
Effect of prior punishment
Participant #
1 0:5885 (0:2434)  0:9459 (0:4775)
2 0:4732 (0:1300)  0:6429 (0:2906)
3 0:3864 (0:1141)  0:4712 (0:1943)
4 0:3061 (0:1036)  0:3544 (0:1477)
5 0:2349 (0:0879)  0:2629 (0:1187)
6 0:1748 (0:0720)  0:1880 (0:0956)
7 0:1257 (0:0593)  0:1269 (0:0772)
8 0:0863 (0:0509)  0:0775 (0:0640)
9 0:0549 (0:0461)  0:0379 (0:0559)
10 0:0301 (0:0436)  0:0066 (0:0514)
11 0:0106 (0:0423) 0:0180 (0:0491)
12  0:0047 (0:0414) 0:0372 (0:0478)
13  0:0165 (0:0404) 0:0519 (0:0466)
14  0:0255 (0:0394) 0:0630 (0:0453)
15  0:0322 (0:0382) 0:0711 (0:0437)
16  0:0369 (0:0369) 0:0767 (0:0419)
17  0:0400 (0:0356) 0:0802 (0:0400)
18  0:0418 (0:0344) 0:0820 (0:0383)
19  0:0424 (0:0335) 0:0822 (0:0368)
20  0:0420 (0:0330) 0:0813 (0:0359)
21  0:0408 (0:0329) 0:0792 (0:0357)
22  0:0387 (0:0334) 0:0762 (0:0364)
23  0:0361 (0:0347) 0:0724 (0:0381)
24  0:0328 (0:0365) 0:0679 (0:0408)
25  0:0290 (0:0390) 0:0628 (0:0444)
26  0:0248 (0:0420) 0:0571 (0:0487)
27  0:0201 (0:0455) 0:0510 (0:0535)
28  0:0151 (0:0495) 0:0444 (0:0589)
29  0:0098 (0:0537) 0:0375 (0:0646)
30  0:0042 (0:0582) 0:0303 (0:0707)
Effect of prior reward
Participant #
1  0:0127 (0:1576)  0:0641 (0:2411)
2  0:0029 (0:1250)  0:0592 (0:1574)
3 0:0030 (0:1014)  0:0556 (0:1131)
4 0:0063 (0:0823)  0:0523 (0:0868)
5 0:0076 (0:0677)  0:0483 (0:0698)
6 0:0073 (0:0574)  0:0436 (0:0587)
7 0:0061 (0:0506)  0:0383 (0:0517)
8 0:0043 (0:0461)  0:0329 (0:0474)
9 0:0020 (0:0431)  0:0276 (0:0447)
10  0:0006 (0:0409)  0:0223 (0:0428)
11  0:0033 (0:0392)  0:0173 (0:0413)
12  0:0061 (0:0377)  0:0125 (0:0398)
13  0:0090 (0:0363)  0:0079 (0:0384)
14  0:0119 (0:0351)  0:0035 (0:0370)
15  0:0149 (0:0339) 0:0007 (0:0356)
16  0:0178 (0:0329) 0:0046 (0:0344)
17  0:0208 (0:0322) 0:0085 (0:0333)
18  0:0238 (0:0317) 0:0121 (0:0326)
19  0:0267 (0:0315) 0:0157 (0:0322)
20  0:0297 (0:0316) 0:0191 (0:0322)
21  0:0326 (0:0322) 0:0223 (0:0328)
22  0:0355 (0:0331) 0:0255 (0:0338)
23  0:0383 (0:0344) 0:0286 (0:0353)
24  0:0412 (0:0361) 0:0316 (0:0372)
25  0:0440 (0:0381) 0:0345 (0:0394)
26  0:0468 (0:0403) 0:0373 (0:0420)
27  0:0496 (0:0428) 0:0400 (0:0449)
28  0:0523 (0:0454) 0:0426 (0:0480)
29  0:0551 (0:0482) 0:0452 (0:0512)
30  0:0577 (0:0512) 0:0477 (0:0546)
Avg. log-like.  0:51108  0:59925
Notes. Table displays estimated marginal effects. Models (1,202 obs., 480 individuals) include dummy variables for each story and a quadratic
effect of page position. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by individual.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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TABLE 1.23: Linear effects of prior punishment/reward on individual behavior (unconditional)
Punishment Reward Viewing
Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE
Effect of prior punishment
Participant #
1 0:0470 (0:0305)  0:0438 (0:0275)  0:0023 (0:0354)
2 0:0331 (0:0202)  0:0379 (0:0201)  0:0077 (0:0256)
3 0:0233 (0:0146)  0:0325 (0:0155)  0:0108 (0:0193)
4 0:0158 (0:0109)  0:0278 (0:0124)  0:0126 (0:0151)
5 0:0104 (0:0082)  0:0238 (0:0102)  0:0135 (0:0122)
6 0:0065 (0:0063)  0:0204 (0:0086)  0:0139 (0:0102)
7 0:0037 (0:0051)  0:0175 (0:0075)  0:0139 (0:0089)
8 0:0016 (0:0043)  0:0150 (0:0066)  0:0137 (0:0080)
9 0:0002 (0:0038)  0:0129 (0:0060)  0:0133 (0:0073)
10  0:0009 (0:0034)  0:0110 (0:0056)  0:0128 (0:0068)
11  0:0017 (0:0032)  0:0094 (0:0052)  0:0122 (0:0064)
12  0:0022 (0:0030)  0:0079 (0:0050)  0:0116 (0:0061)
13  0:0026 (0:0028)  0:0067 (0:0047)  0:0109 (0:0058)
14  0:0028 (0:0027)  0:0056 (0:0045)  0:0103 (0:0055)
15  0:0029 (0:0025)  0:0046 (0:0043)  0:0095 (0:0053)
16  0:0030 (0:0024)  0:0038 (0:0040)  0:0088 (0:0050)
17  0:0029 (0:0023)  0:0031 (0:0038)  0:0081 (0:0047)
18  0:0028 (0:0022)  0:0024 (0:0036)  0:0074 (0:0045)
19  0:0027 (0:0022)  0:0019 (0:0035)  0:0067 (0:0043)
20  0:0025 (0:0021)  0:0014 (0:0033)  0:0060 (0:0041)
21  0:0022 (0:0021)  0:0009 (0:0032)  0:0053 (0:0040)
22  0:0020 (0:0020)  0:0006 (0:0031)  0:0046 (0:0039)
23  0:0017 (0:0020)  0:0003 (0:0031)  0:0039 (0:0038)
24  0:0014 (0:0020) 0:0000 (0:0032)  0:0033 (0:0038)
25  0:0010 (0:0021) 0:0002 (0:0033)  0:0026 (0:0039)
26  0:0007 (0:0021) 0:0004 (0:0035)  0:0020 (0:0040)
27  0:0004 (0:0022) 0:0006 (0:0038)  0:0014 (0:0042)
28 0:0000 (0:0023) 0:0007 (0:0040)  0:0008 (0:0044)
29 0:0004 (0:0025) 0:0008 (0:0044)  0:0002 (0:0046)
30 0:0008 (0:0026) 0:0009 (0:0047) 0:0004 (0:0049)
Effect of prior reward
Participant #
1  0:0094 (0:0155)  0:0063 (0:0105)  0:0120 (0:0221)
2  0:0070 (0:0123)  0:0088 (0:0083)  0:0145 (0:0170)
3  0:0052 (0:0098)  0:0102 (0:0069)  0:0154 (0:0135)
4  0:0038 (0:0078)  0:0110 (0:0060)  0:0155 (0:0112)
5  0:0027 (0:0064)  0:0113 (0:0054)  0:0151 (0:0095)
6  0:0019 (0:0053)  0:0113 (0:0050)  0:0145 (0:0083)
7  0:0013 (0:0046)  0:0111 (0:0047)  0:0137 (0:0075)
8  0:0008 (0:0041)  0:0108 (0:0045)  0:0129 (0:0069)
9  0:0005 (0:0037)  0:0104 (0:0043)  0:0120 (0:0064)
10  0:0002 (0:0034)  0:0099 (0:0042)  0:0111 (0:0060)
11  0:0000 (0:0032)  0:0094 (0:0040)  0:0102 (0:0057)
12 0:0001 (0:0030)  0:0088 (0:0039)  0:0092 (0:0054)
13 0:0003 (0:0028)  0:0082 (0:0038)  0:0083 (0:0051)
14 0:0004 (0:0026)  0:0076 (0:0036)  0:0075 (0:0048)
15 0:0004 (0:0025)  0:0070 (0:0035)  0:0066 (0:0046)
16 0:0005 (0:0023)  0:0064 (0:0034)  0:0058 (0:0044)
17 0:0005 (0:0022)  0:0058 (0:0032)  0:0049 (0:0042)
18 0:0006 (0:0021)  0:0051 (0:0031)  0:0042 (0:0039)
19 0:0006 (0:0020)  0:0045 (0:0030)  0:0034 (0:0038)
20 0:0006 (0:0019)  0:0039 (0:0029)  0:0026 (0:0036)
21 0:0006 (0:0018)  0:0033 (0:0028)  0:0019 (0:0034)
22 0:0006 (0:0018)  0:0027 (0:0027)  0:0012 (0:0033)
23 0:0006 (0:0018)  0:0021 (0:0026)  0:0006 (0:0032)
24 0:0005 (0:0018)  0:0016 (0:0025) 0:0001 (0:0032)
25 0:0005 (0:0018)  0:0010 (0:0025) 0:0007 (0:0032)
26 0:0005 (0:0018)  0:0005 (0:0025) 0:0013 (0:0032)
27 0:0004 (0:0019) 0:0001 (0:0025) 0:0019 (0:0032)
28 0:0004 (0:0020) 0:0006 (0:0025) 0:0025 (0:0033)
29 0:0004 (0:0021) 0:0011 (0:0026) 0:0031 (0:0035)
30 0:0003 (0:0022) 0:0016 (0:0027) 0:0036 (0:0036)
Avg. log-like.  0:14184  0:24959  0:35528
Notes. Table displays estimated marginal effects. Models (8,640 obs., 480 individuals) include dummy variables for each story and a quadratic
effect of page position. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by individual.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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TABLE 1.24: Binary effects of prior punishment/reward on individual behavior (unconditional)
Punishment Reward Viewing
Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE
Effect of prior punishment
Participant #
1 0:0897 (0:0648)  0:0536 (0:0451) 0:0426 (0:0721)
2 0:0565 (0:0325)  0:0481 (0:0298) 0:0132 (0:0419)
3 0:0384 (0:0201)  0:0437 (0:0217)  0:0027 (0:0279)
4 0:0269 (0:0148)  0:0398 (0:0169)  0:0121 (0:0210)
5 0:0190 (0:0123)  0:0363 (0:0142)  0:0180 (0:0177)
6 0:0133 (0:0111)  0:0331 (0:0127)  0:0217 (0:0161)
7 0:0090 (0:0103)  0:0302 (0:0118)  0:0240 (0:0152)
8 0:0057 (0:0097)  0:0274 (0:0113)  0:0254 (0:0147)
9 0:0032 (0:0092)  0:0248 (0:0110)  0:0260 (0:0142)
10 0:0012 (0:0088)  0:0224 (0:0108)  0:0262 (0:0138)
11  0:0004 (0:0084)  0:0201 (0:0106)  0:0260 (0:0134)
12  0:0016 (0:0080)  0:0179 (0:0103)  0:0255 (0:0130)
13  0:0026 (0:0077)  0:0158 (0:0101)  0:0248 (0:0126)
14  0:0034 (0:0074)  0:0138 (0:0098)  0:0239 (0:0122)
15  0:0040 (0:0072)  0:0118 (0:0095)  0:0230 (0:0118)
16  0:0045 (0:0071)  0:0100 (0:0092)  0:0219 (0:0116)
17  0:0049 (0:0071)  0:0082 (0:0090)  0:0207 (0:0114)
18  0:0051 (0:0071)  0:0065 (0:0089)  0:0195 (0:0113)
19  0:0053 (0:0073)  0:0048 (0:0089)  0:0182 (0:0114)
20  0:0054 (0:0075)  0:0032 (0:0089)  0:0168 (0:0115)
21  0:0054 (0:0077)  0:0016 (0:0091)  0:0155 (0:0118)
22  0:0054 (0:0081)  0:0001 (0:0095)  0:0141 (0:0122)
23  0:0054 (0:0084) 0:0014 (0:0099)  0:0127 (0:0128)
24  0:0053 (0:0089) 0:0028 (0:0105)  0:0114 (0:0134)
25  0:0052 (0:0093) 0:0042 (0:0113)  0:0099 (0:0141)
26  0:0050 (0:0098) 0:0055 (0:0121)  0:0085 (0:0148)
27  0:0048 (0:0103) 0:0068 (0:0130)  0:0071 (0:0157)
28  0:0046 (0:0108) 0:0081 (0:0140)  0:0057 (0:0165)
29  0:0044 (0:0113) 0:0094 (0:0150)  0:0043 (0:0175)
30  0:0042 (0:0118) 0:0106 (0:0161)  0:0029 (0:0184)
Effect of prior reward
Participant #
1  0:0122 (0:0393) 0:0265 (0:0312) 0:0300 (0:0507)
2  0:0106 (0:0226) 0:0091 (0:0189) 0:0067 (0:0312)
3  0:0092 (0:0158)  0:0014 (0:0145)  0:0063 (0:0227)
4  0:0081 (0:0128)  0:0083 (0:0131)  0:0143 (0:0190)
5  0:0072 (0:0114)  0:0131 (0:0128)  0:0194 (0:0173)
6  0:0063 (0:0106)  0:0164 (0:0127)  0:0225 (0:0165)
7  0:0056 (0:0101)  0:0188 (0:0126)  0:0245 (0:0160)
8  0:0049 (0:0097)  0:0205 (0:0125)  0:0257 (0:0155)
9  0:0042 (0:0093)  0:0216 (0:0124)  0:0262 (0:0151)
10  0:0036 (0:0089)  0:0223 (0:0122)  0:0263 (0:0147)
11  0:0030 (0:0086)  0:0228 (0:0120)  0:0260 (0:0144)
12  0:0025 (0:0083)  0:0230 (0:0119)  0:0255 (0:0141)
13  0:0020 (0:0080)  0:0230 (0:0118)  0:0249 (0:0139)
14  0:0015 (0:0079)  0:0229 (0:0119)  0:0240 (0:0138)
15  0:0010 (0:0078)  0:0226 (0:0120)  0:0231 (0:0138)
16  0:0006 (0:0077)  0:0222 (0:0122)  0:0221 (0:0140)
17  0:0002 (0:0078)  0:0218 (0:0125)  0:0210 (0:0142)
18 0:0002 (0:0079)  0:0212 (0:0128)  0:0199 (0:0146)
19 0:0006 (0:0081)  0:0206 (0:0133)  0:0187 (0:0150)
20 0:0009 (0:0084)  0:0200 (0:0138)  0:0175 (0:0156)
21 0:0013 (0:0088)  0:0193 (0:0144)  0:0163 (0:0162)
22 0:0016 (0:0092)  0:0186 (0:0151)  0:0150 (0:0169)
23 0:0019 (0:0096)  0:0179 (0:0158)  0:0138 (0:0177)
24 0:0023 (0:0101)  0:0172 (0:0165)  0:0125 (0:0185)
25 0:0025 (0:0106)  0:0164 (0:0173)  0:0113 (0:0194)
26 0:0028 (0:0111)  0:0156 (0:0181)  0:0101 (0:0203)
27 0:0031 (0:0117)  0:0148 (0:0189)  0:0088 (0:0212)
28 0:0034 (0:0122)  0:0140 (0:0197)  0:0076 (0:0221)
29 0:0036 (0:0128)  0:0132 (0:0206)  0:0063 (0:0231)
30 0:0039 (0:0134)  0:0124 (0:0214)  0:0051 (0:0240)
Avg. log-like.  0:14175  0:24959  0:35541
Notes. Table displays estimated marginal effects. Models (8,640 obs., 480 individuals) include dummy variables for each story and a quadratic
effect of page position. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by individual.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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TABLE 1.25: Log effects of prior punishment/reward on individual behavior (unconditional)
Punishment Reward Viewing
Effect SE Effect SE Effect SE
Effect of prior punishment
Participant #
1 0:1019 (0:0827)  0:0816 (0:0785) 0:0815 (0:1401)
2 0:0660 (0:0559)  0:0709 (0:0590) 0:0492 (0:0981)
3 0:0434 (0:0361)  0:0598 (0:0448) 0:0274 (0:0704)
4 0:0285 (0:0245)  0:0498 (0:0347) 0:0126 (0:0519)
5 0:0180 (0:0177)  0:0410 (0:0274) 0:0024 (0:0394)
6 0:0104 (0:0137)  0:0333 (0:0224)  0:0045 (0:0312)
7 0:0047 (0:0115)  0:0267 (0:0190)  0:0093 (0:0258)
8 0:0004 (0:0102)  0:0210 (0:0169)  0:0125 (0:0224)
9  0:0030 (0:0094)  0:0161 (0:0155)  0:0144 (0:0202)
10  0:0055 (0:0089)  0:0117 (0:0146)  0:0155 (0:0188)
11  0:0075 (0:0085)  0:0080 (0:0139)  0:0159 (0:0178)
12  0:0090 (0:0081)  0:0046 (0:0134)  0:0158 (0:0169)
13  0:0101 (0:0078)  0:0017 (0:0128)  0:0154 (0:0162)
14  0:0109 (0:0075) 0:0008 (0:0122)  0:0146 (0:0154)
15  0:0115 (0:0072) 0:0031 (0:0116)  0:0136 (0:0147)
16  0:0119 (0:0070) 0:0051 (0:0110)  0:0124 (0:0140)
17  0:0120 (0:0068) 0:0068 (0:0104)  0:0111 (0:0134)
18  0:0121 (0:0066) 0:0084 (0:0099)  0:0097 (0:0128)
19  0:0120 (0:0064) 0:0098 (0:0094)  0:0082 (0:0123)
20  0:0118 (0:0064) 0:0110 (0:0090)  0:0066 (0:0119)
21  0:0116 (0:0064) 0:0121 (0:0088)  0:0050 (0:0116)
22  0:0112 (0:0064) 0:0131 (0:0087)  0:0034 (0:0116)
23  0:0108 (0:0066) 0:0139 (0:0089)  0:0018 (0:0117)
24  0:0104 (0:0068) 0:0147 (0:0092)  0:0001 (0:0120)
25  0:0099 (0:0071) 0:0154 (0:0096) 0:0015 (0:0125)
26  0:0094 (0:0074) 0:0159 (0:0102) 0:0031 (0:0131)
27  0:0088 (0:0078) 0:0165 (0:0110) 0:0047 (0:0139)
28  0:0082 (0:0082) 0:0169 (0:0118) 0:0063 (0:0147)
29  0:0076 (0:0087) 0:0173 (0:0127) 0:0079 (0:0157)
30  0:0070 (0:0092) 0:0177 (0:0137) 0:0094 (0:0167)
Effect of prior reward
Participant #
1  0:0267 (0:0372)  0:0315 (0:0337)  0:0563 (0:0629)
2  0:0200 (0:0246)  0:0303 (0:0265)  0:0487 (0:0465)
3  0:0156 (0:0177)  0:0278 (0:0210)  0:0413 (0:0353)
4  0:0125 (0:0137)  0:0248 (0:0172)  0:0346 (0:0279)
5  0:0102 (0:0114)  0:0219 (0:0148)  0:0288 (0:0232)
6  0:0085 (0:0100)  0:0190 (0:0133)  0:0237 (0:0203)
7  0:0071 (0:0093)  0:0163 (0:0124)  0:0192 (0:0185)
8  0:0060 (0:0088)  0:0138 (0:0118)  0:0152 (0:0173)
9  0:0051 (0:0084)  0:0114 (0:0114)  0:0117 (0:0164)
10  0:0043 (0:0082)  0:0092 (0:0111)  0:0086 (0:0156)
11  0:0037 (0:0079)  0:0072 (0:0107)  0:0058 (0:0150)
12  0:0032 (0:0077)  0:0054 (0:0103)  0:0033 (0:0143)
13  0:0027 (0:0074)  0:0037 (0:0100)  0:0010 (0:0136)
14  0:0023 (0:0072)  0:0021 (0:0096) 0:0011 (0:0130)
15  0:0020 (0:0069)  0:0006 (0:0092) 0:0030 (0:0124)
16  0:0017 (0:0067) 0:0008 (0:0088) 0:0047 (0:0118)
17  0:0014 (0:0065) 0:0021 (0:0084) 0:0063 (0:0113)
18  0:0012 (0:0063) 0:0032 (0:0081) 0:0078 (0:0108)
19  0:0010 (0:0062) 0:0043 (0:0079) 0:0091 (0:0105)
20  0:0009 (0:0061) 0:0054 (0:0077) 0:0103 (0:0103)
21  0:0007 (0:0061) 0:0063 (0:0076) 0:0115 (0:0102)
22  0:0006 (0:0062) 0:0072 (0:0077) 0:0125 (0:0102)
23  0:0005 (0:0063) 0:0081 (0:0078) 0:0135 (0:0104)
24  0:0004 (0:0064) 0:0088 (0:0080) 0:0144 (0:0107)
25  0:0004 (0:0066) 0:0096 (0:0082) 0:0153 (0:0111)
26  0:0003 (0:0069) 0:0103 (0:0086) 0:0161 (0:0117)
27  0:0002 (0:0072) 0:0109 (0:0090) 0:0168 (0:0123)
28  0:0002 (0:0075) 0:0115 (0:0095) 0:0175 (0:0129)
29  0:0002 (0:0079) 0:0121 (0:0100) 0:0181 (0:0136)
30  0:0001 (0:0082) 0:0126 (0:0106) 0:0187 (0:0144)
Avg. log-like.  0:14195  0:24975  0:35554
Notes. Table displays estimated marginal effects. Models (8,640 obs., 480 individuals) include dummy variables for each story and a quadratic
effect of page position. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by individual.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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TABLE 1.26: Effects on punish/reward choices conditional on viewing (social vs. independent)
Punishment Reward
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social Independent Social Independent
Points sub’ed (dummy) 2:595 -1:326 -2:170 0:730
(0:693) (1:695) (0:693) (1:007)
Points sub’ed  Log(participant #) -0:878 -0:013 0:809 -0:021
(0:255) (0:598) (0:249) (0:365)
Points added (dummy) -0:301 -1:912 0:145 -1:049
(0:676) (1:449) (0:540) (1:089)
Points added  Log(participant #) 0:126 0:695 -0:096 0:355
(0:264) (0:559) (0:212) (0:420)
Individuals 360 119 360 120
Obs. 1; 202 345 1; 202 353
Avg. log-likelihood -0:50882 -0:49301 -0:59917 -0:61571
Notes. Table displays coefficients from logit models using participant-by-story panel data conditioned on viewing a story. Models do not include
controls for page position. The points subtracted (added) dummy indicates if the story was punished (rewarded) by any previous participant.
Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by individual.  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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FIGURE 1.26: Bivariate histogram of 50,000 resampled independent worlds vs. observed social
worlds
Figure 1.26 shows the results of drawing 50,000 worlds from the independent worlds re-
sampling distribution. The distribution of net reward and net punishment is plotted as a bivariate
histogram (heatmap). The observed values from the 12 social worlds at overlaid as red points.
The most evident pattern is that the realizations of net punishment in the social worlds are highly
dispersed, with many of the observations lying in regions where the re-sampling distribution has
low density.
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1.7.5. Open-ended descriptions of experienced anger (raw questionnaire data)
Responses to the prompt: “Please use this text box to describe any feelings of anger or indignation
that you experienced during the study.”’
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
— experience —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
1. — People were too uptight about a survey. —
2. — I didn’t have any feelings of anger or indignation. —
3. — I didn’t experience any anger at all even when I might be in possible opposition to the story/fun.. —
4. — I did not feel any anger. —
5. — one story did affect mw —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
6. — —
7. — None —
8. — I thought the hunting story was ridiculous. Killing animals for sport is worthless. —
9. — Reading about the students abusing the rats in the museum was frustrating, saddening, and made me.. —
10. — Not at all. The stories do not really pertain to my immediate situation. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
11. — —
12. — I did not experience anger or indignation in any way. —
13. — Thought it was weird about the handing out of marijuana —
14. — none —
15. — Civilian patrols are a good idea but beating up on minorities is a dick move. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
16. — I find it hard to believe that some scientists think that altering animal intelligence is benefic.. —
17. — no anger —
18. — —
19. — —
20. — I was a bit angry at the story that proposed the eating of pony meat, but I am not a very angry p.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
21. — A bit of anger at some of the stories. —
22. — —
23. — i was calm while reading the stories —
24. — I experienced no feelings of anger. —
25. — —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
26. — —
27. — —
28. — —
29. — The suicide story made me angry because it seemed as if someone was profiting off of people’s suf.. —
30. — None —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
31. — I was angry at seeing all the crimes committed and it took a civilian to make a vigilante force t.. —
100
32. — none, i like reading about medicine and neuroscience —
33. — I’m amazed at the things people think are good ideas. It’s as if things are never thought through.. —
34. — —
35. — none - I purposely avoided the story (rats) that I felt would make me angry —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
36. — none —
37. — I was not angry, I was intrigued. —
38. — I didn’t experience any anger, or at least I don’t think I did. —
39. — I was an am intrested on how New York in particular would handle the recent decline in funding Po.. —
40. — I thought that Clemson UNiversity was being unnecessarily invasive and overstepping their bounds .. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
41. — N/A —
42. — I was angry at the fact that medical practicioners are not subjected to random drug tests and at .. —
43. — Anger mostly at accounts of invasion of personal privacy by an institution. —
44. — I hard a hard time believing what one organization wanted to do. I could understand their motivat.. —
45. — I really didn’t feel any type of anger reading these two stories. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
46. — The reason I gave it a 4 is because in the second story I was not happy with the way the civilian.. —
47. — Interesting what kind of programs people fund. —
48. — How can companies get away with some of those things? —
49. — I thought it was not okay for the Clemson survey to ask such invasive questions —
50. — I didn’t experience any anger because I completely agree with testing doctors who are off duty fo.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
51. — I feel that I did not really experience too much anger because I always look at the positive side.. —
52. — I was a bit angry when reading about the vigilante patrols. —
53. — i did not experience any anger —
54. — One particular story was about the ponies.They had a solution to save them by eating them!!They d.. —
55. — no anger, just interst —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
56. — When I read about lab rats being abused by students at Petaloma High School, I became very angry... —
57. — The hunting article and the horse eating article made me angry. It shows a disrespect for other .. —
58. — Anger at being labeled —
59. — The suicide article got to me. I am strongly against euthanasia. I knew someone that lived reckle.. —
60. — —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
61. — No anger from this story. I found it to be interesting idea of neighbors helping neighbors, espec.. —
62. — Vigilantism can go horribly wrong. —
63. — Surprised at some of organizations and their goals much less excepting donations . How could you.. —
64. — I get upset when personal privacy isn’t respected. —
65. — —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
66. — —
67. — none —
68. — I was very angry at the thought of a shooting school for the blind. Americans with eyesight are a.. —
69. — Not really anger. Amazed at what people will do —
101
70. — —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
71. — I didn’t like the that the sources were from wikipedia. —
72. — —
73. — It was bad that one of the vigilante groups beat a gay black man. —
74. — I was not surprised, we live in 1984 now —
75. — I read about how LSD is making a comeback for use with cancer patients. Drugs kill so I am a bit .. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
76. — —
77. — —
78. — none —
79. — the suicide club really angered me i think it would take a persons choice away, much like the ore.. —
80. — I didn’t feel anger. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
81. — All of the stories I read made me slightly anger because the abuse of power in them. —
82. — No anger experienced. —
83. — i didn’t feel anything. —
84. — —
85. — I experienced some indignation, particularly with the story regarding the sex survey that the sch.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
86. — —
87. — When I read about the Jewish Orthodox patrol group beating a gay black man, I felt a little indig.. —
88. — I read the story about the patrol groups for neighborhoods and I did experience some anger about .. —
89. — —
90. — I felt angry when reading the story about the students abusing the rats at the museum. Regardless.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
91. — not really angry, but annoyed at times at the things people feel are important, and the things pe.. —
92. — none whatspever —
93. — —
94. — I was angry at the vigilantes that had harmed people and not reported a missing child and at the .. —
95. — I did not experience anger. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
96. — Didnt really feel angry at all. —
97. — didnt like that students were abusing rats. —
98. — I experienced indignation with a couple articles. Especially accepting suicide as a right and it.. —
99. — —
100. — I didn’t feel much anger. It just seemed law enforcement does not understand that other people ca.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
101. — I feel that people need to stop trying to play God. If animals were meant to be smarter, then the.. —
102. — Really, they were kind of mild-mannered, even-keeled stories. —
103. — This made me feel angry because I don’t think that this is the right way to go about assisted sui.. —
104. — I want to be able to trust the law enforcement in an area but also understand feelings of concern.. —
105. — I didn’t feel anything. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
106. — none experienced —
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107. — —
108. — I did not experience any anger. —
109. — I really only clicked on the links I liked. I was mildly angry at the Clemson university story, b.. —
110. — None —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
111. — I thought that some of the stories did not warrant the attention that they were getting. —
112. — Curiosity, I only read the SETI article. —
113. — No anger feelings —
114. — I did not experience any type of anger —
115. — —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
116. — While I read the one on the MIRI, many of the titles seemed to be written to aggravate the reader. —
117. — The article I read about was overall positive. There was no display of anger or indignation. —
118. — None —
119. — —
120. — pissed me off. Might as well try to sell the eponymous bridge too. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
121. — I felt that this was very intrusive. —
122. — I disagreed with some of the news items. —
123. — Veterans looking for additional medical help for pain and suffering. Ponies being killed for food.. —
124. — I didn’t feel any anger. At most, I felt mild bemusement. —
125. — I didn’t feel any anger in the stories I had read. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
126. — —
127. — The thought of eating ponies kind of made me angry —
128. — I have no anger at all. —
129. — Some stories’ headlines made me feel mostly appalled rather than angry. I chose to ignore some of.. —
130. — Of all the thousands of nonprofits in the world that could use support and address issues that I .. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
131. — I was very anger and upset over one of the articles. —
132. — Even though I detest rats and mice, it’s wrong to mistreat them in that museum. Also, civilians .. —
133. — I thought that the Clemson survey was distasteful and I would have been very angry if I had been .. —
134. — —
135. — —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
136. — n/a —
137. — —
138. — —
139. — n/a —
140. — I felt a tiny bit angry at an organization advocating euthanasia. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
141. — i had none —
142. — I felt just slightly upset that raising the lawsuit amount would increase medical costs for every.. —
143. — —
144. — I didn’t understand why there would ever be a gun range for the blind. —
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145. — Neutral —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
146. — Very slight anger that social conventions and governmental laws are restricting the study of pote.. —
147. — I had no feelings of anger. —
148. — —
149. — None of these stories made me very angry. I was slightly annoyed at the vigilante cops, but not e.. —
150. — It really bothered me that we are a nation so completely obsessed with firearms that we are putti.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
151. — I felt a little angry that we have to worry about doctors using illegal drugs and misusing prescr.. —
152. — —
153. — I didn’t really experience any anger —
154. — I had no anger or any aggressive emotions during the study. —
155. — No anger-just thought the topic at hand was very intrusive to the students who participated. Majo.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
156. — Moderately angry at the thought that there is an organization sharing suicide methods and tips to.. —
157. — U felt a little angry that some Dr. S don’t feel they need to be regulated. —
158. — I felt joy learning that veterans can cure symptoms of ptsd by using marijuana —
159. — I believe that the group that is trying to contact extraterrestrial life is putting everyone on e.. —
160. — I felt anger over the mistreatment of animals and the stripping of rights from our veterans. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
161. — —
162. — I was partially angered at the fact that some of the organizations asking for money were ridiculo.. —
163. — The only thing that upset me was eating ponies to save the species. That seems silly. Also, I w.. —
164. — None —
165. — I did not feel any anger. It was just a medical article about LSD. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
166. — I didn’t have any anger —
167. — I did not feel angry or feel any indignation over reading the news. It was not personal. —
168. — —
169. — The story I read had a small boy that is dying allowed to fulfill his hunting dream. Even though .. —
170. — I did not feel any anger. I picked topics that did not anger me. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
171. — I did not experience any anger during the study. —
172. — I felt almost no feelings of anger. The one time I felt a little uneasy maybe edging towards ange.. —
173. — Mainly about the story I read regarding physicians being under the influence of drugs while prefo.. —
174. — The feelings of anger an indignation were during the reading of the story about the school with t.. —
175. — —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
176. — I did not feel angry. —
177. — and while I didn’t agree with many of the stories (helping people kill themselves? could never l.. —
178. — I was very angry at the thought of doctors performing surgery while they are under the influence .. —
179. — —
180. — I did not like the use of Student ID numbers in the survey I read about in the article —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
181. — I read about the horses being used for meat and the thought is angering but when you hear that it.. —
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182. — none —
183. — Was upset over impropriety in an academic setting —
184. — I can see that some of the stories were meant to provoke different kind of anger. I had more curi.. —
185. — Only the general anger that happens when one realizes how weird and potentially terrible the worl.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
186. — why do people not think ahead, animals are animals and humans are humans, there are so many probl.. —
187. — .. —
188. — —
189. — —
190. — I did not feel any anger. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
191. — I didn’t feel any anger. —
192. — I felt angry that people are so judgmental concerning the articles. I even felt that I was fallin.. —
193. — I think some of the science articles were ridiculous, people playing god —
194. — I was moldy angry reading the story of vigilantes in new York city. It arouses my suspicions when.. —
195. — I was disturbed by the rat abuse story on a couple of levels, both the abusive treatment they rec.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
196. — I find it a little maddening that vets aren’t taken care of the way they should be. We send thes.. —
197. — —
198. — none —
199. — Anger at FAA regulation. —
200. — —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
201. — The story of humanistic advance and playing God angered me. —
202. — I didn’t feel too much anger. I didn’t like the fact that the Clemson students needed to sign in.. —
203. — It was a ridiculous survey that the university did. It is none of their business and very intrusi.. —
204. — I experienced absolutely no anger or indignation. —
205. — —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
206. — NO FEELINGS —
207. — I didn’t feel anger at all while reading these stories. In fact, I felt more curious than anythin.. —
208. — angry at one of the articles —
209. — —
210. — I felt no anger —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
211. — No real feelings of anger —
212. — I did not feel any emotions related to anger. —
213. — No anger, just boring headlines. —
214. — I did not experience any feelings of anger or indignation during the study, I enjoyed the stories.. —
215. — I got somewhat upset at the mandatory drug testing law —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
216. — —
217. — —
218. — —
219. — I had no feeling sof anger, just sympathy for the veterans. —
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220. — skeptical about the story about citizens patrols. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
221. — —
222. — —
223. — It amazes me that people have the right intentions, but go about it in a wrong way. That is just.. —
224. — None except for mild disagreement with Hawkings contention that contact with aliens might jeopard.. —
225. — Eating the horses was pretty gross and made me mad. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
226. — I didn’t really feel any. The two stories I read were both very interesting. —
227. — Coming for a state that pot is legal I can see people trying to legalize the use of LSD for medic.. —
228. — I did not have any feelings of anger. —
229. — —
230. — I thought that the articles I read were interesting —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
231. — —
232. — The reading about aliens was as annoying as articles I read in the news paper everyday. —
233. — I felt angry that citizens have to do the work that police are paid to do. What is even the point.. —
234. — Bear hunting story and Ukrainian plane story were a bit maddening. —
235. — —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
236. — I did not feel any anger or indignation. —
237. — The story about the rats being abused filled me with anger. Animal abuse is ugly, ugly behavior. —
238. — I mostly felt anger at the idiotic students that somehow think killing animals is fun. And who w.. —
239. — I didn’t like the celebration of an animal’s death. —
240. — I was angry that some people are too focused on changing things don’t need to be changed. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
241. — I felt indignation at the sex survey article. It was invasive and assumptive. —
242. — none. —
243. — It makes me a little bit upset when I read about animal being test subjects. —
244. — I never felt angry. —
245. — Reading the eating ponies angered me. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
246. — —
247. — —
248. — I experienced no anger. —
249. — I didn’t see anything to get actually angry about. —
250. — i didnt really feel to much of anything during the study, neutral feelings. i wasnt angry or happ.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
251. — —
252. — —
253. — some of the articles I wasnt interested in —
254. — The Dr. Death guy really made me angry. And also those presumptuous stoners handing out maryjane.. —
255. — Pets being made smarter is neutral with me. I read about doctors being drug tested. I think it’s .. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
256. — I was not angry at all —
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257. — —
258. — None experienced. —
259. — I felt anger when reading the story about the abused rats. It’s disturbing that children, or anyb.. —
260. — None —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
261. — did not experience anger —
262. — Some of the stories were quite biased and I did not agree with them. —
263. — I didn’t experience any anger but I did experience slight indignation. —
264. — I read a story about blind people shooting guns. I got a little angry hearing that at least one .. —
265. — —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
266. — I really didnt think eating the ponies was a good idea. It made me angry to read this. —
267. — I don’t think it’s right to allow kids who are terminally sick to go out hunting. It seems hypocr.. —
268. — I didn’t experience any anger, I found the survey interesting and informative. —
269. — —
270. — I do not have any feelings of anger, but only feel more knowledgeable after reading such informat.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
271. — I felt a little annoyed that there is a whole organization committed to saving Dartmoor ponies by.. —
272. — I was indignant at a few of the headlines. I also was disgusted by the article about eating ponie.. —
273. — frustrating about news on government and politics and heatlh etc. —
274. — I felt a little irritation, especially with regard to the articles about guns. —
275. — More than anger I felt outraged. These are public funds. Palladium is an important resource, and .. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
276. — but then I ended up giving then points for helping kids. —
277. — I didn’t feel any of the articles I read were meant to invoke anger or indignation. They were al.. —
278. — I didn’t feel any anger or indignation really, maybe more interest and perplexity —
279. — I usually don’t trust the media. The story I read about weed was interesting but annoyed me a lit.. —
280. — I was somewhat angered about the lack of disclosure in the ad for robotic surgery. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
281. — n/a —
282. — I could not really understand why the blind need to shoot guns, did not get the point. —
283. — I got angry when I read the story about Clemson University because of the types of questions they.. —
284. — none —
285. — When reading about the drones, I felt angered at how much fuss people make over them. Seriously, .. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
286. — I did not experience any feelings of anger —
287. — The whole suicide club article got me pretty angry —
288. — —
289. — There was information within one of the articles I read that brought up anger from prior knowledg.. —
290. — —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
291. — I was angered about the unjust deaths of animals, especially the rats. —
292. — while reading the stories about eating ponies i was horrified and angry. where do we draw the lin.. —
293. — A few made me angry like hunting trips for kids but overall it was more mild disapproval like the.. —
294. — I experienced no anger. —
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295. — I was slightly indignant at the abrupt halt to lsd research since I believe it has benefits. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
296. — i read different story about people try to help other but the government get involve and miss thi.. —
297. — None —
298. — I felt anger concerning the vigilante/crime watch article in which a group beat a black gay man. —
299. — I had no anger. I read the article at first with no bias and then made my own decisions. —
300. — —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
301. — no anger —
302. — response. —
303. — I felt that there was a lot of irresponsible behavior described in most of the articles I read, a.. —
304. — —
305. — —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
306. — I did not like the idea of making meat out of the ponies. I also was angry at the treatment of t.. —
307. — I always feel upset when I learn that anyone is mistreated or treated unfairly. For the most part.. —
308. — N/A —
309. — I did not feel any feelings of anger. —
310. — I am vegetarian so stories about hurting animals made me unhappy. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
311. — The sex survey article was pretty ridiculous and sort of funny. —
312. — —
313. — —
314. — none —
315. — I was annoyed in particular at the Clemson story. There is a problem on campus, but I’m not sure .. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
316. — —
317. — Some of the organizations, in my opinion are just plain stupid. That they would actually garner .. —
318. — I was shocked that Clemson would publish a study that would allow confidential information to be .. —
319. — I felt angry after seeing an image of a pig that was hunted and killed by a little boy. —
320. — I did not really experience any anger or indignation. I thought the articles and organizations we.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
321. — I was angry to see the meat market approach to saving Hill ponies. —
322. — I didn’t really feel angry, although I disagreed with some of the ethics. —
323. — I was a bit angry with the LSD and marijuana legalization efforts, knowing how damaging these dru.. —
324. — I felt angry about the scientists at Colorado Boulder that may have been falsifying their results.. —
325. — There were little amounts of anger in reading the article about Dr.Death and his attempt to allow.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
326. — I was a little angry about the article that said to save horses we should eat them. —
327. — I felt angry at a story about animal abuse reported at a school, as well as a story about researc.. —
328. — there was a story about hunting which made me a bit angry but i did not read the story after seei.. —
329. — —
330. — and on transhumanism, because I felt that they did not deal very well with the science involved. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
331. — no anger or indignation —
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332. — Not very much anger. More like confusion. —
333. — There were a lot of stories that were not real news or beneficial. —
334. — I experienced some anger toward doctors who would treat patients while ’under the influence’ ther.. —
335. — I was angry about one of the articles I read and how the study participants in it were treated. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
336. — I didn’t experience any anger. —
337. — —
338. — Nothing made me angry. —
339. — Some of the stories made me angry at the organizations that were unethical and abused their powers. —
340. — I felt it was ridiculous to teach blind people to shoot guns, and wondered why the State of New H.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
341. — none —
342. — I was perfectly at peace during the study. —
343. — I did not feel angry at all doing the readings —
344. — I got angry when I read about Drs. performing surgery with drug problems. —
345. — —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
346. — No anger —
347. — —
348. — —
349. — —
350. — No anger at all —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
351. — Did not have any anger. —
352. — —
353. — It made me slightly angry to read that Congress has mandated that a third of military forces are .. —
354. — I did not experience anger or indignation. —
355. — none really —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
356. — I didn’t feel any anger. I felt the Doctor’s decision is justified. If someone wants to end their.. —
357. — The thought of eating horses is disgusting —
358. — I had some anger at Clemson University for their questions about how many times the students had .. —
359. — There were none. —
360. — —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
361. — I felt indignation because none of the news stories were inspirational. None of the organizations.. —
362. — I did think the pony eating was a little disgusting, but I didn’t feel anger or indignation. Also.. —
363. — I felt no real anger. I am not keen on some of the subjects, but I wouldn’t call what I felt as a.. —
364. — —
365. — I don’t recall feeling any anger. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
366. — most of the studys in these news story where just bull i just got mad about the waste of time and.. —
367. — —
368. — I felt some anger from the euthanasia article when at the end of the article they quoted someone .. —
369. — No anger...maybe a little fear. (the alien one) —
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370. — N/A I don’t get angry easily —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
371. — Well, i was not angry, but there are a couple of stories that really make you re-think beliefs an.. —
372. — No anger felt. I had a position in my mind while reading but they didn’t cause any agitation or a.. —
373. — Slight anger over those who can’t see being allowed to use firearms. Moderate anger over eating h.. —
374. — —
375. — I fully understood each article and nothing anger me. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
376. — I thought it was a little strange that someone would think that everyone living forever would be .. —
377. — none —
378. — No feelings of anger. I did think there was a potential for the vigilante justice workers to go .. —
379. — none —
380. — No anger, but I didn’t like the story about the vigilants in Howard Beach —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
381. — I felt anger when I read the rat story. I hate animal abuse. I believe all animals should have ri.. —
382. — Just don’t fancy horse eating. —
383. — —
384. — its bad that their are not enough cops —
385. — Not so sure about the vigilante’s in NY. Are the police officers that overwhelmed there? I think .. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
386. — —
387. — —
388. — i dont like untrained people in squad cars —
389. — I didn’t experience any anger. —
390. — I was a bit angered and disturbed by the story about the organization promoting selling and eatin.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
391. — I didn’t read any stories that would make me feel any anger. There is too much sad and disgustin.. —
392. — —
393. — no anger —
394. — That a group who is supposed to save horses says to eat them, that kind of makes me angry. A scho.. —
395. — —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
396. — None —
397. — —
398. — Hunters kids? I don’t like —
399. — I felt indignant at the irresponsible methods some Pro-Euthenasia groups go about things. —
400. — I had no anger I was just reading news stories who gets angry at the news? —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
401. — I felt a little angry because I do not agree with vigilante groups and it brought up old feelings.. —
402. — I felt no feelings of anger toward the articles I read. —
403. — i felt very little anger because i had a level head —
404. — I did not like the story about ponies and eating them. I also did not like TOR because I felt th.. —
405. — Anger that children are taught to slaughter wild animals. Anger that ponies would be killed for m.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
406. — I was angered just a tiny bit because the headlines weren’t necessarily ones I wanted to donate to —
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407. — none —
408. — —
409. — I had no feelings of anger —
410. — Calmness and interest —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
411. — is a ridiculous notion to have more ponies....if you’re having more for them to be eaten, I fail.. —
412. — Most of the causes seems to be fairly liberal with the goal of playing God or defeating tradition.. —
413. — I’m just kind of confused with the points system. —
414. — None —
415. — Reading some of the stories the topics made me angry. Like eating horses and abusing mice —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
416. — —
417. — —
418. — Some of the articles presented ugly sides of humanity, such as dishonest physicians and the use o.. —
419. — I did not experience much anger. The only slight feeling of indignation was when I was reading a.. —
420. — No feelings of anger! —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
421. — I didn’t feel any. —
422. — I don’t think people should have to disclose their personal lives unless help is granted afterward. —
423. — I was somewhat disappointed by this research. There were so many discrepancies in whether or not .. —
424. — The only story that upset me was about the assisted suicide. It has been a hot topic lately, so I.. —
425. — Some of those people are so stupid! —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
426. — Slightly upset —
427. — —
428. — Hunting is one thing, but just torturing animals is another. —
429. — —
430. — I just disagreed with the two stories I read. I found them very absurd! —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
431. — —
432. — I read the article on eating Dartmoor ponies to save them. As the article says, I see horses as c.. —
433. — —
434. — I was angry at eating the horses and helping people commit suicide. —
435. — I think it’s pathetic how people think animals should be treated. I can’t stand reading about peo.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
436. — None of the stories that I chose made me feel angry. I avoided the ones that would have, like the.. —
437. — —
438. — n/a —
439. — I was very interested in some of the stores. —
440. — I did not feel any anger or indignation. Perhaps it was my choice of articles. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
441. — The stories about gun use were particularly bothersome to me. —
442. — —
443. — I did not experience anger. —
444. — —
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445. — none —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
446. — I am really feeling that the vets deserve medical marijuana. —
447. — I didn’t really have any feelings of anger. Some disappointment in things a story reported, but n.. —
448. — —
449. — I think it’s wrong —
450. — a hard time. I believe individuals who are suffering should be allowed to end their lives in a d.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
451. — I was frustrated that humans would either want to experiment on animals or take it upon themselve.. —
452. — I had no angry feelings. —
453. — I felt angry that the rebels in the story tried to boast on min, then when they found out it was .. —
454. — I had no feelings of anger while doing this study. —
455. — I thought that people are stupid a lot which makes me mildly angry but not tremendously angry tho.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
456. — Not angry as much disturb by the thought of trying to live forever from the article I read. —
457. — It made me a little angry when I read they ate the horses. —
458. — —
459. — I felt very angry about the story of the rats being abused —
460. — The story was more information and not an issue that would generate a lot of emotional response —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
461. — I chose articles that were not the type that causes anger —
462. — I had no anger just curiosity in the subjects at hand. —
463. — I experienced anger when reading the stories related to the animals - the abuse and mistreatment .. —
464. — I think it is ridiculous that anyone would even consider training a blind person to shoot a gun. .. —
465. — none —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
466. — No anger —
467. — I wasn’t angry, I found the news article interesting. —
468. — Some of the stories just touch home to me and bother me quite a bit. Although Im not furiously an.. —
469. — I was slightly angry reading about the Clemson University story. It upset me that students were .. —
470. — Some of the titles of the articles I did not want to read. I chose not to read those...I think I .. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
471. — Not really anger. Just the stories I read seemed rather bizarre and foolish, if not outright dang.. —
472. — The sex survey story made me angry. nobody has any right to make people disclose this type of inf.. —
473. — Some of the stories made me cringe because of their beliefs within the stories. —
474. — The story I read was about MD’s not diclosing financial ties to the DaVinci. It’s angering becaus.. —
475. — I experienced anger while reading the story of the 7 year old boy whose bear hunt was sponsored b.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
476. — I thought it was ridiculous that the Howard Beach Civilian Patrol was not appreciated by NYPD. —
477. — I was upset that no matter what you do on the internet, it can never really be kept secret. Altho.. —
478. — I can just imagine the rise of many George Zimmerman type crimes taking place with the vigilante .. —
479. — —
480. — —
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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1.7.6. Open-ended general comments (raw questionnaire data)
3. — I have a lot of confidence because you put it in writing. If you don’t then your credibility is s.. —
7. — none —
12. — This was an interesting and unique study. I look forward to hearing about the results. —
16. — I enjoyed it. —
17. — none, thank you —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
18. — thanks —
20. — N/A —
24. — Good luck with your research! I have some good friends at CalTech. —
27. — Interesting articles, some I’ve heard of and some I will look up after survey completion. —
38. — It was interesting to have so much control over what to read and how to influence how much money .. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
39. — program where you and a few people ellect to talk to some one i.e a sophmore would talk to a sen.. —
41. — This was a fun and interesting Hit. Thanks, have a great day!! —
51. — Thank you, this was very nicely put together and the topics were great. —
57. — I just started Mechanical Turk so the weekly amounts above are estimates. —
58. — NA —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
63. — none —
75. — I believe some of these stories are made up for research purposes. —
82. — None —
90. — I enjoyed participating in your study and reading the articles. —
92. — ty —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
96. — I like turtles —
98. — I just started using mechanical turk so my average time and amount earned are not entirely accura.. —
100. — It was a little confusing at first, but I soon got the hang of what was required. —
103. — Interesting survey! —
114. — thank you —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
120. — What a great study presentation. Low stress, made me want to read the articles. This is a better .. —
123. — I feel very fortunate that I am well. —
124. — n/a —
130. — Very interesting study, rather unique. I appreciate the opportunity to participate. —
134. — I enjoyed reading the articles. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
137. — Some of the headlines seemed to not be real. —
146. — none. neat new survey tool —
148. — Interesting! —
149. — Excellent HIT, thanks a ton! —
151. — Interesting and fun study. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
154. — n/a —
162. — I doubt there will be any actual money paid even though the 10 points are merely 30 cents. I sti.. —
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165. — I stated that I didn’t feel any anger but the next question was how you define your anger. —
167. — Fun study. I like to read the news, you had a nice selection of different topics. I’ll look for.. —
170. — No problems. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
175. — thanks —
185. — Wish I could have read more articles. Interesting selections! —
186. — , so I don’t really have a proper weekly hours time or earnings amount. —
192. — I really enjoyed this type of survey, very unique. —
193. — na —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
196. — good luck with your research! —
201. — real purpose?? —
204. — The news stories were varied and interesting. —
214. — N/A, thank you very much. —
225. — Feel free give out bonuses to us sub-minimum wage folks. ;-) —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
228. — Very interesting articles! —
235. — none —
241. — None. —
250. — no additional comments. —
254. — the articles were interesting and informative —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
255. — This has been simple to understand. —
256. — There were a lot of editing errors in the articles on this site. —
259. — n/a —
270. — I really enjoyed taking this survey. —
276. — I’m not certain all those news articles are actually real. Just a comment, not a complaint. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
277. — The articles were not that interesting overall. They were regarding subjects that are very much .. —
278. — Interesting study! —
279. — thank you for the study, it was interesting —
281. — n/a —
284. — none —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
285. — This was interesting. —
289. — This was an interesting survey. I did enjoy taking it. I love to read. —
294. — Thank you! —
296. — none —
299. — none —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
302. — Good luck--good variety of articles and I learned something new today!!! That’s a BIG plus when y.. —
309. — Very interesting, thank you! —
311. — It was a fun exercise. Thanks! —
318. — None, thanks! —
329. — thank you —
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—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
330. — Some of the articles seemed to have grammatical mistakes, although this may not be your fault. Al.. —
337. — Thank you! —
338. — I liked the variety of headlines that were available to choose from. —
340. — I thought it was interesting, and different (in a good way) —
346. — None —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
347. — Some of the news articles were interesting to read. —
350. — No complaints or concerns... —
353. — n/a —
355. — none —
356. — Interesting choice of stories. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
359. — I liked this study. —
361. — not any —
364. — Thanks for the articles, there were a few I wasn’t aware of. —
365. — Interesting survey! —
370. — none but thanks for the survey —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
375. — interesting and different —
377. — was very interesting the two stories I read were very informative —
380. — Interesting survey. Thanks! —
390. — The stories were cool! A lot of random information and organizations I didn’t know about. —
391. — I found this survey very interesting. This is a lot different than most hits on Mturk which is w.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
394. — I wish I could read more or that it explains (and maybe it does) that the headlines do not need t.. —
398. — Interesting —
400. — I love the design of this site, wish I had more time to play around on it but I have to go to din.. —
410. — Thank you. —
423. — I have no other comments about this study except that I find that there are some disturbing thing.. —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
431. — none —
439. — Vary insightful!! —
441. — I really like the way this survey was designed. It was fun and easy to use. I’d love to do some m.. —
451. — No other comments. —
452. — none —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
453. — Thank You —
459. — have a nice day —
461. — No comment —
462. — N/A —
467. — None —
—-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------—
475. — It was interesting reading the articles but I feel like the instructions were a little hard to un.. —
476. — None. —
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TABLE 1.27: The questionnaire
Variable Question text
Anger level Overall, while reading these news stories how much did you
experience ANGER? Use this scale where 1=No anger at all
and 10=Greatest anger you can imagine.
Gender What is your gender?
Education What is the highest level of education you completed?
Experienced anger Please use this text box to describe any feelings of anger or in-
dignation that you experienced during the study.”
Hours/week on Mturk Howmany hours per week do you USUALLYwork on Mechan-
ical Turk?
Dollars/week on Mturk How much do you USUALLY earn per week on Mechanical
Turk? Please answer in dollars.
Engaged in political protest Have you ever done any of the following forms of political ac-
tion? Joining in boycotts, attending peaceful demonstrations,
joining strikes.
Has smartphone Do you have a smartphone like an iPhone, Samsung Galaxy
phone, or Windows Phone?
Uses Twitter Do you use Twitter?
Uses Facebook Do you have a Facebook account?
Belief in donation How much confidence do you have that we will pay out the
points as explained?
Low wealth If you were to lose your main source of income (e.g., job, gov-
ernment benefits), could you cover your expenses for 3 months
by borrowing money, using savings, selling assets, or borrowing
from friends/family?
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Chapter 2
Fear itself: The effects of distressing
economic news on birth outcomes
Published as “Fear itself: The effects of distressing economic news on birth outcomes” in the
Journal of Health Economics. Vol. 41, May 2015, pp. 117–132.
Abstract
I use new administrative data on mass layoffs and plant closings to study the effects of distressing
economic news. Exposure to stressful events during pregnancy can impair fetal development. I find
that announcement of impending job losses leads to a transient decrease in the mean birth weight
within the firm’s county one to four months before the job losses. A loss of 500 jobs corresponds
roughly to a decrease of 15–20 grams and 16 percent greater risk of low birth weight. Layoffs
announced late in pregnancy are most strongly linked to decreased birth outcomes.
2.1. Introduction
Each year in the United States some 20 million jobs are lost through layoffs or discharges. Workers
who lose employment face serious problems, including long-term loss of earnings and damaged
health, which have been documented in the economics literature.1 However, each time someone
1Displaced workers’ long-term earnings losses can range from 10 to 25 percent (Ruhm 1991; Jacobson et al. 1993;
Couch and Placzek 2010). Recently displaced workers are likely to drop out of the labour force (Huttunen et al. 2011)
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loses employment, he first receives the unfortunate news of the impending event. And each time a
firm announces the decision to lay off workers or shut down, those residing nearby must consider
how the change might affect the local economy and their future livelihoods. Many forms of dis-
tressing news appear as a part of the normal course of economic activity, but we know relatively
little about the effects and costs associated with these messages.
Economic research on bad news and distress is nascent and promising. For example, Deaton
(2012) reports a surprisingly strong relationship between negative hedonic experience and the S&P
500 index during the recent financial crisis. He conjectures that the index functioned as a highly
salient channel for pessimistic news, which drove up mental and physical symptoms on a large
scale. The present study investigates a similar relationship but focuses on many, localized news
shocks rather than a nationwide crisis. These news shocks are announcements of mass layoffs and
plant closings at specific sites. Such events are considered in light of the human capital literature
which studies the damaging effects of stress experienced by women during pregnancy. Shocking
events, such as terrorism and natural disasters, can decrease birth weights and shorten gestation
(see, for example, Camacho 2008a or Simeonova 2011). These findings suggest that brief events
can have serious health consequences that may even affect the next generation. However, these
studies’ quasi-experimental designs exploit very unusual events that may have effects different
from those of common economic stressors.
The conjunction of stress and economic news is exceptionally appropriate. Perhaps the most
common stressors are personal finances, jobs, and economic conditions (American Psychological
Association 2012). To address the question of causal identification, I construct a novel data set
containing the dates of major job loss events and information about the amount of forewarning
given to the local community. These data allow me to analyze the particularly interesting period in
which news of job losses is taking effect, but the job losses themselves have not yet occurred. My
empirical model is constructed to rule out the direct consequences of job loss and isolate anticipa-
tory effects. Such effects include the immediate, physiological effects of stress but also behavioral
and can experience enormously elevated mortality risk (Sullivan and von Wachter 2009). A parent’s job loss can also
reduce the health of subsequently born children (Lindo 2011).
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responses in anticipation of economic change. For example, pregnant women who receive negative
information about the future might decrease consumption of healthful goods, increase consump-
tion of unhealthful goods, become more neglectful of their health in other ways, experience stress
as a result of initiating a job search, or be burdened with extra responsibilities when another mem-
ber of the household initiates a job search. Many of these channels cannot be isolated with the
present data.
I study mass layoffs and plant closings using administrative data from Alabama, New York,
Texas, and Washington. These data, derived from notices filed under the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, are merged with natality data at the county-by-month level
to link each birth with job losses occurring in the mother’s community. The results indicate that
mean birth weights drop by 15–20 grams during a brief period before a large job loss event (defined
as one at the 95th percentile or approximately 500 workers in an average U.S. county). However,
the effect is almost entirely restricted to job losses where the firm in question provides a large
amount of forewarning rather than little, suggesting that bad news is the driving factor. These
negative effects also appear in analyses of individual-level birth data, which reveal that WARN
notices occurring in the mother’s county of residence just around the time of birth are linked to
significant decreases in birth weight and gestational age. The strongest effects are associated with
exposure to notices in the third trimester.
The study has several limitations. Births and dislocations are linked only by time and place, be-
cause the identities of the mothers and the people affected by WARN notices are unknown. There-
fore like other studies of wide-scale stressors, the estimates represent only effects averaged over
the affected community. In addition, the arrival time of the bad news about worker dislocations is
only approximately known, which “blurs” the estimated form of the response. Finally, caution is
required when interpreting the results and considering policy implications. One should not con-
clude that WARN notices or worker notification laws are harmful on the basis of this study. Others
have found that displaced workers can find new jobs more quickly when protected by notification
laws (Friesen 1997; Jones and Kuhn 1995). Compared to job losses without any notice, notices
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might have some negative effects upfront but provide benefits over a longer time span. Any policy
is bound to have unintended consequences. My results should instead be considered evidence that
announcements of common business decisions are associated with substantial psychological and
physiological costs that occur before the decision takes effect.
2.2. Background
2.2.1. Stress due to economic conditions
Several studies report that workers’ physical and mental conditions deteriorate in anticipation of
job loss events. Evidence from quasi-experimental designs with large samples is reported by
Hamilton et al. (1990a) and Ferrie et al. (1995, 2002). The latter presents strong evidence from
longitudinal data on self-reported and physiological measures of health in about 3,500 workers.
Earlier studies, although smaller and weaker in some design aspects, also report physiological ef-
fects before job loss events (Kasl and Cobb 1970a, 1980a). Overall, these studies cover a variety
of workers, including both blue collar and white collar workers along with both sexes. However, a
notable shortcoming is that each study considers only one employer.
Individuals who do not lose employment can still suffer from layoffs. Workers remaining at
firms that have conducted layoffs can exhibit worsened health and increased absenteeism as evi-
denced by studies of survey data (Moore et al. 2004), administrative records (Vahtera et al. 1997),
and interviews with managers (Maki et al. 2005). Although these studies also examine just one
employer each, the link between pessimistic job expectations and poor health is broad enough to
appear in representative survey data (Kalimo et al. 2003). Finally, numerous studies of a variety of
sizes report that a wife may feel stress due to her husband’s layoff or job troubles (Dew et al. 1987;
Rook et al. 1991; Vinokur et al. 1996; Westman et al. 2001). For example, Dew et al. (1987) re-
port that wives of laid-off steel workers experience stress increases which depend on the husband’s
mental health. However, direct, person-to-person transmission—sometimes called contagion—is
generally difficult to isolate from empirically similar effects, such as the effect of a common envi-
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ronment. This caveat is important: A community’s economic and social characteristics can have
especially strong effects on mental health and subjective well-being, as found in the well-known
Moving to Opportunity experiment (Ludwig et al. 2012). However, to support the hypothesis of
this study it is enough to document that the effects of layoffs can spread broadly. In general, it
is likely that news of layoffs will spread and induce stress through a variety of channels, which
include being at a directly affected employer, having a household member or family member af-
fected, word-of-mouth, or local media coverage.
2.2.2. Prenatal stress
Research from a large variety of approaches links stress experienced by the mother during preg-
nancy with effects on fetal development, birth outcomes, and health later in life. Causal effects
of prenatal stress are well-supported by evidence from animal experiments (for a review, see We-
instock 2005). Ethics strongly constrain exogenous stress manipulations in human subjects, but
there are converging lines of evidence to support effects in humans.
Birth weight and gestational age are the most commonly studied outcomes in this literature be-
cause they are easily available and indicative of health.2 Several studies take a simple observational
approach and document that stress reported by pregnant women is negatively associated with birth
weight and gestational age (see Copper et al. 1996; Dole et al. 2003; and Rondo´ et al. 2003 for
studies with relatively large samples). However, these generally provide weak evidence of causal-
ity because a third factor may cause both stress and low birth weight. Other clinical studies focus
on the mechanisms linking stress and birth outcomes, which are thought to involve neuroendocrine
processes, immune-inflammatory activity, and behavior (Wadhwa et al. 2001b,a; Wadhwa 2005;
Dunkel Schetter 2011). Clinical research on birth outcomes and stress hormones—cortisol and
corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH)—typically report negative correlations between hormone
2The literature’s narrow focus on these variables is a well-known limitation (Currie 2011). Nevertheless, birth
weight and gestational age are important intermediate outcomes (Cunha and Heckman 2007) that consistently predict
health and socioeconomic success (Behrman and Rosenzweig 2004; Black et al. 2007; Currie and Moretti 2007a;
Royer 2009). A broad review of child health and socioeconomic status is provided by Currie (2009).
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levels and birth outcomes (Hobel et al. 1999; Inder et al. 2001; Wadhwa et al. 2004). Such stud-
ies still lack exogenous variation,3 but they provide additional evidence of causality by examining
mechanisms that are well-supported by basic neuroendocrinology (Wadhwa et al. 2011; Welberg
and Seckl 2001; Weinstock 2005; Seckl and Holmes 2007; Glover et al. 2010; Erickson et al. 2001;
McLean et al. 1995; De Weerth and Buitelaar 2005). The role of infection as a link between stress
and birth outcomes has received somewhat less study than endocrinology (Wadhwa et al. 2001b,
2011), but intrauterine infection is a heavily-studied risk factor for preterm birth (Goldenberg et al.
2008).
To address the lack of exogenous variation in the clinical research, some studies use quasi-
experiments generated by plausibly exogenous, stressful events, for example, natural disasters or
terrorist attacks. As an added advantage, such studies can use large administrative data sets. These
studies typically report that prenatal exposure to the stressor decreases the expected birth weight
and gestational age. Effects in terms of mean birth weight are typically a few grams up to about
30 grams while average effects on gestational age are roughly a day (Camacho 2008a; Simeonova
2011; Eccleston 2011; Brown 2014). However, one study reports no effects of a “near miss”
by a hurricane on birth weight nor on gestational age (Currie and Rossin-Slater 2013a). Some
studies only consider low birth weight as an outcome, making comparisons across the literature
more difficult, but these studies consistently report elevated risk of low birth weight (Catalano
and Hartig 2001; Lauderdale 2006; Eskenazi et al. 2007). The use of exogenous stressors is both
the main advantage and disadvantage of this research.4 The events are typically extraordinary,
3However, Aizer et al. (2009) investigate the role of cortisol using a novel design that exploits within-mother—
between-pregnancy variation in cortisol measurements taken during the third trimester. They report that higher levels
predict worse cognitive and health outcomes in the child. Aizer et al. (2009) do not find evidence of an effect on birth
outcomes but attribute this to the way the sample was selected.
4An additional concern that applies to the entire literature is the inconsistency in the evidence related to the timing
of stress during pregnancy. Laboratory studies using artificial stress tests report both decreasing (De Weerth and
Buitelaar 2005) and increasing (Entringer et al. 2010) sensitivity. Associations between stress tests and pregnancy
outcomes are also mixed (McCubbin et al. 1996; Vythilingum et al. 2010). These studies are small, and the relationship
between laboratory stress tests and naturally-occurring stressors in this context is unknown. Large-scale studies based
on administrative data and exogenous stressors are similarly inconclusive. These have reported that the strongest
effects occur due to exposure during early and middle pregnancy (Eskenazi et al. 2007), middle and late pregnancy
(Class et al. 2011; Catalano and Hartig 2001; Simeonova 2011), the first trimester (Torche 2011), and the second
trimester (Camacho 2008b).
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meaning the generalizability of the findings is questionable. In addition, the stress-related causal
mechanism is often poorly isolated because the stressors involve violence and destruction that
could have independent health effects or drive selective migration. Some studies do attempt to
address these issues, for example, by using location instruments (Currie and Rossin-Slater 2013a)
or analyzing birth rates (Quintana-Domeque and Rodenas 2014).
My study mitigates these concerns by examining a common stressor before there is likely to
be a significant material effect. The empirical model used for this analysis is like that used by
Currie and Schmieder (2009) to study pollution releases. Following their approach, I aggregate the
data at the county level and estimate how births respond to within-county variation in a continuous
treatment variable. This approach has the advantages of (1) isolating the period before a worker
dislocation, (2) allowing for estimation of birth rates, and (3) describing the process that would
occur in a community during the period before a dislocation. However, the county-level approach
does not describe the effects ofWARN notices appearing at different time points in pregnancy. That
question involves some complications in defining the trimesters of pregnancy, which the county-
level approach avoids. However, the question is still important, so I also analyze the natality micro-
data by estimating models where birth outcomes depend on variables that represent exposure to
notices during each trimester of pregnancy.
2.3. Data
This study examines births from 1999 to 2008 using a county-month panel data set that includes
all 422 counties in Alabama, New York, Texas, and Washington. These states were selected based
on the histories of WARN notices available from state-level agencies. I traded off geographic
coverage against panel length while forming a balanced panel. The core of the dataset is composed
of 7,113,083 births and 2,626WARN notices. Extended summary statistics for all data are available
in the appendix.
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TABLE 2.1: Summary of dataset
Births % Births Counties Advance notices
Alabama 546,870 7.7 67 282
New York 2,327,954 32.7 62 891
Texas 3,476,622 48.9 254 1,142
Washington 761,637 10.7 39 311
Total 7,113,083 100.0 422 2,626
2.3.1. Layoffs and plant closings
2.3.1.1. Description
The United States Congress enacted the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of
1988 in order to help individuals and communities anticipate worker dislocations. Under this
law, private employers must notify workers and authorities (the chief elected official in the local
government where the employer is located) at least 60 days in advance of a plant closing or mass
layoff. Closings and layoffs trigger the law only if they meet certain criteria, which mainly specify
thresholds for the number of workers involved. If a worksite with at least 50 workers will close,
then the employer must provide notice. Similarly, the law applies to (1) layoffs of 500 or more
workers and (2) layoffs of 50–499 workers when they constitute at least 33 percent of a site’s
workforce.5 When one of these conditions applies, the employer must give detailed, written notices
to (1) the affected workers, (2) the workers’ representatives, (3) the local government, and (4)
the state’s dislocated worker unit (DWU). Upon receipt of a notice, the DWU’s Rapid Response
team contacts workers and the employer to arrange meetings and provide services to the affected
workers. Typical services include guidance on unemployment insurance, career counseling, and
job search assistance.
Several DWUs have provided electronic records of WARN notices for this study. Each notice
specifies several key pieces of information: (1) the employer’s name and address, (2) the number of
5For a complete description of the criteria in the Act, see the guide published by the Employment and Training
Administration (2003).
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workers affected, (3) the date on which the DWU was notified,6 and (4) the date on which worker
dislocations were to occur or begin. This combination of details allows me to identify distressing
events that are locally salient, something not possible with other data. For example, the BLS Mass
Layoff Statistics program lacks information about the amount of forewarning given by employers
and provides coarser temporal and geographic resolution.
Based on the difference between the notice date and dislocation date, I categorize each notice
into one of two types: Advance notices (ANs) provide at least 60 days’ notice, while short notices
(SNs) provide less. The analysis here focuses on advance notices because they indicate situations
where an anticipatory effect can be isolated. In the case of short notices it is difficult to isolate
births that could be affected by an anticipatory effect but not by the job losses themselves. The next
paragraphs describe the two types of notices and argue that they are substantially similar except
for the fact that advance notices provide much greater forewarning about an impending dislocation
and appear to receive greater coverage in the media.
Advance notices make up about 40 percent of the total, a finding like those of U.S. government
studies (U.S. General Accounting Office 1993, 2003). A small portion of notices, about 5 percent,
arrived more than 30 days after the dislocation or more than 120 days early. These were regarded
as erroneous or atypical situations and discarded. Nevertheless, the inclusion of these notices has
no substantial effect on the results. Advance notices provide on average 70 days of forewarning,
while short notices provide on average 31. Figure 2.1 shows a histogram of the distribution of
amounts of forewarning given in the notices.
There are several reasons why notices giving less than 60 days’ notice can appear. Employers
are suspected to violate the WARN Act’s requirements because of confusion, weak enforcement,
and small penalties (U.S. General Accounting Office 1993). No government agency is directly
responsible for enforcement of the Act. Following a violation, workers or local governments may
file suit against employers in U.S. District Court to extract back pay. Such lawsuits can be costly
6The Alabama and New York records include just the date of the notification document, but the data from Wash-
ington include just the date on which the DWU received the notification. Only Texas includes both dates. I use the
date of receipt in the analysis, but the results are not substantially changed by using the other date.
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and uncertain because the criteria in the act are complicated and courts have interpreted the WARN
Act inconsistently. These factors also contribute to underreporting. It is estimated that employers
fail to file a notice for one-half to two-thirds of events that should be reported (U.S. General Ac-
counting Office 1993, 2003). However, the WARN Act also encourages employers to file notices
even if they are not obligated to do so, and these notices are not distinguished in the data. Finally,
I contacted DWU staff to ask about differences between the two types. They denied that there is
any clear difference (Faraone 2012; Jordan 2012).
A key feature of the notices is that the two types implicitly attribute different amounts of bad
news to the months before dislocations. The notice date represents an important point in the pro-
cess that disperses information about the impending job losses. However, the notice date should
not be viewed as the single point at which full information about the job losses is instantaneously
revealed to all. First, the notice date is generally the latest date at which workers would learn of the
planned job losses. Employers want to break the news before Rapid Response makes contact with
the workers. The U.S. General Accounting Office (1993) reports that workers generally receive
somewhat more forewarning than DWUs. Second, workers also receive informal signals of the
impending notice filing and dislocation. Previous studies of worker notification laws have consid-
ered this “spillover” problem (Friesen 1997; Jones and Kuhn 1995). Finally, the employer must
also notify the community’s authorities, and local media often report WARN notices. Some state
governments, including all four in the study, publish WARN notices online as they receive them,
which provides another way for people to learn about them. Thus, when a dislocation follows
an advance notice rather than a short one, the news of the impending job losses will have had a
relatively long time to spread throughout the community and exert an effect.
An important factor that determines the effect of a notice is how much attention it receives. A
notice that is reported by the media will have a greater potential to generate stress than a notice
that is not reported and remains little known. The WARN notice data do not report whether a
notice received media coverage. To determine the amount of coverage, a random sample of 220
notices was hand-coded according to whether media coverage relating to the notice could be found
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using a search engine.7 Media coverage typically announces that the worker dislocation has just
occurred or reports, shortly before the notice, that a company is preparing to lay off workers or
shut down. The results of this analysis appear in Figure 2.1. Overall 45 percent of the notices have
media coverage. The notices are grouped into bins (of width 1 day), and the points represent the
proportion of notices in each bin having media coverage. The smoothed (LOWESS) plot indicates
that notices with a medium amount of forewarning receive the least amount of coverage. The
probability of coverage increases sharply as the amount of warning approaches 60 days, which
suggests that notices with 60 days or more forewarning may be more consequential. The greater
amount of news coverage could directly increase the effects of these notices by making them more
widely known. Alternatively, the greater amount of news coverage may simply reflect a belief that
such notices are likely to have a greater impact on economic activity.
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FIGURE 2.1: Distributions of days of advance notice and media coverage
A dislocation’s potential impact depends in part on the number of workers affected and the size
7This method is imperfect but still reveals an important feature of the data. The random sample was stratified
according to the amount of notice given, and the statistics were weighted by the actual sample frequencies. This
method was chosen so that a sufficient amount of notices in the middle range would be included in the sample. The
coding was done by searching for the company name along with the year of the notice and the location in Google
News search. A notice was classified as having media coverage if any articles were found that directly mentioned the
notice or that discussed plans for layoffs or shut down around the time of the notice. The coding was done blind to the
amount of forewarning and with the notices sorted in a random order.
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of the community. Thus, I operationalize this potential as the ratio of (a) the number of workers
affected to (b) the population of working-age people in the county of the employer. In the set of
county-month cells with at least one AN dislocation, the mean (median) potential is 0.124 (0.024)
percent.8
WARN notices are rare in the sense that about 6 percent of county-month cells contain one.
However, 67 percent of counties have at least one at some point in time. The second percentage
would be above 90 if not for Texas, where 50 percent of the counties have no notices. The WARN
Act applies only to employers with at least 100 employees in total, regardless of howmany workers
lose employment at a single worksite operated by the employer, and there may be few or no such
large employers in the many small counties of Texas. Figure 2.2 shows that WARN notices are
highly dispersed over the study period. No single year has more than 13 percent of the notices nor
less than 7 percent.
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FIGURE 2.2: Monthly frequency of WARN notices by state, 1999–2009
2.3.2. Natality data
The National Center for Health Statistics at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has provided
a confidential version of the Vital Statistics natality data that identifies each mother’s county of
8AN and SN dislocations have very similar distributions of potential. The corresponding mean (median) for SN
dislocations is 0.125 (0.026) percent. The first and third quartiles are also nearly equal across the two types. The mean
number of workers affected by an AN notice is 114, while SN notices affect 117 on average.
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residence. Practically all births in the United States appear in these data. The available variables
include the birth weight (BWT) in grams, the gestational age (GA) in weeks, the month of birth,
and the mother’s demographic characteristics. Births were included based on these criteria: (1)
the birth was a singleton, (2) the mother resided and gave birth within the same state, and (3) the
mother was 18 to 45 years of age. If a record had a missing value in the birth weight, gestational
age, plurality, or location variables, then it was dropped before analysis. The mean age of mothers
at the time of birth is 27.6 years. Births to Hispanic, white, black, and “other” mothers make up
33, 47, 14, and 6 percent of the sample. The means of birth weight and gestational age are 3,318
grams and 38.7 weeks.
By convention, babies born at a weight below 2,500 grams are classified as low birth weight
(LBW), and births before 37 weeks are classified as preterm (PTB). I also consider age-conditional
z-scores and the proportion of babies that are both LBW and PTB. The z-scores indicate how
much a baby’s birth weight deviates from the median birth weight given the length of gestation,
so they are sensitive to changes in fetal growth but not changes in gestational age. The z-scores
are calculated using the tables and reference population provided by Oken et al. (2003). Z-scores
are only defined for gestational ages between 22 and 44 weeks, so births outside this range, which
make up less than one percent of the sample, are dropped when z-scores are analyzed.
2.3.3. Other data
The Bureau of Labor Statistics provides unemployment data at the county-by-month level through
the Local Area Unemployment Statistics program. Finally, birth rates and working-age populations
are calculated using intercensal population estimates from the U.S. Census and National Cancer
Institute/SEER. The Census estimates July populations for each county, so linear interpolation
provides figures for the remaining months.
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2.4. Empirical model
2.4.1. County-level model
In order to estimate how birth outcomes respond to dislocations, I use a county fixed effects model
that incorporates the following key features. First, each month’s outcomes are allowed to depend
on AN dislocations up to 6 months in the future. For a depiction of this structure consider the
timeline in Table 2.2. This table gives an example of how the key variables relate to the timing
of a notice and layoff. This example depicts a typical case in the sense that within a given county
most layoffs will be isolated in time. In this example, a layoff of 250 workers occurs in October,
the last column. However, the notice was given in July, and the period between the notice and the
dislocation is shaded. Note that the row “# jobs lost in month t” has the value 250 in October, and
the row “# layoffs announced in month t” has the value 250 in July. In addition, note that in July the
distributed lead variable “# number jobs lost in month t+3” has the value 250. This variable along
with the other distributed leads is the key to the anticipation effect because it allows outcomes in
the earlier months to depend on the impending job losses. The regression coefficients on these
distributed leads quantify the deviations in birth outcomes occurring during the 6 months before
the job loss. For example, if the coefficient on the three-month lead is -20 grams, then it should
be interpreted to mean that births occurring about 3 months before a unit-sized layoff are expected
to be 20 grams lower than if there was no layoff (all else equal). Importantly, the model allows
birth outcomes to respond to a dislocation up to six months before the job losses actually occur.
As discussed above, the small number of WARN notices providing more than 120 days of advance
notice were dropped from the data set. To demonstrate how this relates to the model, suppose that
a notice was filed in June for a layoff occurring 120 days (4 months) later in October. It is possible
that an anticipatory response appears in May, 5 months before the dislocation. This could occur
if the firm made a pre-announcement in May stating that it was planning to formally announce
layoffs in the next few weeks. By including the full set of 6 months of distributed leads of job loss
variables, the model allows for such a situation. In principle, any number of distributed leads could
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TABLE 2.2: Example timeline of WARN notice in July of 250 layoffs in October
Month Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct
Months before layoff 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Months after notice -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
# layoffs announced in month t . . . 250 . . .
# jobs lost in month t . . . . . . 250
# jobs lost in month t+ 1 . . . . . 250 .
# jobs lost in month t+ 2 . . . . 250 . .
# jobs lost in month t+ 3 . . . 250 . . .
# jobs lost in month t+ 4 . . 250 . . . .
# jobs lost in month t+ 5 . 250 . . . . .
# jobs lost in month t+ 6 250 . . . . . .
be included, but 6 months is used because it is expected to encompass almost all anticipatory effects
related to job losses. The second key feature is that dislocations enter the model as a proportion of
the working-age population in the county.
The estimated equation is
Yi;t =
6X
=0
 (AN)i;(t+) + Zi;t + i;t;
where for each county i and month t
 Yi;t is the mean of a birth outcome,
 (AN)i;t is the proportion of the working-age population dislocated under an advance notice.9
In the example above, if t =July, then
(AN)i;t+3 = 250working-age population of county i
(up to a scaling factor). If the corresponding coefficient 3 is negative, then the presence of
job losses in October (month t + 3) will have a negative effect on the mean birth outcome
in July (month t). This relationship is precisely the “anticipatory effect” whereby women
respond to impending job loss events. Since layoffs are rare, the (AN)i;t are sparse. That is,
it is unlikely for more than one of the (AN)i;t to be non-zero in any given case (i; t).
9Summary statistics for the variable (AN) are printed in appendix Table 2.9. This variable corresponds to the row
in the above table labelled “# jobs lost in month t” except that the population normalization is applied. For example,
the mean value taken over county-month cells is 0.124 percent.
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 Zi;t is a vector that potentially includes the means of characteristics of women giving birth
and county-specific quadratic time trends along with indicators for county of birth, year of
birth, and calendar month of birth.10
Each observation is weighted by the number of births to increase efficiency, and standard errors
are adjusted for clustering at the county level. Some specifications also include a window of
unemployment rates, which is detailed in the results section. The dislocation effect variables are
scaled so as to represent the effect of a 95th percentile layoff. The scaling factor was obtained by
examining the 6% of county-month cells in which any worker dislocations resulted from WARN
notices. From these cells, the 95th percentile of the dislocation potential (the percentage of the
working-age population dislocated by a WARN notice) was extracted giving the number 0.0067.
Note that since the percentile is determined by only a small subset of the cells, the use of the 95th
percentile does not mean that a unit-sized or larger layoff occurs in 5% of county-month cells.
During the period from 1999 through 2009, only 176 county-month cells, or about 0.32%, reach
the threshold of 0.0067. Thus, the effects in this paper are scaled so as to represent very extreme
dislocation events.
While it may seem counter-intuitive to use the month of the job losses as a reference point,
this specification is a natural result of the identification strategy. The statistical model must be
designed so as to clearly separate the effects of job loss from the anticipatory effects caused by bad
news. If the model were to use the month of the notice as a reference point, the anticipatory effects
could be confounded with the effects of job losses. For example, suppose the results showed that
birth weight tends to be lower than normal about three months after a notice. There could be
two explanations. One is that people are anticipating layoffs that had 3–4 months of notice. The
other is that some layoffs, which had two months of notice, are generating effects one month after
10Mother characteristics enter as proportions of mothers in groups defined following Currie et al. (2011). The age
groups are “Less than 20”, “20 to 34”, “Over 34”, and “Missing”. The race and ethnicity groups are “Hispanic”,
“White”, “Black”, “Other”, and “Missing”. The educational attainment groups are “Less than high school”, “High
school”, “Some college”, “College or higher”, and “Missing”. The marital status groups are “Married” and “Not
married”. Finally, the categories for total birth order are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more, and “Missing”. However, these maternal
variables are omitted from birth rate models because they are undefined in months with no births. Smoking variables
are omitted because of possible endogeneity, but their inclusion has minimal effect on the results. Birth rates are
calculated as the number of births per 1,000 women aged 18–45.
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the job losses—which is three months after the notice. Therefore, the county-level analysis uses
the approach which sharply separates the pre- and post-job loss periods. However, the individual-
level analysis (explained below) allows notices to directly enter the model, which provides the
perspective of explicitly looking at responses to notices.
2.4.2. Individual-level analysis on natality micro-data
The second set of results uses birth-level micro-data to estimate the effects of exposure to notices
at different points during the pregnancy. This approach presents some complications because ex-
posure during the last trimester of pregnancy is partially determined by the length of pregnancy. A
birth occurring at 40 weeks rather than 39 will have one extra week in which to accumulate expo-
sure. This relation creates an upward (positive) bias in the effect of exposure in the third trimester
even if the true effect is null or negative. Currie and Rossin-Slater (2013a) call this complication
a “mechanical correlation” between the exposure and outcome, and they propose instrumenting
for exposure using the potentially counterfactual exposure that would have resulted if the birth
occurred at 39 weeks. That is, the instrument represents exposure as-if the pregnancy lasted 39
weeks. The instrument can be viewed as the result of making a small but critical adjustment to
the endogenous exposure variable. I apply the “full-term instrument” method in this analysis. The
individual-level results using this approach are consistent with results from the county-level data.
Each pregnancy is first divided into three trimesters corresponding to 13-week periods relative
to conception. The date of conception is estimated by taking the midpoint of the birth month and
subtracting the gestational age. Two weeks are added because conception normally occurs two
weeks after the date of the last normal menstrual period, which is used to compute gestational age.
Based on this conception date the trimesters of pregnancy are defined. In each trimester I compute
the total amount of workers dislocated and affected by WARN notices by summing all those within
the county of residence of the mother and falling within the appropriate time period. The third
trimester ends at birth and may be longer than 13 weeks. The instrument is constructed using the
same method except under the assumption that the birth occurred at 39 weeks gestational age. As
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a result, for births occurring at 39 weeks the instrument and the actual exposure are identical.
In addition to the three trimesters of pregnancy I define three additional trimesters for use in
the analysis. Trimester 0 is the 13-week window just before conception. For births that occur at
39 weeks, trimester 4 is the 13 weeks after birth. Otherwise, trimester 4 is the window following
trimester 3 up to 52 weeks after conception. 11 Finally, trimester 5 is weeks 53–65. This last period
is included in the spirit of a placebo test, meaning it is expected to have relatively little effect.12
2.4.3. State-to-state heterogeneity of effects
Estimates using only data from individual states reveal heterogeneity in the effects of WARN
notices. The two large states, New York and Texas, show the strongest evidence of anticipatory
effects of notices on birth outcomes. However, the smaller states show more equivocal results. The
estimates from Washington suggest moderate effects on birth outcomes, while Alabama shows no
evidence of a decrease. State-by-state results from micro-data are in Table 2.11.
This heterogeneity demands some conceptual and methodological consideration before the
analysis can proceed. Differences in anticipatory effects might arise from variation in regional
labor market features or policies, locals’ prior beliefs about job losses, spatial relationships among
employers and employees, or numerous other factors. Alabama is the only state that shows no
evidence of effects, and it is an outlier from the other states in several ways. First, the mean birth
weight is substantially lower than in the other states. For example, it is 86 grams lower than the
mean of New York. This difference dwarfs the estimated effects in this paper, which are already
scaled to represent a very large loss of jobs. Second, Alabama is substantially more rural than the
other three states.13 Third, relative to these small counties, the worker dislocations in Alabama tend
11Trimester 4 ideally is the one following birth, but it will in reality slightly overlap with pregnancy in some cases
because only the month of birth is known. In addition, because the exact timing at which people learn of an impending
dislocation is not known, the inclusion of trimester 4 allows testing for anticipation of events occurring just after birth.
12Note that constructing the regressors requires 4 trimesters of notice data before the birth, so it is not possible to
use births from 1999. Therefore, the individual-level analysis focuses on 2000–2008.
13The distribution in Alabama stands out with much fewer births in large metropolitan areas compared to the other
states. However, the effects of notices does not appear to vary systematically between rural and urban areas. These
results are available from the author.
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to be large relative to the local population, although they are not unusually large in absolute terms.
In the other three states about 0.1 percent of the working age population is affected by a WARN
notice in an average month. However in Alabama, this value is over 0.3 percent, which suggests
that the effects of dislocations are likely to be dispersed outside the county. Future research should
investigate how people in different environments vary in their reaction to economic news.
Heterogeneity of treatment effects presents some complications when estimating average treat-
ment effects. Angrist (1998) shows that when treatment effects are heterogeneous across groups
an OLS estimator which allows just one treatment effect will not in general estimate the average
treatment effect. Instead, the estimator will estimate a weighted average of the group-specific
treatment effects where each weight is proportional to the group-specific variance of the treatment
variable. The estimator then depends on the marginal distribution of the treatment variable within
each group. In this case the estimator overweights Alabama because the notice variables have high
variance relative to the other states. Morgan and Winship (2007) propose addressing this problem
by a simple stratification method which estimates the group-specific treatment effects and then av-
erages them using weights proportional to the number of observations in each group. I implement
this estimator by computing one regression which allows each state to have a separate set of effects.
A single treatment effect is then estimated by averaging these four state-specific effects using the
proportion of births in each state as weights. This approach is applied to both the county-level es-
timates and the individual-level estimates. Estimates from models that estimate single, unstratified
effects are available in appendix Table 2.12 along with estimates based on raw counts of workers
affected by notices.
2.5. Results
2.5.1. County-level results for birth weight and gestational age
Table 2.3 presents the main results for birth weight and gestational age. The estimates show that
both variables selectively decrease in anticipation of dislocations. During the period four months
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to one month before dislocations, the mean birth weight is depressed by 15–20 grams and the mean
gestational age by roughly one half to one day.
TABLE 2.3: Estimated anticipation effects on birth weight and gestational age
Birth weight (grams) Gestational age (days)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Timing of birth
(relative to job losses)
6 mos. before 0:26 -1:89 -3:55 -3:54 -0:17 -0:19 -0:04 -0:06
(4:77) (4:45) (5:12) (5:17) (0:21) (0:21) (0:22) (0:22)
5 mos. before 0:83 -2:73 -4:74 -4:98 -0:18 -0:23 -0:10 -0:10
(6:52) (5:75) (5:86) (5:87) (0:21) (0:20) (0:23) (0:23)
4 mos. before -17:32 -18:24 -18:81 -19:15 -0:86 -0:93 -0:77 -0:79
(6:06) (5:89) (5:93) (5:91) (0:20) (0:21) (0:20) (0:21)
3 mos. before -16:71 -18:89 -20:18 -20:81 -0:29 -0:33 -0:18 -0:21
(7:58) (7:48) (7:45) (7:43) (0:22) (0:22) (0:20) (0:19)
2 mos. before -10:66+ -14:63 -16:00 -16:94 -0:57 -0:61 -0:48 -0:53
(5:88) (5:44) (5:61) (5:65) (0:24) (0:24) (0:22) (0:22)
1 mo. before -11:83+ -14:30 -16:07 -17:27 -0:23 -0:25 -0:12 -0:16
(7:06) (6:87) (6:81) (6:75) (0:27) (0:28) (0:24) (0:24)
Same month 4:46 1:42 1:05 -0:08 -0:04 -0:09 0:08 0:06
(7:55) (7:62) (7:38) (7:59) (0:26) (0:28) (0:26) (0:26)
County, yr., mo. FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Moms’ characteristics : Yes Yes Yes : Yes Yes Yes
County quad. trends : : Yes Yes : : Yes Yes
Unemp. rates : : : Yes : : : Yes
Cells 49; 123 49; 123 49; 123 49; 123 49; 123 49; 123 49; 123 49; 123
Adj. R-sq. 0:655 0:665 0:674 0:674 0:536 0:539 0:561 0:561
Notes. Average treatment effects of a 95th percentile layoff printed with standard errors in parentheses. FE=Fixed
effects. Statistical significance symbols: + p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
Estimates from four specifications allow us to consider the potential influence of omitted vari-
ables. The most basic specification includes just county fixed effects and state-specific year and
calendar month fixed effects. This relatively simple model is sufficient to show the basic form of
the anticipatory response to dislocations. The addition of the mothers’ demographic characteristics
increases the magnitude of the birth weight coefficients associated with advance notice and tends
to increase the precision of the estimates. These additional covariates also slightly increase the
magnitude of the gestational age coefficients. This result suggests that the effects are not driven by
changes in the demographic composition of mothers.
Since the study period spans ten years, one might be concerned that the counties underwent
heterogeneous drift in some unobserved factors related to birth outcomes and job loss activity,
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which could bias the estimates. This problem appears unlikely because the birth outcomes show
transient responses. Nevertheless, the third specification includes county-specific quadratic time
trends. These trends should capture the effects of unobserved influences that vary in a smooth way
within each county. This change adds over 800 parameters to the model, but has little effect on the
estimated coefficients and standard errors. The birth weight effects slightly increase in magnitude,
while the gestational age effects slightly decrease in magnitude.
Finally, it might also be suspected that dislocation activity simply reflects more general eco-
nomic conditions. The state-by-year fixed effects in the basic model should control for economic
activity varying at the state level. However, county-level heterogeneity might still be a source of
bias. The quadratic trends might not properly account for varying economic activity since two
recessions occured during the study period. So, the last specification includes a 19-month win-
dow of county-level unemployment rates. Twelve months of lags are included to capture effects
occuring around the time of conception and during pregnancy. Six months of leads are included
to allow for pregnant women to react to expectations about future economic activity. Inclusion
of unemployment rates slightly increases the magnitude of the birth weight and gestational age
effects, suggesting that local fluctations in general economic activity are not a serious problem.
2.5.2. Effects over broader geographic regions
The effects of job losses and their announcements might extend beyond the county where they
occur. This subsection shows that such effects are unlikely to be large, which justifies the paper’s
focus on within-county effects. To check for the possibility of such inter-county spillover effects
the model is augmented with variables that represent, for each county, the job losses in a group
of nearby counties. The model retains variables representing same-county notices. Therefore, the
model allows us to answer the question, ‘How do birth outcomes in a particular county i respond
to increasing the amount of WARN notices in i’s group (holding constant notices within i itself)?’
For the moment, assume that all counties have been partitioned into contiguous groups. The
variables that represent inter-county influences are constructed analogously to those that represent
138
within-county influences and use the same scaling factor. The variable representing the inter-
county influences on i is
# of workers being laid off by advance notices in i’s group (but not in i itself)
the working-age population of the group (excluding i’s population)
:
Just like the baseline specification, these inter-county variables enter the model as distributed leads.
Four methods of grouping counties are analyzed: Metro- and micro-politan areas, commuter
zones (as defined by the US Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service), component
economic areas, and economic areas. The last two groupings are defined by the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis. Some counties are not part of a metro- or micro-politan area, so these counties
have zeros for all inter-county influence variables.
The results of this approach appear in Table 2.4. Same-county effects from the previous table
are reprinted in the first column for the purpose of comparison. In contrast to the same-county esti-
mates, which show a consistent, statistically significant negative effect, the inter-county estimates
have widely varying signs and do not reach significance at conventional levels. Based on these
results the remainder of the analysis will consider only within-county effects.
2.5.3. Dynamic features of the birth weight response
The four-month period before dislocations shows a fairly stable depression in birth weights, but this
stability hides interesting dynamics. In particular, the initial response is marked by a precipitation
of babies born too early and too small. Later parts of the response show decreased fetal growth and
possibly some selection. With these two mechanisms in mind, I now consider several additional
variables.
The main physiological contributors to birth weight are the length of gestation and the rate of
intrauterine growth. These contributions can be partially disentangled by considering the joint dis-
tribution of birth weight and gestational age. Decreased birth weights caused by shorter gestation
should be reflected in the proportion of babies born both preterm and with low weight. However,
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TABLE 2.4: Inter-county effects of dislocations over wider geographic areas
Surrounding area (inter-county effects only)
Same
county Metro area
Commuter
zone
Component
economic area
Economic
area
Timing of birth
(relative to job losses)
6 mos. before -3.55 -4.87 -3.63 1.13 12.33
(5.12) (10.01) (8.15) (10.80) (9.39)
5 mos. before -4.74 2.33 -1.04 10.07 7.12
(5.86) (7.11) (7.99) (10.65) (18.40)
4 mos. before -18.81** 19.73+ -6.50 20.84 8.47
(5.93) (11.36) (9.35) (16.86) (17.02)
3 mos. before -20.18** -0.68 -1.69 -3.41 -15.19
(7.45) (10.55) (10.70) (13.96) (14.25)
2 mos. before -16.00** -16.16 -19.45 -12.86 -23.00
(5.61) (15.62) (12.57) (18.97) (21.07)
1 mo. before -16.07* -0.87 -5.95 -11.74 15.74
(6.81) (10.31) (9.84) (11.69) (15.08)
Same month 1.05 -9.09 -11.96 -1.78 13.23
(7.38) (6.43) (9.75) (9.43) (13.54)
# geographic units 422 323 108 57 36
Notes. Average treatment effect of a 95th percentile layoff printed with standard errors (clustered at the level of
geographic grouping) in parentheses. All models include county, year, and month fixed effects along with county-
specific trends. Only advance notices included. Statistical significance symbols: + p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
this variable is not sensitive to a change merely in fetal growth rates. Alternatively, birth weights
caused by lower growth rates can be detected in age-conditional z-scores, which are sensitive to
changes in birth weight conditional on gestational age.
Table 2.5 displays the estimated effects of a dislocation on the (1) mean birth weight, (2) birth
rate, (3) proportion low birth weight, (4) proportion both low birth weight and preterm, and (5)
mean age-conditional z-score of birth weight. Several results suggest that the initial decrease
in birth weight at month four can be attributed to reduced gestational age. First, at this point
the proportion LBW is increased by one percentage point, or 16 percent of the overall rate, and
the proportion LBW & PTB increases by 0.76 percentage points, or 20 percent of the overall
rate, revealing that the additional low weight births are largely also additional preterm births.14
Second, the contemporaneous effects (“four months before”) in the main results above show that
the decreases in birth weight and gestational age are consistent with each other. To a first-order
approximation, a 0.8 day decrease in gestational age implies a decrease of 18.9 grams, which is
14The LBW and PTB cutoffs are somewhat arbitrary, so it is reasonable to vary the cutoffs and recalculate the
effects. That analysis is presented in Appendix Figure 2.5 and is consistent with the results in this subsection.
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almost exactly the estimated change in mean birth weight.15
TABLE 2.5: Dynamics of the anticipatory response
BWT BR LBW LBW & PTB Z-score
ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE
Timing of birth
(relative to job losses)
6 mos. before  3:55 (5:12)  0:03 (0:07) 0:19 (0:29) 0:01 (0:19)  0:19 (1:04)
5 mos. before  4:74 (5:86)  0:09 (0:07) 0:06 (0:23)  0:01 (0:20)  1:05 (1:09)
4 mos. before  18:81 (5:93)  0:01 (0:06) 1:01 (0:28) 0:76 (0:23)  0:76 (1:06)
3 mos. before  20:18 (7:45)  0:14+ (0:07) 0:88 (0:28) 0:34+ (0:18)  3:61 (1:39)
2 mos. before  16:00 (5:61) 0:01 (0:05) 0:20 (0:29) 0:01 (0:21)  2:02+ (1:09)
1 mo. before  16:07 (6:81)  0:22 (0:07) 0:28 (0:28) 0:16 (0:19)  3:24 (1:13)
Mo. of layoff 1:05 (7:38)  0:09 (0:07)  0:19 (0:35)  0:24 (0:27)  0:52 (1:26)
Cells 49; 123 50; 640 49; 123 49; 123 49; 108
Adj. R-sq. 0:674 0:840 0:254 0:177 0:572
Notes. Average treatment effect of a 95th percentile layoff printed with standard errors in parentheses. Outcome
models include county, year, and month fixed effects along with county-specific trends. BR model is a Poisson model
with coefficients reported. BWT=Birth weight (grams). BR=Monthly birth rate: Births per 1,000 women of child
bearing age. LBW=Proportion low birth weight  100. PTB=Proportion preterm birth  100. Z-score represents
BWT conditional on gestational age and is multiplied by 100 for display. Statistical significance symbols: + p < 0:10,
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
Closer to the dislocation month, there appear changes in intrauterine growth. The effect on the
proportion LBW progressively diminishes from month four onwards while the decrease in mean
birth weight is about 16 grams. Months three through one show rescaled z-scores decreased by
2.02–3.61, suggesting that retarded intrauterine growth is reducing birth weights. Converting the
z-score effect to grams gives a decrease of 11–17 grams.16 This result indicates that decreased
growth, due to physiological stress responses or increased levels of unhealthful behaviour by preg-
nant women, can account for most or all of the estimated change in birth weight.
One concern is that average birth outcomes could change if women migrated out of areas where
job losses are about to occur. Immigration is also possible but less likely in this context. Estimates
of changes in birth rates before job losses suggest that selection is unlikely to account for the
estimated effects on birth outcomes. Table 2.5 also shows changes in the monthly birth rate using
a model like those used to estimate changes in average birth outcomes. These results show that the
15Oken et al.’s (2003) supplemental tables indicate that a median baby born at 38 weeks should weigh 165 grams
more than one born at 37 weeks. The calculation (3; 301   3; 136)  17  0:8  18:9 suggests that around this point
in pregnancy a decrease of 0.8 days in GA should result in a 18.9 gram decrease in birth weight.
16For a birth at 39 weeks, Oken et al.’s (2003) supplemental tables associate a loss of 11 grams with a decrease of
0.03 in z-score. Alternatively, the standard deviation of birth weight in the data is 562 grams. So, a change of 0.03
standard deviations corresponds to 17 grams.
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changes in birth outcomes do not coincide with changes in the birth rate. Recall that birth weight
is consistently depressed from 4 months to 1 month before the job loss event. However, the birth
rate is decreased only in months 3 and 1 and by less than 5%. This discrepancy in timing indicates
that a simple pattern of selection cannot account for the decrease in birth weight.17
2.5.4. Individual-level results using birth micro-data
The last analysis approaches the problem differently by modeling individual-level birth outcomes
in the manner commonly used to study prenatal exposures in the economics literature. Linear mod-
els are estimated which allow the expected outcome of each birth to depend on exposure—notices
occurring in the mother’s county—during each trimester of the pregnancy. This approach provides
the advantage of explicitly allowing the effect of an exposure to depend on when in pregnancy it
occurred. However, this approach also complicates the identification of the effects of notices them-
selves because a given pregnancy is often exposed to both the notice and the subsequent pregnancy.
Nevertheless, these new results are consistent with anticipatory effects. Exposure to notices late in
pregnancy is associated with significant decreases in both birth weight and gestational age.
The estimated individual-level effects of exposure to WARN notices are displayed in Table 2.6.
Like the previous set of results these include only advance notices.18 Each IV column shows esti-
mates from a model using the full-term instruments, while the OLS columns show reduced-form
estimates. The notice exposure variables are scaled so that they are comparable to the county-level
results. That is, a unit of exposure in a particular trimester corresponds to WARN notices directly
affecting approximately 0.67% of the county’s working-age population during that trimester. In
the birth weight columns, the negative coefficients on third and fourth trimester exposure indicate
that the occurrence of notices in those periods—just around birth—is associated with a strong de-
crease in birth weight. The point estimates for these two trimesters are around -30 and -21 grams,
17Additional analysis that consider subgroups of mothers and mothers’ characteristics also fail to show clear evi-
dence of selection. These results are available from the author.
18The analysis in this section gives similar results if all notices are included. However, the estimates are smaller in
magnitude because the short notices “dilute” the effect. These results are available from the author.
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respectively. These estimates are somewhat more negative than the county-level results, which
are about -20 grams. This difference likely occurs because the county-level effects isolate births
that are before layoffs, but the individual-level results include many births occurring after a layoff.
For example, the third trimester coefficients may be picking up additional negative effects of lay-
offs that are both announced and carried out during the third trimester. However, the differences
between the county-level and individual-level models are not especially large compared to the stan-
dard errors of about 6. Additionally, this same concern applies to all of the trimester coefficients,
which may be contributing to a small downward bias across all trimesters. Taking the evidence all
together, the effects of notices are likely closer to 20 grams.
These results provide additional evidence that birth outcomes deteriorate in anticipation of
job losses. The effects are concentrated in the third and fourth trimesters rather than earlier in
pregnancy. If the effects were actually driven by the consequences of job losses themselves, for
example, lost income or migration, then we should expect to see the strongest effects from notices
early in pregnancy. For example, if women tend to selectively migrate away from areas that are
losing jobs, then the effect of selection should increase as time passes, which would result in larger
effects for earlier notices rather than later ones. In addition, significant effects are estimated from
notices occurring in the fourth trimester, which covers the period just following pregnancy and
possibly the very end of pregnancy.19 There is little opportunity for job losses associated with
fourth trimester notices to directly affect the pregnancy. These effects are likely due to both the
brief overlap between the fourth trimester and pregnancy along with anticipation of the notice itself.
Finally, the fourth trimester estimates are uniformly smaller than the third trimester estimates,
suggesting that the strongest effects result from notices occurring at the end of pregnancy.
19Separate analyses were run where job losses enter the individual-level models instead of notices. The results show
that birth weight and gestational age are significantly lower among births that occur just before a job loss event, which
also suggests anticipatory effects. These results are available upon request.
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TABLE 2.6: Individual-level effects of advance notices during pregnancy
Time of exposure
relative to conception
Birth weight Gestational age Low birth weight Preterm birth
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Trimester 0 -7:99 -8:02 -0:59 -0:59 0:33 0:33 0:83+ 0:83+
[1–13 weeks before] (5:83) (5:80) (0:29) (0:29) (0:24) (0:24) (0:50) (0:50)
Trimester 1 -10:07 -10:10 -0:47 -0:47 0:21 0:21 0:37 0:37
[weeks 1–13] (7:92) (7:88) (0:30) (0:30) (0:34) (0:34) (0:50) (0:50)
Trimester 2 -6:94 -6:93 -0:78 -0:78 0:29+ 0:29+ 0:59 0:59
[weeks 14–26] (4:73) (4:70) (0:28) (0:28) (0:16) (0:16) (0:39) (0:39)
Trimester 3 -29:62 -30:32 -1:16 -1:17 0:92 0:94 1:29 1:30
[weeks 27–39] (5:70) (6:00) (0:36) (0:37) (0:21) (0:23) (0:49) (0:51)
Trimester 4 -21:47 -21:07 -1:08 -1:07 0:68 0:67 1:04 1:02
[weeks 40–52] (4:35) (4:51) (0:26) (0:26) (0:17) (0:18) (0:39) (0:40)
Trimester 5 -4:62 -4:62 -0:53 -0:53 0:28 0:28+ 0:71 0:71
[weeks 53–65] (4:30) (4:27) (0:22) (0:22) (0:17) (0:17) (0:35) (0:35)
Notes. Estimates from micro-data. OLS column shows reduced-form estimates. IV column shows instrumental
variables estimates. Coefficients for LBW and PTB models are multiplied by 100 so as to represent percentage point
effects. All models have 6,332,304 observations. Average treatment effect of a 95th percentile layoff printed with
standard errors (clustered by county) in parentheses. All models include county, year, and month fixed effects along
with mother covariates. Statistical significance symbols: + p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
2.6. Conclusion
Analyzed in variety of ways, the data reveal that birth outcomes deteriorate in anticipation of
job loss events that are announced with substantial forewarning. That is, several months before
mass layoffs and plant closings, birth weights transiently decrease by 15–20 grams within the
affected community. Results from individual-level data show that birth outcomes are affected
by announcements of worker dislocations made late in pregnancy or around the time of birth as
well as by worker dislocations occurring just after birth. These effects are largely restricted to
exposures that occur late in pregnancy rather than early in pregnancy. The results are robust to the
instrumental variables approach of Currie and Rossin-Slater (2013b). Thus, both approaches to the
data indicate significant anticipatory effects of job losses on birth outcomes in the local community.
These results suggest that the arrival of commonplace bad news about the local economy can
generate a wave of stress or unhealthful coping behaviors that in turn decrease birth weights. In
addition, the response of birth weights has an intuitive dynamic. The curtailment of pregnan-
cies can affect birth weights abruptly, while changes in growth rates require time to integrate up
to a significant effect. This pattern appears in the results. The initial response to bad news ap-
pears to be babies born too early and too small, while later decreases are associated mostly with
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slower intrauterine growth. Nevertheless further research should probe the mechanisms related
to the anticipation of negative economic events. This study cannot disentangle direct physiolog-
ical responses to stress from behavioral responses that might also generate deterioration of birth
outcomes. Future research should look at data with fine-grained temporal resolution to determine
exactly when and how behavior and physiology begin to anticipate shocks. Mobile and wearable
technology or social media may provide an especially useful source of such data (see, e.g., An-
tenucci et al. 2014). In general, one important matter is how disclosure policy, media coverage,
and social networks influence the anticipatory response to economic events.
FIGURE 2.3: Birth weight decreases in context with other studies
The results in this study are similar in magnitude to those reported in studies of prenatal stress
and destructive events. This similarity may seem surprising, but recall that the effects in this
study are scaled to represent very extreme job loss events. The unconditional probability of such
a job loss event occurring within the county-month sample is 0.0032. Figure 2.3 displays reported
effects on birth outcomes from a wide variety of studies. The effect attributed to the current study
was obtained by averaging the county-level anticipatory effects 1–4 months before a dislocation
event. An important takeaway from this figure is that the effects of even fairly extreme stressors,
such as terrorist attacks, tend to be small, typically in the single- or low double-digits. These
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effects are quite small compared to the effect of smoking, race-related differences, the difference
between Alabama and New York, or even the decrease in the mean U.S. birth weight since the
1990s—which is largely unexplained (Donahue et al. 2010). Of particular interest are the findings
of Lindo (2011), which show that babies fathered by men who have lost employment are 142 grams
lighter. This treatment effect is probably the largest one attributed to a specific event but is likely
to include substantial income effects along with stress and other mechanisms. If one supposes
that stress makes up a small but significant fraction of that decrease, then the present results on
layoff notices would require that a fairly large portion of a county’s population be stressed. Since
most layoff events dislocate only a very small portion of the local population, it is likely that many
people are indirectly affected by dislocations.
Although the mean effects on birth weight and gestational age associated with this study and
others on extreme events are fairly small, the risk of falling below critical thresholds can be sub-
stantial. For example, the individual-level results above indicate that large layoffs can increase the
risk of preterm birth by 10 percent. Future research might try to determine who is most at risk of
a strong negative reaction to bad news. Finally, policy makers might consider the possibility of
offering health assessments or counselling to workers facing imminent job loss or others who are
at significant risk.
2.7. Appendix of chapter 2
2.7.1. Data description
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TABLE 2.7: Natality data summary statistics
Alabama New York Texas Washington All
Mother’s age (years) 26.27 28.94 26.85 27.99 27.61
(5.56) (5.96) (5.76) (5.83) (5.90)
Married 0.664 0.628 0.668 0.711 0.659
(0.47) (0.48) (0.47) (0.45) (0.47)
Hispanic 0.0565 0.224 0.479 0.165 0.330
(0.23) (0.42) (0.50) (0.37) (0.47)
Non-Hispanic white 0.629 0.501 0.372 0.663 0.465
(0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.47) (0.50)
Non-Hispanic black 0.300 0.173 0.108 0.0401 0.137
(0.46) (0.38) (0.31) (0.20) (0.34)
Non-Hispanic other 0.0143 0.0873 0.0382 0.107 0.0598
(0.12) (0.28) (0.19) (0.31) (0.24)
Less than high school 0.193 0.180 0.281 0.160 0.228
(0.39) (0.38) (0.45) (0.37) (0.42)
High school 0.328 0.287 0.304 0.260 0.296
(0.47) (0.45) (0.46) (0.44) (0.46)
Some college 0.252 0.233 0.208 0.282 0.227
(0.43) (0.42) (0.41) (0.45) (0.42)
College 0.225 0.292 0.197 0.260 0.237
(0.42) (0.45) (0.40) (0.44) (0.43)
Female 0.489 0.488 0.489 0.487 0.488
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Birthweight (grams) 3244.0 3329.7 3298.8 3422.1 3317.9
(588.4) (568.9) (553.1) (551.6) (562.5)
Low birthweight 0.0802 0.0602 0.0618 0.0447 0.0609
(0.27) (0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.24)
Gestational age (weeks) 38.43 38.90 38.63 39.02 38.74
(2.66) (2.40) (2.41) (2.23) (2.42)
Preterm birth 0.138 0.0980 0.116 0.0847 0.108
(0.34) (0.30) (0.32) (0.28) (0.31)
Low weight and preterm 0.0507 0.0373 0.0382 0.0280 0.0377
(0.22) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19)
Births 546,870 2,327,954 3,476,622 761,637 7,113,083
Standard deviations in parentheses. Categories specified as proportions.
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TABLE 2.8: Account of WARN notices, 1999–2009
Alabama New York Texas Washington Total
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Completeness
Complete 857 99.8 2,443 99.0 2,840 99.8 760 96.9 6,900 99.2
Incomplete 2 0.2 25 1.0 6 0.2 24 3.1 57 0.8
Total 859 100.0 2,468 100.0 2,846 100.0 784 100.0 6,957 100.0
Type
>30 days late 37 4.3 73 3.0 56 2.0 9 1.1 175 2.5
Short 488 56.8 1,428 57.9 1,576 55.4 441 56.2 3,933 56.5
Advance 282 32.8 899 36.4 1,144 40.2 324 41.3 2,649 38.1
>120 days early 52 6.1 68 2.8 70 2.5 10 1.3 200 2.9
Total 859 100.0 2,468 100.0 2,846 100.0 784 100.0 6,957 100.0
In analysis?
Included 768 89.4 2,302 93.3 2,715 95.4 741 94.5 6,526 93.8
Excluded 91 10.6 166 6.7 131 4.6 43 5.5 431 6.2
Total 859 100.0 2,468 100.0 2,846 100.0 784 100.0 6,957 100.0
TABLE 2.9: Potential of dislocation-months as a percentage of working-age population
Mean Max Q1 Median Q3
State AN SN AN SN AN SN AN SN AN SN
Alabama 0.345 0.343 8.205 5.028 0.037 0.045 0.121 0.135 0.424 0.411
New York 0.065 0.061 1.333 1.936 0.008 0.008 0.020 0.019 0.069 0.053
Texas 0.111 0.085 3.440 5.350 0.007 0.004 0.018 0.015 0.067 0.052
Washington 0.085 0.097 1.431 1.543 0.009 0.011 0.021 0.031 0.065 0.096
Total 0.124 0.125 8.205 5.350 0.009 0.008 0.024 0.026 0.091 0.092
Note: Each statistic is calculated separately on the set of county-month cells with a positive number of AN
dislocations and the set of cells with a positive number of SN dislocations.
Abbreviations: AN=Advance notice, SN=Short notice, Q#=Quartile #
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TABLE 2.10: Previously estimated effects of prenatal exposures
Study Location Exposure Timingy BWT effect GA effect
Camacho (2008b) Colombia Landmine Trimester 3 -0.4g ns .
Camacho (2008b) Colombia Landmine Trimester 2 -0.8g ns .
Camacho (2008b) Colombia Landmine Trimester 1 -2.0g .
Catalano & Hartig (2001) Sweden Estonia sunk Trimester 3 -18 vLWBs ns .
Catalano & Hartig (2001) Sweden Estonia sunk Trimester 2 +26 vLWBs .
Catalano & Hartig (2001) Sweden Estonia sunk Trimester 1 -15 vLWBs ns .
Catalano & Hartig (2001) Sweden Palme murder Trimester 3 +44 vLWBs .
Catalano & Hartig (2001) Sweden Palme murder Trimester 2 +13 vLWBs ns .
Catalano & Hartig (2001) Sweden Palme murder Trimester 1 +16 vLWBs ns .
Descheˆnes et al. (2009) USA Temp.>85F Trimester 3 -0.009 % .
Descheˆnes et al. (2009) USA Temp.>85F Trimester 2 -0.008 % .
Descheˆnes et al. (2009) USA Temp.>85F Trimester 1 -0.003 % .
Eccleston (2011) NYC 9/11 attack Trimester 3 ns ns
Eccleston (2011) NYC 9/11 attack Trimester 2 -14.3g -0.12 ws.
Eccleston (2011) NYC 9/11 attack Trimester 1 -11.9g -0.22 ws.
Eskenazi et al. (2007) NYC 9/11 attack +0–1 ws. 1.44a, vLWB 1.30a, vPTB ns
Eskenazi et al. (2007) NYC 9/11 attack +0–1 ws. 1.67a, mLBW .
Eskenazi et al. (2007) NYC 9/11 attack +13–16 ws. 1.36a, vLWB ns
Eskenazi et al. (2007) NYC 9/11 attack +17–20 ws. 1.28a, vLWB 1.20a, vPTB
Eskenazi et al. (2007) NYC 9/11 attack +33–36 ws. 1.29a, vLWB ns
Eskenazi et al. (2007) Upstate NY 9/11 attack +17–20 ws. 1.46a, vLWB 1.10a, mPTB
Eskenazi et al. (2007) Upstate NY 9/11 attack +33–36 ws. 1.32a, vLWB ns
Eskenazi et al. (2007) NYC 9/11 attack +0–8 ws. ns 0.87a, mPTB
Eskenazi et al. (2007) Upstate NY 9/11 attack +0–4 ws. ns 0.89a, mPTB
Khashan et al. (2008) Denmark Relative dies Trimester 3 -29g .
Khashan et al. (2008) Denmark Relative dies Trimester 2 -47g .
Khashan et al. (2008) Denmark Relative dies Trimester 1 -27g .
Khashan et al. (2008) Denmark Relative ill Trimester 3 -10g .
Khashan et al. (2008) Denmark Relative ill Trimester 2 -13g .
Khashan et al. (2008) Denmark Relative ill Trimester 1 -15g .
Simeonova (2011) USA Ext. weather Birth 1 mo. -0.7g ns ns
Simeonova (2011) USA Ext. weather Birth 2 mo. -1.6g ns
Simeonova (2011) USA Ext. weather Birth 3 mo. -1.6g -0.01 ws.
Simeonova (2011) USA Strong storm Birth 1 mo. -1.8g -0.01 ws. ns
Simeonova (2011) USA Strong storm Birth 2 mo. -2.2g -0.20 ws.
Simeonova (2011) USA Strong storm Birth 3 mo. -1.1g ns -0.01 ws. ns
Smits et al. (2006) Netherlands 9/11 attack Trimester 3 -71g -0.5 days ns
Smits et al. (2006) Netherlands 9/11 attack Trimester 2 -67g -1.1 days
Smits et al. (2006) Netherlands 9/11 attack Trimester 1 +2g ns +0.7 days
Torche (2011) Chile Earthquake Trimester 3 +2.6g ns +0.03 ws. ns
Torche (2011) Chile Earthquake Trimester 2 +17g ns +0.01 ws. ns
Torche (2011) Chile Earthquake Trimester 1 -51g -0.19 ws.
y Large plus symbol indicates timing of observed effect relative to exposure. Notation: BWT=Birthweight;
(v,m)LBW=(very,moderately)Low birthweight; GA=Gestational age; (v,m)PTB=(very,moderately)Preterm birth; a ad-
justed odds ratio; ns=Reported as statisically non-significant; ws.=weeks; g=grams
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FIGURE 2.5: Anticipatory effects for varying LBW & PTB cutoffs (95% CIs plotted)
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TABLE 2.11: Micro-data IV estimates of effects of advance notices in each state
Birth weight (grams) Gestational age (days)
AL NY TX WA AL NY TX WA
Trimester 0 -2:39 -12:50 -6:97 -3:00 -0:09 -1:12 -0:36 -0:35
(2:32) (11:77) (8:74) (8:88) (0:09) (0:71) (0:36) (0:34)
Trimester 1 3:64 -11:42 -14:71 5:49 0:11 -0:76 -0:48 0:01
(1:75) (19:39) (9:69) (5:80) (0:07) (0:74) (0:36) (0:27)
Trimester 2 -0:46 -6:69 -6:86 -12:68+ -0:00 -1:48 -0:48+ -0:60
(1:81) (9:22) (7:30) (6:43) (0:08) (0:73) (0:29) (0:36)
Trimester 3 -1:09 -42:92 -26:13 -25:64 0:06 -2:66 -0:33 -1:34
(2:29) (12:94) (6:92) (16:79) (0:10) (0:92) (0:35) (0:83)
Trimester 4 0:95 -45:63 -13:74 0:27 -0:10 -2:62 -0:39 -0:24
(2:14) (9:99) (5:57) (8:74) (0:11) (0:69) (0:24) (0:29)
Trimester 5 -4:63 -8:82 -2:71 -0:64 -0:10 -1:57 -0:02 0:01
(2:04) (10:45) (5:09) (7:58) (0:08) (0:57) (0:22) (0:22)
Births 483; 908 2; 056; 626 3; 112; 455 679; 315 483; 908 2; 056; 626 3; 112; 455 679; 315
Adj. R-sq. 0:057 0:036 0:035 0:028 0:017 0:015 0:013 0:011
Notes. Effects of exposure a 95th percentile notice with at least 60 days forewarning. Standard errors (clustered by
county) in parentheses. All models include county, year, and month fixed effects along with county-specific trends.
Estimates are multiplied by 100 so as to represent percentage point changes. Statistical significance symbols: +
p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
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TABLE 2.12: Alternative specifications for micro-data models
Birth weight (grams) Gestational age (days)
Proportion Levels Proportion Levels
Trimester 0 -2.91 -0.23 -0.24+ -0.08
(2.46) (0.70) (0.14) (0.06)
Trimester 1 -0.24 -2.05 -0.10 -0.11*
(2.92) (1.44) (0.13) (0.05)
Trimester 2 -2.70 -0.33 -0.29 -0.11**
(2.37) (0.70) (0.18) (0.04)
Trimester 3 -10.42+ -2.58* -0.35 -0.10
(5.45) (1.05) (0.25) (0.08)
Trimester 4 -4.57 -0.41 -0.35* -0.06
(3.51) (0.79) (0.18) (0.04)
Trimester 5 -2.85 0.65 -0.19+ -0.01
(2.27) (0.58) (0.11) (0.03)
Births 6,332,304 6,332,304 6,332,304 6,332,304
Adj. R-sq. 0.041 0.041 0.019 0.019
Notes. All treatment variables included without stratification by state. Proportion column uses the standard treatment
variable used throughout the paper: the proportion of the working-age population affected by WARN notices. The
levels column uses the number of workers affected by WARN notices and is scaled to represent the effect of 500 work-
ers. All models include county, year, and month fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by county are in parentheses.
Statistical significance symbols: + p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
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Chapter 3
Red alert: Prenatal stress and plans to close
military bases
Abstract
InMay 2005 the U.S. military announced a restructuring plan called Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC). Some areas were projected to lose 20 percent of employment, sparking much distress.
Previous research shows that stress affects pregnancy and fetal development. I find that immedi-
ately following the announcement, the mean gestational age in the most-affected areas dropped by
1.5 days for a period of 1–2 months. Births shifted from 39+ to 37–38 weeks, a period linked to
health risks. Similar changes appear in birth weight. Local changes in employment and mothers’
characteristics do not account for these effects.
3.1. Introduction
The effects of government policies are the subject of much economics research. However, less
attention focuses on the effects of the decision process during which a potential policy is publicly
discussed and announced. When the costs of a potential policy change will be highly concentrated
in specific areas, their residents may react to the decision process with a great deal of distress.
This stress may affect people’s mental or physical well-being before any policy changes are im-
plemented. The relevant situations typically involve large, lumpy, localized projects, for example,
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U.S. domestic military activities. In many communities military operations make up a major por-
tion of economic activity, which makes these communities especially sensitive to actual or planned
changes in military policy.1 For example, as a result of the 2013 budget sequestration, the De-
partment of Defense announced tentative plans to furlough almost all civilian employees for 22
days (Carroll 2013).2 These plans threatened to have extremely concentrated, negative effects at
places like Newport News, Virginia, where the shipyard for nuclear-powered aircraft carriers em-
ploys some 21,000 people. In a high-profile speech at the shipyard, President Obama attributed
significant harm to the mere threat of furloughs and spending cuts (Shear and Shanker 2005).
To study these announcement effects in a specific and tractable way, I focus on a major military
reorganization process called Base Realignment and Closure 2005 (BRAC 2005). It is the most
recent and best documented reorganization of the U.S. military. Another round of BRAC may
occur in the next few years. BRAC 2005 involved a secretive decision process surrounded by much
speculation and anxiety, during which the Department of Defense (DoD) announced a preliminary
plan that involved hundreds of military sites throughout the United States. Some major bases were
designated for closure or reduction in size, and projected losses of local employment reached as
high as 20 percent. However, the implementation of this plan was to begin only long after the
announcement and was not certain. An independent commission reviewed the DoD’s plan, heard
communities’ concerns, and ultimately canceled several parts of the plan. This study focuses on
May–August 2005, the period starting with the DoD’s announcement of its plans and ending with
the BRAC commission’s final revisions. This period was marked by highly salient uncertainty and
much public distress.
The announcement’s effects are examined using the human capital literature that considers the
effects of stress experienced by women during pregnancy. The condition of the baby at birth is
important because it predicts the offspring’s later life outcomes such as earnings, education, IQ,
and pregnancy outcomes in adulthood (Behrman and Rosenzweig 2004; Black et al. 2007; Royer
1Military spending, Medicare-Medicaid, and Social Security each consume similar portions of the federal budget.
However, military spending is relatively concentrated in specific areas, a characteristic which is the subject of its own
literature (see Braddon 1995).
2The initial plans called for 22 days of furlough, which was later cut to 11.
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2009).3 We can better understand the intergenerational evolution of outcomes by studying how
conditions during pregnancy affect the offspring (Currie and Moretti 2007b). Several studies have
shown that disasters and other extreme events can decrease birth weights and shorten pregnancies
in the surrounding area (see, for example, Camacho 2008a or Simeonova 2011). Such findings
raise the possibility that stressful events experienced during a critical phase of development might
have long-lasting effects on human capital. However, it remains unclear how stress related to
violent and destructive events compares to stress caused by changes in economic conditions. This
study helps to fill that gap by relating a stress-inducing announcement about economic policy to
birth outcomes.
The results presented here show that, in some areas, the BRAC 2005 announcement had effects
quite similar to those reported in studies of prenatal stress and natural or man-made disasters. In a
few communities that were projected to lose 10–20 percent of employment due to BRAC, the DoD
announcement was associated with a significant decrease in mean gestational age. Gestational
age trended downward in the months preceding the announcement, and the effect reached a peak
just after the announcement of the BRAC list. The month of the announcement and the following
month show a brief, sharp drop in gestational age of about 1.5 days in magnitude. The drop is
characterized by a shift in births from 39 weeks and above to 37–38 weeks, a period called early-
term and associated with long-lasting, negative effects on health and cognitive function. This result
is supported by auxiliary, individual-level analyses using a full-term exposure instrument (Currie
and Rossin-Slater 2013a), which reveal a strong negative link between expected gestational age and
BRAC exposure during the third trimester. Over the key period between the DoD announcement
and the commission’s decision, the mean gestational age was about half a day lower. These results
are robust to many alternative specifications of the control group. The effects on the mean birth
weight are more difficult to estimate but are consistent with the effects seen in gestational age.
These results suggest that researchers and officials should pay greater attention to the negative
psychological and health effects of major policy announcements.
3However, the degree of importance of birth outcomes is still a subject of debate (Almond et al. 2005).
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Further investigation shows that these effects are unlikely to be explained by economic changes
or selection by potential mothers. Unemployment rates show little evidence of a BRAC effect on
local economic conditions during 2004–2005. The BRAC-affected areas show some evidence of
changes in the characteristics of women giving birth, but these changes are generally small in size,
in a direction that cannot account for the effect, or temporally inconsistent with the changes in
gestational age. Finally, the main results for gestational age and birth weight are affected little by
the inclusion or exclusion of demographic control variables and by highly flexible specifications
of the control variables.
The next section of the paper explains the BRAC process and findings from previous studies
of stress. The following section covers the data and empirical model. Afterwards the results are
presented along with a variety of robustness checks.
3.2. Background
3.2.1. Statutory requirements of BRAC
The BRAC 2005 process was a major restructuring of the United States military in which many
military sites were closed or “realigned,” that is, had personnel and functions removed and re-
located to other sites. The overall effect was mainly a consolidation of operations rather than a
reduction in total military size. The procedures for BRAC are specified in the Defense Base Clo-
sure and Realignment Act of 1990. Previous rounds of BRAC were carried out in 1988, 1991,
1993, and 1995, which reduced the military’s installation inventory by about 21 percent (Base
Realignment and Closure Commission 2005a, p. 314).
The requirements of the Act are as follows. The Department of Defense must prepare an
inventory of military installations and develop a 20-year plan for national security as a part of the
fiscal year 2005 budget process (Base Realignment and Closure Commission 2005b, Appendix C.
Section 2912). The Secretary of Defense must then decide whether the military needs to close or
realign military installations in order to follow the 20-year plan.
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If so, the Secretary must publicly certify the need for BRAC and publish a list of recommended
closures and realignments by May 16, 2005 (Base Realignment and Closure Commission 2005b,
Appendix C. Section 2914(a)). These recommendations must be made according to two sets of
criteria. The military value criteria have four components: (1) the current and future mission ca-
pabilities of the Department of Defense for fighting and training, (2) the availability of land, facil-
ities, and airspace at military sites, (3) the ability to accommodate contingencies and mobilization,
and (4) the cost of operations and personnel implications. The other criteria are: (1) the extent and
timing of costs and savings from closures and realignments, (2) the economic impact of changes
on communities near military installations, (3) the ability of community infrastructure to support
operational changes, and (4) environmental impact, including restoration and waste management.
The Act instructs the Secretary to place higher priority on the military value criteria.
The Act also requires the President to nominate, by March 15, 2005, nine members for the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, which are subject to appointment by the
Senate (Base Realignment and Closure Commission 2005b, Appendix C. Section 2912(d)). The
Commission is required to review the list of recommendations published by the DoD and prepare
a report on its findings and conclusions, which must be sent to the President by September 8,
2005. The review process must include public hearings on the recommendations. In addition,
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) must assist in the review process by publishing a
report analyzing the recommendations by July 1, 2005. The Commission’s report must include a
revised set of recommendations. The Commission can modify or strike recommendations that are
judged to deviate from the 20-year plan and final criteria. However, new closures and realignments
or expansions of realignments require additional procedures, including public hearings and the
support of 7 of the 9 commissioners. The President must approve or disapprove the Commission’s
recommendations by September 23, 2005.
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3.2.2. The BRAC list and results
For this study, the two key BRAC events are the public announcement of the Secretary’s recom-
mended closings and realignments—commonly called “the BRAC list”—on May 13, 2005 and the
final deliberations of the BRAC Commission, broadcast live on August 24–27, 2005. The May
13 announcement was very salient and the subject of great anticipation because the communities
near military installations feared reductions in employment following realignment or closure. On
May 14, 2005 the New York Times covered the list in a front page story (Schmidt 2005). Figure 3.1
shows the intensity of Google searches for “BRAC 2005”, which indicates that attention began to
increase in late 2004 and built up to a sharp spike in May 2005. A smaller peak occurs in August
2005, the month of the final vote. During this May–August period, the communities subject to
closures and realignments lobbied the BRAC Commission fiercely, arguing that their base should
be removed from the list.
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BRAC list
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FIGURE 3.1: Public attention to the BRAC process
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The DoD’s BRAC list proposed 837 closures and realignment actions. Included were 33 major
closures and 30 major realignments. The DoD designates a closure as “major” if the facility has a
plant replacement value of at least $100 million.4 A realignment is designated as “major” if it will
result in a net reduction of at least 400 military or civilian personnel at the installation (Government
Accountability Office 2005). The DoD’s designations are not ideal indicators of the local economic
impact of BRAC. First, major closures are defined only by the value of physical plant and in some
cases affect a small number of personnel. Second, they do not take into account the size of the
installation relative to the local economy.
Instead, I focus on six actions singled out by the GAO, which publishes many studies to support
the BRAC decision process and audits the results of BRAC implementation. For the statutorily-
mandated report released on July 1, 2005, the Government Accountability Office analyzed the
potential negative economic impact of the BRAC actions and found that six areas faced “fairly
significant impact” (Government Accountability Office 2005, p. 48). These are the communities
associated with (1) Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico; (2) Hawthorne Army Depot, Nevada;
(3) Naval Support Activity Crane, Indiana; (4) Submarine Base New London, Connecticut; (5)
Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska; and (6) Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota. The estimated,
combined direct and indirect losses of area employment ranged from 8.5 percent to 20.5 percent.
These areas (“the GAO-6”) are listed in table 3.1.
In five of these cases, the Commission modified the recommendation. The Commission can-
celed the realignment of Hawthorne Army Depot and the closure of Ellsworth Air Force Base.
Cannon Air Force base was assigned to enclave status, in which it would remain open while a new
use was found for it. The closure of Submarine Base New London was reduced to a realignment,
and the realignment of Eielson Air Force Base was partially canceled. Only the realignment of
Naval Support Activity Crane stood without modification.
4Plant replacement value of a facility is the cost, in current year dollars, of designing and constructing a replacement
of the facility at the same site (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 2003).
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TABLE 3.1: Sites facing significant negative effects from BRAC 2005 (GAO-6)1
Military installation DoD’s recommended ac-
tion
Result2 County Percentage
employment loss
projected
Population
Y2004
Cannon AFB Close Enclave Curry, NM 20.5 45,951
Hawthorne Army Depot Realign Struck Mineral, NV 13.6 4,827
NSA Crane Realign Realign Martin, IN 11.6 10,220
SUBASE New London Close Struck/R New London, CT 9.4 266,890
Eielson AFB Realign Struck/R FNSB, AK 8.6 92,301
Ellsworth AFB Close Struck Pennington, SD 8.5 92,890
1 “Of those communities facing potential negative economic impact, six communities face the potential for a fairly
significant impact. They include the communities surrounding Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico; Hawthorne
Army Depot, Nevada; Naval Support Activity Crane, Indiana; Submarine Base New London, Connecticut; Eielson
Air Force Base, Alaska; and Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, where the negative impact on employment as a
percent of area employment ranges from 8.5 percent to 20.5 percent.” (GAO-05-785, pp. 48–49)
2 The BRAC commission spared five of the installations by voting to strike or modify the DoD’s recommended action.
Abbreviations: AFB=Air Force Base, NSA=Naval Support Activity, SUBASE=Submarine Base, FNSB=Fairbanks
North Star Borough
3.2.3. Public reactions to BRAC as reported by the news media
News coverage of the BRAC process frequently reported anxiety, fear, and local efforts to prepare
to lobby the Commission. Before the announcement of the list, local papers ran headlines like
“A Good Navy Town, Submarines Run Deep In Groton’s Soul, And So Does Fear For The Naval
Base’s Future” (Hamilton 2005). The local paper in Clovis, New Mexico reported that closure of
Cannon Air Force Base could “devastate” the community with over 7,000 jobs lost (Irvin 2005).
Hoax emails claiming to leak the list were circulating by late 2004 (Linn 2004). Some community
groups sought to retain law firms for assistance in lobbying the Commission (Gargulinski 2005).
Economic impact analyses were also commissioned in order to challenge BRAC decisions on the
economic impact criterion (see, e.g., State of Connecticut 2005).
The New York Times, in a front page story, characterized the day of the BRAC announcement
by saying, “On military bases across the country and in the communities that depend on them, all
the dread and anxiety comes into high focus today, when the Pentagon plans to release a new list
of recommended base closings and consolidations” (Semple 2005). Civilian employees at military
sites crowded around televisions waiting for the press conference in which the list would be an-
nounced (Hartz 2004).5 Residents in the GAO-6 were variously reported to react with “engaged
5“When defense officials announced Cannon was recommended for closure, a sense of unbelief crashed through
the crowd [watching the press conference]. ‘We were all very upset and shocked,’ said Wike, a manager of dining
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anger,” “denial”, and “shock” (Semple 2005; Hartz 2004).
3.2.4. Previous research on stress
This study’s hypothesis depends on two key relationships. First, the announcement of the BRAC
recommendations should cause a broad increase in stress levels among residents of the GAO-6.
Media reports and data on community lobbying both support this point, and studies discussed
below report evidence that people are sensitive to anticipated changes in economic conditions.
Second, stress experienced by a woman during pregnancy tends to cause an earlier birth and lower
birth weight.
Economic matters are important sources of stress according to representative survey data. In
recent surveys by the American Psychological Association (2012), “the economy” is the third most
commonly reported stressor, after “money” and “work.” Anxiety levels reported by workers are
highly responsive to cyclical changes in labor market conditions (Davis and von Wachter 2011).
Finally, self-reported negative hedonic experience is sensitive to short-term changes in the S&P 500
index (Deaton 2012). At a finer level numerous studies by health researchers link deterioration of
workers’ physical and mental health to anticipation of negative workplace events, for example,
layoffs, plant closures, and restructuring (Kasl and Cobb 1970b, 1980b; Hamilton et al. 1990b;
Ferrie et al. 1995; Grunberg et al. 2001).6
A wide variety of research links stress experienced during pregnancy to effects on fetal devel-
opment and birth outcomes. The risks of low birth weight and preterm birth are positively asso-
ciated with self-reported stress (see Copper et al. 1996; Dole et al. 2003; and Rondo´ et al. 2003
for clinical studies with samples sizes on the order of 1,000). The biological mechanisms under-
lying these links involve neuroendocrine processes, immune/inflammatory activity, and behavior
(Wadhwa et al. 2001b,a; Wadhwa 2005; Dunkel Schetter 2011). Two commonly studied hor-
mones in this context are cortisol and corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH), which are involved
facilities and clubs at Cannon” (Hartz 2004).
6Carlson (2015) provides a more detailed discussion of stress in this context.
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in the physiological stress response and pregnancy. Cortisol is implicated in “programming” of the
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, a proposed prenatal mechanism that permanently al-
ters physiology with consequences for cognitive, emotional, and physiological health (Welberg
and Seckl 2001; Weinstock 2005; Seckl and Holmes 2007; Glover et al. 2010). Aizer et al.
(2009) investigate cortisol using within-mother—between-child variation and report that higher
levels predict worse cognitive and health outcomes in the child. Corticotropin-releasing hormone
plays a critical role in both the stress response and determining the timing of birth (Erickson et al.
2001). Some researchers propose that CRH functions as a “clock” that determines the onset of
birth (McLean et al. 1995). Numerous studies positively associate levels of maternal CRH with the
risk of preterm birth (see, for example, Hobel et al. 1999; Inder et al. 2001; Wadhwa et al. 2004;
Sandman et al. 2006). Stress can also raise the mother’s risk of infection or level of inflammatory
processes, which in turn increase the possibility of preterm birth (Wadhwa et al. 2001b). Finally,
mothers experiencing stress may cope by using substances or altering diet (Dunkel Schetter 2011).
These studies are critically important for establishing the biological plausibility of a causal link
between stressful experiences and effects on fetal development. The main shortcoming of this line
of research in humans is a lack of exogenous variation in stress.
That shortcoming is partially addressed by the research that studies pregnant women who were
exposed to an exogenous, stressful event, typically a disaster or similar extreme situation. A variety
of disasters have been studied including earthquakes (Glynn et al. 2001; Tan et al. 2009; Torche
2011), extreme weather (Xiong et al. 2008; Descheˆnes et al. 2009; Simeonova 2011; Currie and
Rossin-Slater 2013a), armed conflict (Catalano and Hartig 2001; Camacho 2008a; Mansour and
Rees 2012; Quintana-Domeque and Rodenas 2014), a nation-wide blackout (Burlando 2012), and
the September 11, 2001 attacks (Berkowitz et al. 2003; Lederman et al. 2004; Lauderdale 2006;
Smits et al. 2006; Eskenazi et al. 2007; Lipkind et al. 2010; Eccleston 2011; Brown 2014). The
designs of these studies are highly variable in terms of the sophistication of statistical methods
and origin of data, with some using small, convenience samples and others using comprehensive
administrative data. Studies typically report that exposure to extreme events modestly decreases
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mean birth weight or gestational age and increases the risk of low birth weight or preterm birth.7
Studies using large administrative data sets have reported birth weight decreases such as 8.7g (Ca-
macho 2008a, landmine exposure), 8–19g (Eccleston 2011, 2001-09-11 in NYC), 5–15g (Brown
2012, 2001-09-11 outside NYC/DC), 2g and 30g (Simeonova 2011, storms and floods), 51g
(Torche 2011, earthquake), and 0.3g (Descheˆnes et al. 2009, per day >85F). Reported decreases
in mean gestational age are typically on the order of a day (see, for example, Eccleston 2011; Sime-
onova 2011; Torche 2011). However, even in careful studies there are still concerns. The physical
destruction caused by extreme disasters could impede access to food, water, or medical services.
Women may leave or be forced from disaster-affected areas or may experience an abortion. These
influences could introduce selection bias.
To study some of these concerns Currie and Rossin-Slater (2013a) utilize a dataset that links
births to mother identifiers and precise location data. With this data they can use a mother’s lagged
location to instrument for hurricane exposure during subsequent pregnancies. An instrumental
variables approach is also used to correct for the fact that longer pregnancies are more likely to be
exposed to a hurricane. The authors report no effect of hurricane exposure on gestational age nor
birth weight. However, they do find exposure to increase the risk of abnormal conditions.
This paper also relates to research on economic changes and birth outcomes. Dehejia and
Lleras-Muney (2004) report a countercyclical relationship between economic conditions and birth
outcomes in the United States. Babies conceived when unemployment is high are at lower risk of
low birth weight. However, Bozzoli and Quintana-Domeque (2014) study Argentina during 2001–
2003 and report that low economic activity in the month of birth predicts a lower birth weight.
However, the effects of economic conditions are strongest in low-education women. The high-
education women appear to be sensitive only to economic conditions in early pregnancy. Finally,
Lindo (2011) finds evidence that a man’s displacement from work can negatively impact the birth
weight of his wife’s babies.
7However, Lipkind et al. (2010) reports no difference in mean birth weight and gestational age between pregnant
women in the immediate vicinity of the World Trade Center on 2001-09-11 and other pregnant women in New York
City more than 5 miles from the towers.
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3.3. Data and model
3.3.1. BRAC data
The BRAC process is heavily documented. The DoD’s main report is a volume of about 650
pages, while eleven additional volumes provide supporting documentation (United States Depart-
ment of Defense 2005a,b). Appendix B details the 449 sites where BRAC actions would have
a net, non-zero effect on area employment.8 The BRAC Commission’s report is over 700 pages
and indicates all changes to the DoD’s original list (Base Realignment and Closure Commission
2005a,b). The last key document is GAO report 05-785 (Government Accountability Office 2005),
which identifies the major closures, major realignments, and the GAO-6 sites.
3.3.2. Community lobbying data
There are two separate sets of data on community lobbying: web comments and postal letters.
The web comments were obtained from the site BRAC.gov, which was created by the BRAC
Commission. Members of the public were able to submit anonymous, public comments at this site
without charge. The comments were submitted in 2005 between May 21 and September 16. A
total of 13,249 comments are posted at the site. Commenters were able to fill in a field specifying
the base on which they were commenting, and about 89 percent of the comments contain this
information. The analysis focuses on a subset of 5,884 messages that meet the following criteria:
(1) the comment was associated with one of the 444 domestic installations on which the BRAC list
had a net personnel effect, (2) the comment was submitted before the Commission’s final votes on
August 24–27, and (3) the comment was not associated with a set of nine bases that were added to
the list by the Commission in July.9
8Each site was assigned an area according to the following rule. If the site was in a metropolitan division (MD),
then it was assigned to that MD. Otherwise, if the site was in a metropolitan or micropolitan statistical area, then it
was assigned to that area. If neither of the above applied, then the site was assigned to its county.
9These bases were actually on the original list, but the Commission voted on July 19 to make the effects more
negative. For example, Naval Air Station Oceana was changed from a minor realignment to a major closure (Defense
Base Closure and Realignment Commission 2005a).
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Data on lobbying via postal letter was derived from an archive of BRAC documents. The Com-
mission scanned and archived all documentation, including letters sent from community members.
Metadata on these files is maintained by the University of North Texas Digital Library. These
metadata files were used to estimate the number of letters sent by members of each community.10
The analysis includes the 157,661 letters that met the same selection criteria used for the web
comments.
3.3.3. Natality data
The data on births come from the National Center for Health Statistics at the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC). Almost all births in the United States are recorded in this data set. The key vari-
ables are the birth weight (BWT) in grams, the gestational age (GA) in weeks, the month of birth,
and the mother’s county of residence. For the purpose of this study, births are assigned to the
county in which the mother resides, rather than the county of birth, so as to capture the effect of
the mother’s environment. Births meeting the following criteria were included: (1) The birth was
a singleton, (2) the mother resided and gave birth within the same state, and (3) the mother was 18
to 45 years of age. If a record had a missing value in the birth weight, gestational age, plurality, or
location variables, then it was dropped before analysis.
Summary statistics of the birth data appear in table 3.2. Several differences appear between the
GAO-6 and control areas. Births in the GAO-6 are more likely to be to non-Hispanic white moth-
ers. These mothers are slightly younger and more likely to be married. The education distribution
of mothers in the GAO-6 is more tightly clustered around high school and some college. Finally,
births in the GAO-6 have a higher mean weight, by about 44 grams, and gestational age, by about
0.12 weeks.
10Standard text processing techniques were used to process metadata entries like: “‘Community Correspondence -
214 Individual Letters from Cannon AFB’, ’2005 BRAC Commission”’. However, in some cases the exact number of
letters could not be determined. These cases were counted as one letter. The responses likely contain some measure-
ment error, but this appears to be small. For example, the data contain 125,699 letters from the Niagara Falls area, and
local news coverage on the letter campaign reported that more than 123,000 letters had been sent by August 16, 2005
(Buckley 2005).
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TABLE 3.2: Summary statistics for birth data, 2000–2005
All GAO-6 Control groups
Baseline Minor Major Military States
Mother characteristics:
Age< 20 7:20 7:81 7:63 7:18 6:18 7:50 7:95
Age2 [20; 24] 25:76 29:96 26:96 25:08 23:34 28:51 27:65
Age2 [25; 34] 52:58 49:22 51:83 52:56 54:29 49:89 51:24
Age> 34 14:46 13:00 13:58 15:18 16:19 14:10 13:16
Hispanic 21:70 11:81 22:63 35:54 22:64 24:85 19:58
Non-Hispanic white 57:98 71:86 59:54 44:05 51:98 45:64 64:13
Non-Hispanic black 12:20 5:33 10:15 10:99 15:19 12:38 8:39
Non-Hispanic other 7:34 9:39 7:09 8:93 8:94 15:56 6:93
Less than high school 18:42 11:73 19:67 22:89 16:70 15:42 18:48
High school 30:63 37:19 31:46 29:06 28:53 34:00 32:67
Some college 22:14 26:03 22:34 20:58 21:97 24:56 22:82
College graduate 27:45 23:96 25:47 26:24 30:60 23:86 24:59
Married 67:77 69:69 66:95 65:50 70:49 69:11 64:31
Gained< 16 lbs. 12:18 11:11 12:44 11:33 11:64 11:57 11:38
Gained> 60 lbs. 2:03 1:74 2:04 1:94 1:94 2:24 2:25
Smoked while preg. 9:49 14:42 10:53 6:19 6:01 5:87 13:72
Cigs. per day 1:08 0:80 1:21 0:78 0:79 0:82 0:43
Prenatal visits 11:64 11:51 11:64 11:76 11:77 11:54 11:27
C-section 24:71 23:08 24:40 24:47 25:00 24:20 23:60
Induction 20:30 17:37 20:55 16:94 18:94 14:09 22:29
Child characteristics:
Female 48:80 49:00 48:80 48:80 48:81 48:69 48:78
Birth weight (grams) 3347:28 3391:48 3346:90 3334:23 3355:79 3343:11 3337:69
Gestational age (weeks) 38:84 38:96 38:85 38:83 38:85 38:89 38:81
Low weight (< 2500g) 5:73 5:04 5:71 5:79 5:55 5:75 5:82
Preterm (< 37 wks.) 9:86 8:38 9:89 9:97 9:49 9:79 10:14
Births 13; 698; 648 38; 755 9; 082; 906 3; 884; 247 3; 098; 584 702; 046 1; 104; 693
Notes. Variables are binary and expressed as percentages unless otherwise specified. Standard deviations in appendix.
3.3.4. Additional data
The county-by-month level unemployment data comes from the Local Area Unemployment Statis-
tics program. County-level military employment data is provided by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Population estimates for July 1 come from the U.S. Census and National Cancer Insti-
tute/SEER.
3.3.5. Empirical model
The analysis estimates how county-level mean birth outcomes respond to the BRAC process rather
than how individual-level outcomes respond to exposure in different trimesters of pregnancy. Thus
the approach here is more like that of Currie and Schmieder (2009). The main reason for adopting
this approach is that the BRAC effect is not necessarily confined to the announcement on May 13,
2005. That event is of primary interest, but there is also anticipatory stress before the announce-
ment and the committee’s decision in August. These various influences are difficult to disentangle.
For example, pregnancies exposed to the May announcement in the second or third trimester were
also exposed to anticipatory stress before the announcement. However, for the sake of comparison
with the related literature, the appendix does include results from individual-level exposures in
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the three different trimesters. Those results include estimates using the counterfactual full-term
pregnancy instrument proposed by Currie and Rossin-Slater (2013a).
To estimate how birth outcomes respond to the BRAC announcement, I use a linear model with
county fixed effects. The mean birth outcome Yi;t for each county i and month t is modeled by
Yi;t = i +
 
6X
=1
T

i;t + 

t
!
+Z 0i;t + i;t;
where
 the six treatment variables T i;t indicate if county i is in the GAO-6 and month t is in the
period  = (1) Jan–Apr 2004, (2) May–Aug 2004, (3) Sept–Dec 2004, (4) Jan–Apr 2005, (5)
May–Aug 2005, and (6) Sept–Dec 2005;
 t indicates when t is in period  as defined above; and
 Zi;t is a vector of other covariates, including year indicators, seasonality indicators, and
means of mothers’ characteristics.11 The seasonality indicators are interacted with the treat-
ment group so that the treatment effect estimates are not biased by differences in seasonal
patterns between the groups. This specification is strongly supported by tests of the restric-
tion that the seasonal patterns are equal in the two groups.12
The key parameter is 5, which gives the average effect of the BRAC announcement on birth
outcomes in the GAO-6 during May–August 2005. The corresponding estimate along with those
for the other five periods of interest are reported in the results section. The regressions weight each
11The mothers’ characteristics are proportions of mothers falling in various groups. The age categories are “Less
than 20”, “20 to 24”, “25 to 34”, “Over 34”, and “Missing”. The race and ethnicity categories are “Hispanic”, “White”,
“Black”, “Other”, and “Missing”. The educational attainment categories are “Less than high school”, “High school”,
“Some college”, “College or higher”, and “Missing”. The marital status categories are “Married” and “Not married”.
The categories for total birth order are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more, and “Missing”. Tobacco use variables are not included in
the main results because they are reported irregularly across states and over time. These self-reported variables are also
generally suspected to contain significant measurement error. Nevertheless additional results reported in the appendix
show that inclusion of tobacco use variables has no substantial effect on the results. The variables included are “non-
smoker”, “smokes 1–5 cigarettes per day”, “smokes 6–10 cigarettes per day”, “smokes 11-20 cigarettes per day”,
“smokes 21 or more cigarettes per day”, “smokes an unknown amount”, “smoking status unknown”, and “smoking
variables not reported.”
12The p value from the seasonality interaction test (SIT) is reported in the regression tables.
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cell by the number of births it contains. The cluster-robust covariance estimator is used to allow
for within-county correlation in i;t.
The model focuses only on short-term effects through 2005 because an analysis over a longer
term would require an investigation of much greater scope. BRAC actions began to be imple-
mented in 2006, so analyzing longer-term effects would require considering additional changes
in military operations, economic conditions, and demographics. However, in the interest of com-
pleteness, results for 2006 are presented in the appendix (see table 3.16).
3.4. Results
3.4.1. Lobbying intensity in the GAO-6
I use data on community lobbying to independently check whether the GAO-6 areas reacted un-
usually strongly to the BRAC list announcement. Both measures of lobbying intensity are far more
intense in the GAO-6 than in other areas. Incidence-rate ratios from negative binomial models ap-
pear in Table 3.3. These results show that the rate of web comments, where area population is the
denominator, was about 600–900 times higher in the GAO-6 relative to areas with minor BRAC
actions, while the rate of postal letters was 10,000–50,000 times higher. Compared to areas with a
major loss, the GAO-6 areas sent roughly 100 times more web comments and 50–100 times more
postal letters. The GAO-6 effects increase after adding controls for urban population, military em-
ployment, and area income. The estimated effects of these controls show a striking consistency
across both web comments and postal letters. More urban areas are associated with less lobbying
as are areas with higher military employment.13
13This result may seem counterintuitive, but members of the military have relatively little stake in BRAC. They
frequently relocate to new bases regardless of BRAC. Thus, they have little reason to lobby.
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TABLE 3.3: Estimated citizen lobbying intensities from BRAC-affected areas
Web comments Postal letters
Base category:
- GAO-6 682:99 839:52 10;768:72 49;859:67
- Major loss 4:88 11:12 243:76 459:33
- Minor action 1:00 1:00 1:00 1:00
- Major gain 0:65 1:47 0:61 1:88
Percent urban 0:96 0:95
Percent military 0:89 0:84
Per cap. income 1:00 1:00
Observations 435 435 435 435
Pseudo R2 0:090 0:116 0:094 0:103
Notes. Incidence-rate ratios from negative binomial models that include population as an exposure term. Statistical
significance symbols: + p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
3.4.2. Birth outcomes
3.4.2.1. Pre-treatment trends
Figure 3.2 shows that the pre-treatment trends in gestational age provide a suitable basis for a
difference-in-differences strategy. The mean gestational age decreases by about one day over
the period 2000–2004 in both the GAO-6 and the control region.14 To provide support for the
difference-in-differences identifying assumption, I tested and could not reject the hypothesis of a
common trend during the periods 2000–2003 and 2000–2004.15 The evidence of a common trend
becomes somewhat stronger after adjusting the means for variation related to mother covariates.16
However, the mean birth weights in the two areas diverge over the period 2000–2004. This makes
estimation of the effect on birth weight more problematic, which is discussed further below. This
problem is even more severe for other outcomes such as the proportion low birth weight or preterm,
so these auxiliary outcomes are not included in the analysis.
14The downward trends in gestational age and birth weight are well-known but cannot be fully explained by changes
in demographics or obstetric practices (Donahue et al. 2010).
15The test uses the null hypothesis that the five differences in means, fMeanGAGAO-6;y   MeanGAcontrol;y : y =
2000; 2001; : : : ; 2004g, are all equal. These Wald tests use coefficients estimated using only data for the relevant time
period.
16Adjusted means are plotted in the appendix. Adjustments are made by computing the estimated conditional
expectation with all mother covariates held at the sample mean. The estimates are obtained from the same models
used in the main analysis but omitting year 2005 data.
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FIGURE 3.2: Year-to-year trends in gestational age and birth weight
3.4.2.2. Main results for gestational age
The main regression results for gestational age appear in Table 3.4. In each of the five models, there
are six estimates, which correspond to the six four-month periods of 2004–2005. Across all models
the pattern is a decrease in gestational age that is strongest in May–August 2005 followed by an
insignificantly positive effect after August 2005. The first column shows results using the baseline
control group. In 2005, the January–April and May–August effects reach -0.42 (SE=0.27) and
-0.60 (SE=0.20) days, respectively. However, the September–December effect is +0.31 (SE=0.24)
days. Below the regression estimates is the p value of the equality test, which has the null hypothe-
sis that the three effects in 2005 are equal but not necessarily equal to zero. Thus, the test has some
robustness to a violation of parallel trends. The test strongly rejects that the three coefficients are
equal. In addition, note that the coefficient estimates do not change monotonically over time. The
mean deviation test is designed to test for a linear relationship among the three coefficients. The
null hypothesis is that the May–August 2005 effect is equal to the average of the January–April
2005 and September–December 2005 effects. This test also rejects strongly as seen in bottom of
Table 3.4.
The other four columns show that the pattern of results is robust to the use of alternative control
groups. The minor control group is the set of 144 counties that were affected by a minor BRAC
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action.17 They satisfied these criteria: (1) A military installation in the county was put on the DoD’s
BRAC list, (2) no major closure, major realignment, nor major gain occurred in the county, and (3)
the employment changes associated with the county’s BRAC activities were less than one percent
of the county’s employment. The major control group is the set of 171 counties that fell in an
economic area that was slated to have a major closure or major realignment (where economic area
is defined as described in the background section above). The minor and major control groups are
disjoint. The military control group is the set of 56 counties where military employment made up
5–25% of employment in 2004. The military control group is not a strict subset of the minor control
group nor of the major control group. Finally, the states control group includes only counties in
the same states as the GAO-6 areas. The alternate control groups give statistically significant
May–August 2005 estimates in the range of -0.59 to -0.83, an interval which includes the estimate
obtained from the baseline model. In addition the equality and deviation tests are rejected in all
cases.
Only the May–August 2005 estimate is statistically robust across all models, but the results
suggest that gestational age was already trending downward before May 2005. The trend can be
seen to start in late 2004, which suggests that something was influencing gestational age in the
GAO-6 areas before the announcement in May 2005. One possibility is a change in economic
conditions. This topic is considered further below, and the unemployment rate data do not reveal
any significant changes over 2004–2005. Another possibility is selection or migration by potential
parents, also considered in more detail below. The results do not show unusual changes in the
characteristics of mothers giving birth during 2004–2005 nor the number of births. Finally, there
is the possibility that the decrease in gestational age is due to a process of anticipatory stress
that built up and peaked just after the BRAC list was announced. The coefficient estimates on the
gestational age effects steadily decrease and appear to be part of a single process that reaches a peak
and terminates in May–Aug. 2005. Gestational age then abruptly returned to a baseline level. An
anticipatory stress process is consistent with the local press reports discussed above, which indicate
17The number of counties is not equal to the number of clusters in the table because some counties are combined
according the military’s definition of an economic area.
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a significant amount of anxiety before the BRAC announcement. However, this explanation also
requires that the GAO-6 areas were affected more severely than other military areas. Unfortunately
there is no data on beliefs about the relative likelihood of different military sites being assigned
to the BRAC list. Research on BRAC or other policy changes should consider the possibility that
medical or physiological data might reflect aggregate beliefs about the likelihood of stressful future
events.
3.4.2.3. Main results for birth weight
The results for birth weight must be interpreted with caution because, as shown in Figure 3.2, the
pre-treatment trends diverge. Table 3.4 displays regression results analogous to those for gesta-
tional age, but these birth weight models include treatment group-specific quadratic time trends.
This functional form appears most plausible in appendix Figure 3.6. Nevertheless, regression re-
sults for alternative specifications are presented in appendix table 3.10. The birth weight results are
in qualitative agreement with the gestational age results and suggest a decrease in growth during
May–August 2005 relative to the other parts of the year. The May–August 2005 effect estimates
range from -30 to -45 grams, but the estimates are somewhat imprecise with standard errors in
the range of 14 to 18. Across all the control group specifications the equality tests and deviation
tests are rejected, indicating an unusual change in birth weights over the course of the 2005. The
results from alternative specifications of the time trend also indicate a decrease in birth weight
during May–August 2005 and rejection of the equality test. Ultimately, the results here suggest the
same pattern of changes seen in gestational age, but the lack of well-behaved pre-treatment trends
precludes a sharp conclusion about the size of the birth weight effects.
3.4.2.4. Month-by-month results for gestational age
Examining the effects on a monthly basis provides additional evidence that the BRAC announce-
ment decreased the mean gestational age in the GAO-6. To investigate the effects of the announce-
ment in finer detail, I estimated a model with separate effects for each month of 2005 instead of
174
only three periods. The model is otherwise identical to that in column 1 of table 3.4. The estimated
coefficients are plotted in Figure 3.3. These estimates reveal that the decreased gestational age in
the May–August period is actually concentrated in just May and June. The mean gestational age
was decreased by about 1.5 days in the month of announcement and the following month. The
acute effect of the announcement must have occurred within about two weeks of May 13 because
no effect is evident in April. Further, the effects in May and June are almost equal. This strong ef-
fect precisely in the period just after the announcement provides strong support for a stress-induced
decrease in gestational age. Finally, at the end of August a substantial portion of the BRAC ac-
tions affecting the GAO-6 areas were canceled. This “good news” may have had a brief protective
effect on birth outcomes as suggested by the positive September estimate with a magnitude of one
day. However, there is little research on the effects of positive information, so this result should be
viewed tentatively.
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3.4.2.5. Distributional effects on gestational age
May through June 2005 appears to be the period where the BRAC effects were most concentrated,
so the last level of analysis focuses there. Figure 3.4 depicts how the distribution of gestational
age in the GAO-6 areas changed during the May–June 2005 period, which contained 1,147 births.
Each plotted series represents the change in the empirical probability mass function (histogram)
of gestational age from March–April to May–June within a given year. A positive value at a
particular gestational age bin indicates that a larger percentage of births fell into that bin during
May–June than during March–April. The 2005 series shows large, positive values at 37 and 38
weeks but negative values at 39–42 weeks. This pattern suggests that the 1.5-day decrease in the
May–June average represents a shift in births from 39+ weeks gestation to 37 and 38 weeks, which
are regarded as early-term births. If zero change is taken as the baseline, then this result implies
that the early-term bins gained about 48 births as a result of the BRAC announcement.18 Although
these births did not fall below the conventional threshold for preterm birth, recent research links
early-term births to health and developmental risks. Crump et al. (2013) report that early-term
birth predicts greater risk of childhood and adult mortality relative to birth at 39–42 weeks. For
those who reached 18 years of age, early-term birth was associated with a 20 percent increase in
the risk of death during young adulthood. Yang et al. (2010) report that, relative to children born
at 39 weeks, children who were born at 38 or 37 weeks had IQ scores 0.4 or 1.7 points lower,
respectively.
The 2005 series represents a change that is opposite to what tends to occur in the other years.
The years 2000–2003 show instead large negative values around 38 weeks and large positive values
around 39 and 40 weeks. This indicates that the usual change from March–April to May–June is
actually towards fewer births around 38 weeks and more around 40 weeks. Finally, in 2004 the
distributions in March–April and May–June were very similar to each other.
18The calculations are 0.0275  1,147 = 31.5425, for 38 weeks, and 0.0145  1,147 = 16.6315, for 37 weeks. The
total is 48.174.
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FIGURE 3.4: Effects on the gestational age distribution in the GAO-6
3.4.2.6. Randomization inference for gestational age effect
Additional analysis shows that the changes in birth weights in the GAO-6 are unusual relative to
those found in other areas. I conducted a randomization inference test similar to that discussed by
Bertrand et al. (2002) and Donohue and Ho (2007). This test holds all covariates constant except
for the BRAC treatment variables, which are randomly assigned to other areas. After random
assignment, the effects of the randomly assigned treatments are estimated. Under the sharp null
hypothesis of no treatment effect in every unit, repetition of this procedure N times delivers an
estimate of the randomization distribution of the test statistic of interest, ftn : n = 1; : : : ; Ng.19
Observing an extreme test statistic relative to the randomization distribution provides evidence
against the null hypothesis.
This test is constructed such that it parallels the research design and incorporates informa-
tion about the treatment assignment mechanism. Intuitively it answers the question, “If many
researchers conducted studies of BRAC by randomly choosing six counties with a large military
presence and then conducted the usual analysis, what would be the distribution of results?” In
19Calculation of all possible permutations is infeasible.
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each realization of the test, the placebo treatments are randomly assigned so as to create a group
of six counties that are similar to the GAO-6. These random groups are drawn from the set of 62
counties where military employment made up 5–25 percent of local employment.20 The test statis-
tic used is the t statistic on the May–August 2005 effect, the same statistic used for inference in
the conventional analysis. If the BRAC list announcement truly has no effect, then the observed t
statistic is unlikely to be unusual relative to the randomization distribution. Finally, one additional
step is included to address the problem of pre-treatment trends and the difference-in-differences
identifying assumption. Some randomly formed treatment groups do not share a common trend
with the control group. Ignoring this problem would cause potentially severely biased estimates
to enter the randomization distribution. To address this problem, the random groups are filtered
through the parallel trends test used elsewhere in the paper. Each realization is only included if
this test has p > 0:05 over 2000–2004.21
A total of 5,000 randomizations were attempted, which yielded 922 statistics after filtering. The
p-value on the May–August 2005 estimate had a 95 percent confidence interval which fell entirely
below 0.05, thus satisfying a simple stopping rule. A histogram of these realizations appears in
figure 3.5. The observed t =  2:91 has a one-tailed p-value of 0.027. Thus, the real result was
unlikely to be generated under the null hypothesis of no BRAC effect. The equality test of the
three key coefficients is also rejected under the randomization implementation with a p-value of
0.014. The January–April and September–December coefficients however are not significant at
conventional levels. These additional results are plotted in the appendix.
3.4.2.7. Individual-level estimates
For comparison with the literature, estimates on individual-level natality data are presented in the
appendix. These models treat the BRAC announcement on May 13, 2005 as a point source of
stress like studies of disaster exposure. Exposures are treated both in the conventional way and
20This includes the GAO-6 counties. Two of the GAO-6 sites, Martin, Indiana, and Mineral, Nevada, were reported
to have less than 5 percent military employment in the Bureau of Economic Analysis data. But these data conflict with
military figures and appear to be unreliable due to the small populations.
21The trends are tested over 2000-2004 and only the treatment variables for 2005 are included.
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FIGURE 3.5: Histograms of randomization test results, May–Aug. coefficients and equality test
using the full-term instrument proposed by Currie and Rossin-Slater (2013a). These results are
consistent with the analysis presented above. Exposure in the third trimester is associated with
a decrease in gestational age of about one day (see Table 3.17). The corresponding effect on the
probability of preterm birth is positive but does not reach statistical significance in the instrumented
model (see Table 3.18). This finding is consistent with the month-by-month results above where
the decreases in gestational age tended to shift births downwards to 37–38 weeks, which is above
the conventional preterm threshold. The estimated effects on birth weight are negative but not
significant at conventional levels. However, the models do show a link between third trimester
exposure and increased risk of low birth weight (see Table 3.18). Estimates of selection effects
on mothers’ characteristics are also consistent with the selection results discussed below, showing
a shift towards relatively more white mothers. No significant effects are found on obstetric pro-
cedures, mother’s age, or reported tobacco use. However, exposure to the BRAC announcement
in the second trimester is associated with an increase in the risk of meconium staining (see Table
3.19) of about 2 percentage points. This effect is close to that reported by Currie and Rossin-Slater
(2013a). However, unlike the present study, they also found an effect of exposure in the third
trimester. Overall, the individual-level results tell a story that agrees with the aggregate results.
The mean gestational age in the GAO-6 decreased sharply among pregnancies that were far along
at the time of the announcement. There is some evidence of a decrease in birth weights and little
evidence of other changes that would account for the decreased gestational age.
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3.4.3. Additional mechanisms
3.4.3.1. Unemployment rates
Employers in the GAO-6 areas might have reacted to BRAC by slowing hiring or laying off work-
ers. The unemployment data provide little evidence of this effect. Appendix figure 3.7 plots the
unemployment rates in the two areas, which shows that unemployment in the GAO-6 was lower
throughout the study period. However, the gap between the two areas grew after the 2001 recession
and then steadily shrank.22 To account for that approximately linear change in the gap from 2002
onwards, the unemployment models in Table 3.5 are estimated on the 2002–2005 data and include
group-specific linear trends. The negative coefficients reflect that unemployment in the GAO-6 is
lower even after taking into account the linear drift in the gap, although the coefficients are not
significant at conventional levels. If anticipation or the consequences of the BRAC announcement
had increased unemployment in the GAO-6, then we would expect an upward trend in the coeffi-
cients. However, the coefficients show a downward trend with time. In addition, this trend is fairly
steady, whereas the changes in birth outcomes show a sharp reversal within 2005. Overall, these
results show little evidence of unusual changes in employment activity in the GAO-6.
3.4.3.2. Selection
The means of gestational age and birth weight are also influenced by the composition of mothers.
Several additional checks show that changes in the composition of mothers are unlikely to explain
the decrease in gestational age and birth weight. The first check is to estimate a model of the birth
rate. The estimates from a Poisson conditional fixed-effects model are displayed in the last column
of Table 3.6. The results show little evidence of changes in the birth rate, and the usual equality
test does not reject the hypothesis that the Jan.–Apr., May–Aug., and Sept.–Dec. coefficients
from 2005 are equal. The same results hold for the alternative control groups (see appendix Table
3.29). These results leave little room for women to select out of giving birth in the GAO-6 on
net. The second check simply allows the demographic control variables to enter the models of
22The militarized areas may have been insulated from the business cycle.
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TABLE 3.5: Estimated effects of BRAC list announcement on unemployment in the GAO-6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Jan.–Apr. 2004 -0:012 -0:063 -0:115 -0:169 -0:092
(0:175) (0:180) (0:178) (0:184) (0:197)
May–Aug. 2004 -0:150 -0:134 -0:247 -0:315 -0:196
(0:339) (0:346) (0:347) (0:350) (0:359)
Sept.–Dec. 2004 -0:421 -0:345 -0:495 -0:594 -0:522
(0:499) (0:506) (0:508) (0:517) (0:529)
Jan.–Apr. 2005 -0:204 -0:176 -0:438 -0:578 -0:607
(0:493) (0:506) (0:502) (0:511) (0:535)
May–Aug. 2005 -0:181 -0:130 -0:401 -0:630 -0:577
(0:546) (0:564) (0:553) (0:564) (0:593)
Sept.–Dec. 2005 -0:292 -0:268 -0:539 -0:778 -0:657
(0:616) (0:629) (0:626) (0:636) (0:671)
Control group Baseline Minor Major Military States
Equality, p 0:674 0:572 0:479 0:450 0:783
Deviation, p 0:381 0:299 0:227 0:529 0:485
Cells 79; 008 7; 200 8; 496 2; 976 11; 520
Adj. R2 0:836 0:864 0:859 0:884 0:794
Notes. All models include year fixed effects, calendar month indicator variables interacted with treatment group, and group-specific linear trends.
Cells are weighted by the size of the labor force. The equality test has the null hypothesis that all three coefficients in 2005 are equal. Deviation
test explained in main text. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by county. Statistical significance symbols: + p < 0:10,  p < 0:05, 
p < 0:01.
mean gestational age and birth weight more flexibly. The estimated decreases in gestational age
and birth weight are robust to excluding the demographic controls or simultaneously interacting
them with treatment group, calendar month, and year indicator variables. The May–Aug. 2005
estimate of the decrease in gestational age is -0.517 (SE=0.25) when demographic controls are
omitted. Including the controls results in an estimate of -0.602 (SE=0.204). Finally, interacting
the demographic controls with indicators for treatment group, calendar month, and year results in
an estimate of -0.567 (SE=0.226). These robustness results are available for both the baseline and
military control groups in the appendix (Tables 3.11 and 3.12).
Further checks for selection are implemented by estimating models of the proportions of moth-
ers falling into various demographic categories. These models are like those used for the main
results above but exclude mothers’ demographics as covariates. This check was run for a variety of
characteristics including age categories, educational attainment, marital status, and smoking status.
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The results are presented in Table 3.6 and the appendix. The mothers’ characteristics show some
evidence of changes over 2004–2005, but these changes appear unlikely to explain the changes
in gestational age and birth weight. The magnitudes of the demographic changes are small, and
the period-to-period timing of the changes in demographics does not match well with changes in
gestational age. Finally, these demographic results are sensitive to the specification of the control
group, whereas the main results are quite robust.
For example, during 2005 and especially the crucial May–August period, there is evidence of
a moderate increase in the percentages of mothers who are white and married. Comparing the
three race/ethnicity columns suggests that births shifted from Hispanic and black mothers to white
mothers. This shift appears unlikely to account for the gestational age results because on average
births to white mothers and Hispanic mothers have similar gestational ages. Births to black mothers
have significantly lower gestational age than the two other groups, and births to married women
tend to have higher gestational ages (see appendix Table 3.14). Finally, marriage tends to have a
positive effect on gestational age.
The education results in Table 3.6 suggest that the mean educational attainment of mothers in
the GAO-6 decreased during 2005 with a shift from college education to high school and partial
college. This change would tend to decrease the mean gestational age, but the effects are quite
small at about 1–2 percentage points. More importantly the pattern of education changes does not
match the pattern of gestational age changes. The proportion of college-educated mothers remains
depressed throughout 2005, but the gestational age was depressed only during the first two periods
of the year and elevated in the last period. In addition, the decrease in college-education is greatest
during Jan.–Apr. 2005, with an estimate of -1.87 percentage points, and then rises to -1.03 during
May–Aug. 2005. However, the gestational age decrease was greatest during the May–Aug. period.
Furthermore, if the model is estimated using the military control group, then the decrease in the
proportion of college-educated mothers is substantially smaller and not statistically-significant. In
contrast, the gestational age effect of BRAC appears larger when switching from the baseline to
military control group. Finally, in the individual-level models there is no significant association
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between the mother’s education and third trimester BRAC exposure (see appendix Table 3.20).
Estimates for additional variables, including weight gain, prenatal visits, birth method, tobacco
use, and birth order, are available in the appendix (see Table 3.23 and the following tables). Like
the results discussed above, these additional variables overall do not exhibit patterns of changes
that can explain the decreases in gestational age and birth weight.
3.4.4. Effects beyond the GAO-6
The GAO-6 areas represent a small portion of those affected by BRAC. Other areas that were
targeted by major closures or realignments may have experienced similar stress-related effects. A
supplementary analysis here suggests the possibility of small negative effects on gestational age.
To examine other areas, I use the same models as in the main analysis (see Table 3.4). However,
treatment is redefined to be any major closure or realignment. More precisely, a county was defined
as treated if it contained a military site that was assigned to undergo a “major closure” or “major
realignment” as defined by the DoD. The GAO-6 areas were entirely excluded from this analysis.
The results appear in appendix Table 3.13. First, in some specifications the parallel trends tests
reject or nearly reject, so the results are subject to bias. However, there is still some evidence
of an effect in May–August 2005 because, like the main GAO-6 results, that period shows lower
gestational ages than preceding and following periods. However, the size of the difference is small
relative to the GAO-6 results and generally not significant at conventional levels. Thus, the results
here are qualitatively consistent with the stress hypothesis, but the effects, if any, are small and
strong conclusions cannot be reached.
3.5. Conclusion
In May 2005 the Department of Defense announced plans to close or shrink military sites across the
United States. In six communities that were expected to experience serious losses of employment
as a result of the policy change, the announcement was met with much anxiety and distress. In
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these areas, the mean gestational age decreased by 1.5 days for a period of 1–2 months following
the announcement. This decrease was driven by a greater risk of early-term birth, a factor which
predicts decreased cognitive function and higher risk of childhood and adult mortality. The mean
birth weight showed changes that are consistent with the decreases in gestational age. A smaller
decreasing trend in gestational age appeared in the months before the announcement. Alternative
models were estimated that treat the BRAC announcement as a point source of stress exposure for
individual pregnancies. These results are consistent with the aggregate results and are robust to the
use of the full-term instrument proposed by Currie and Rossin-Slater (2013a). The effects on birth
outcomes are not accounted for by changes in unemployment rates or demographic features of the
mothers in the BRAC-affected areas during 2004–2005.
This result suggests that policy announcements can have substantial effects in areas where
many people expect to suffer losses from the policy change. In addition, anxiety about impending
economic changes may be revealed by medical or physiological changes in the relevant population.
This study focused on areas where effects were concentrated, but there are also people working in
relatively small sites who may fear being furloughed or having their work place closed. It is unclear
how these isolated workers will differ. They might be less distressed by announcements if they
believe that they can easily find another job in their area. They might also be less affected if the
results of this study depend on social interactions to amplify distress. However, social interactions
might also provide a protective effect, which would make isolated workers even worse off. These
questions can only be addressed with additional research using individual-level data.
Nevertheless, these results are highly relevant because many policy changes and business de-
cisions have strongly concentrated effects. As shown here, the mere announcement of a policy is
followed by responses similar to those seen following disasters. In addition, the health effects are
unlikely to be restricted to just birth outcomes, so further research on additional outcomes would
be valuable. Cardiovascular and mental health variables are likely candidates. Officials in areas
facing strong impacts from policy changes should be cognizant of health effects. They may want
to provide interventions to help employees or citizens manage stress levels and maintain healthful
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behaviors during uncertain times.
3.6. Appendix of chapter 3
3.6.1. Background
TABLE 3.7: Key dates in BRAC 2005 process
Date Event
November 15, 2002 BRAC process initiated by SECDEF.1
February 12, 2004 Final base selection criteria published by SECDEF.2
March 23, 2004 Need for BRAC 2005 certified by SECDEF.3
April 1, 2005 BRAC commissioners appointed by President Bush.4
May 13, 2005 Recommendations (BRAC list) announced by SECDEF.
July 1, 2005 GAO reported analysis of DoD’s recommendations.5
August 24–27, 2005 Final deliberations and vote by BRAC commission6
2006– BRAC actions implemented
SECDEF=Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 1 Government Accountability Office (2005, p. 2)
2 United States Department of Defense (2005a, p. 18) 3 United States Department of Defense (2005a, p. 2)
4 United States Department of Defense 5 Government Accountability Office (2005) 6 Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Commission (2005b)
TABLE 3.8: Control groups used in estimation
Control group Definition
Baseline All non-GAO-6 areas where no major closure, realignment, or gain occurred.
Minor BRAC All non-GAO-6 areas affected by BRAC where (1) no major closure, realignment,
or gain occurred; and (2) projected changes in local employment (due to BRAC)
were less than one percent.
Major BRAC All non-GAO-6 areas where a major closure or realignment occurred.
Military All non-GAO-6 areas where military employment is 5–25% of total employment.
States Alaska, Connecticut, Indiana, Nevada, New Mexico, South Dakota
Notes. Major closures are closures of installations of at least $100 million in plant replacement value. Major realign-
ments (gains) are actions that would remove (add) at least 400 jobs at an installation.
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3.6.2. Data
TABLE 3.9: Summary statistics of natality data
All GAO-6 Control groups
Baseline Minor Major Military States
Age< 20 7:20 7:81 7:63 7:18 6:18 7:50 7:95
(25:84) (26:83) (26:54) (25:81) (24:09) (26:34) (27:05)
Age2 [20; 24] 25:76 29:96 26:96 25:08 23:34 28:51 27:65
(43:73) (45:81) (44:38) (43:35) (42:30) (45:15) (44:72)
Age2 [25; 34] 52:58 49:22 51:83 52:56 54:29 49:89 51:24
(49:93) (49:99) (49:97) (49:93) (49:82) (50:00) (49:98)
Age> 34 14:46 13:00 13:58 15:18 16:19 14:10 13:16
(35:17) (33:63) (34:26) (35:88) (36:84) (34:80) (33:81)
Hispanic 21:70 11:81 22:63 35:54 22:64 24:85 19:58
(41:22) (32:27) (41:84) (47:86) (41:85) (43:21) (39:68)
Non-Hispanic white 57:98 71:86 59:54 44:05 51:98 45:64 64:13
(49:36) (44:97) (49:08) (49:64) (49:96) (49:81) (47:96)
Non-Hispanic black 12:20 5:33 10:15 10:99 15:19 12:38 8:39
(32:73) (22:47) (30:20) (31:28) (35:89) (32:94) (27:72)
Non-Hispanic other 7:34 9:39 7:09 8:93 8:94 15:56 6:93
(26:08) (29:17) (25:66) (28:52) (28:53) (36:24) (25:39)
Less than high school 18:42 11:73 19:67 22:89 16:70 15:42 18:48
(38:76) (32:18) (39:75) (42:01) (37:30) (36:11) (38:82)
High school 30:63 37:19 31:46 29:06 28:53 34:00 32:67
(46:10) (48:33) (46:44) (45:40) (45:15) (47:37) (46:90)
Some college 22:14 26:03 22:34 20:58 21:97 24:56 22:82
(41:52) (43:88) (41:65) (40:43) (41:40) (43:04) (41:97)
College graduate 27:45 23:96 25:47 26:24 30:60 23:86 24:59
(44:63) (42:68) (43:57) (44:00) (46:08) (42:62) (43:06)
Married 67:77 69:69 66:95 65:50 70:49 69:11 64:31
(46:73) (45:96) (47:04) (47:54) (45:61) (46:20) (47:91)
Gained< 16 lbs. 12:18 11:11 12:44 11:33 11:64 11:57 11:38
(32:71) (31:42) (33:00) (31:69) (32:07) (31:99) (31:76)
Gained> 60 lbs. 2:03 1:74 2:04 1:94 1:94 2:24 2:25
(14:10) (13:09) (14:12) (13:80) (13:78) (14:80) (14:82)
Smoked while preg. 9:49 14:42 10:53 6:19 6:01 5:87 13:72
(29:31) (35:13) (30:70) (24:10) (23:77) (23:50) (34:41)
Cigs. per day 1:08 0:80 1:21 0:78 0:79 0:82 0:43
(3:81) (3:05) (4:04) (3:21) (3:22) (3:21) (2:36)
Prenatal visits 11:64 11:51 11:64 11:76 11:77 11:54 11:27
(3:85) (3:26) (3:80) (3:91) (3:86) (3:94) (4:05)
Induction 20:30 17:37 20:55 16:94 18:94 14:09 22:29
(40:22) (37:89) (40:40) (37:51) (39:18) (34:80) (41:62)
C-section 24:71 23:08 24:40 24:47 25:00 24:20 23:60
(43:13) (42:13) (42:95) (42:99) (43:30) (42:83) (42:46)
Female 48:80 49:00 48:80 48:80 48:81 48:69 48:78
(49:99) (49:99) (49:99) (49:99) (49:99) (49:98) (49:99)
Birth weight (grams) 3347:28 3391:48 3346:90 3334:23 3355:79 3343:11 3337:69
(566:19) (561:60) (564:56) (560:75) (565:74) (566:39) (561:03)
Gestational age (weeks) 38:84 38:96 38:85 38:83 38:85 38:89 38:81
(2:37) (2:21) (2:37) (2:37) (2:33) (2:40) (2:37)
Births 13; 698; 648 38; 755 9; 082; 906 3; 884; 247 3; 098; 584 702; 046 1; 104; 693
Notes. Variables are binary and expressed as percentages unless otherwise specified. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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FIGURE 3.6: Adjusted year-to-year trends in gestational age and birth weight
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3.6.3. Results
Randomization
inference test:
tobs = −1.807
p = 0.185±0.013
Random permutation
distribution:
N = 922
Mean = −0.381
Median = −0.221
0
2
4
6
8
Pe
rc
en
t
−15 −10 −5 0 5
t statistic
(on Jan−Apr DD estimate for gestational age effect)
FIGURE 3.8: Histogram of randomization test results, Jan.–Apr. ’05
TABLE 3.10: Estimated effects of BRAC list on mean birth weight (grams), alternate trend
specifications
1 2 3
Jan.–Apr. ’04 24:657 15:641 9:052
(7:62) (13:95) (13:61)
May–Aug. ’04 23:474 14:404 4:395
(6:87) (4:63) (9:73)
Sept.–Dec. ’04 -2:315 -11:339 -24:676
(10:83) (9:12) (6:98)
Jan.–Apr. ’05 12:276 -0:461 -17:829
(18:52) (16:56) (16:51)
May–Aug. ’05 -0:226 -13:010 -35:164
(16:01) (15:25) (15:16)
Sept.–Dec. ’05 19:967 7:237 -19:596
(7:96) (9:90) (22:39)
County FE Yes Yes Yes
Linear trend : Yes Yes
Quad. trend : : Yes
Trend test: p 0:000 0:000 0:007
Equality test, p 0:0236 0:0243 0:0004
Cells 115; 708 115; 708 115; 708
Adj. R-sq. 0:514 0:514 0:514
Notes. All models include year and calendar month fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance symbols: + p < 0:10, 
p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
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Randomization
inference test:
tobs = 1.975
p = 0.116±0.011
Random permutation
distribution:
N = 922
Mean = 0.047
Median = 0.063
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FIGURE 3.9: Histogram of randomization test results, Sept.–Dec. ’05
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TABLE 3.14: Effects on gestational age (days), additional control variables printed
Jan.–Apr. ’04 0:255 0:090 0:167 0:157 0:480
(0:408) (0:463) (0:394) (0:453) (0:399)
May–Aug. ’04 -0:176 -0:288 -0:275 -0:367 -0:161
(0:446) (0:470) (0:451) (0:499) (0:447)
Sept.–Dec. ’04 -0:444 -0:436 -0:488 -0:281 -0:455
(0:191) (0:216) (0:202) (0:244) (0:209)
Jan.–Apr. ’05 -0:424 -0:571+ -0:590 -0:410 -0:305
(0:274) (0:322) (0:288) (0:324) (0:274)
May–Aug. ’05 -0:595 -0:789 -0:801 -0:757 -0:583
(0:202) (0:188) (0:190) (0:261) (0:237)
Sept.–Dec. ’05 0:297 0:239 0:234 0:354 0:378
(0:244) (0:294) (0:207) (0:250) (0:265)
Age 2 [20; 24] -0:096 -0:216 -1:189 0:265 -0:467
(0:208) (1:025) (0:857) (1:356) (0:486)
Age 2 [25; 34] -0:852 -1:577 -1:712+ -1:090 -1:341
(0:236) (1:165) (0:988) (1:610) (0:556)
Age > 34 -2:448 -2:222 -3:692 -2:502 -2:930
(0:290) (1:406) (1:279) (2:023) (0:682)
Non-Hispanic White -0:458 0:332 -0:077 1:206 -0:830
(0:311) (1:354) (0:994) (1:024) (0:570)
Black -4:128 -3:450 -4:152 -4:141 -3:922
(0:376) (1:133) (1:029) (1:445) (1:397)
Other rage/origin -0:864 -3:868 -2:860 -6:146+ -0:112
(0:611) (3:116) (1:285) (3:503) (0:697)
Race/origin missing -1:233 -3:008 -0:223 -1:485 -0:476
(0:577) (1:169) (1:206) (1:454) (0:906)
High school -0:278+ -1:192 1:047 1:655 -0:528
(0:167) (0:881) (0:721) (1:437) (0:437)
Some college -0:388+ -0:370 1:430+ 1:498 0:346
(0:208) (1:042) (0:810) (1:696) (0:520)
College 0:164 0:256 2:126 2:636 -0:061
(0:232) (1:175) (0:946) (1:999) (0:600)
Edu. missing -0:572 0:640 1:804 3:415+ -2:132
(0:735) (2:498) (0:912) (1:962) (1:463)
Married 0:704 2:641 0:676 -0:148 0:333
(0:141) (0:720) (0:467) (0:822) (0:343)
Second birth -0:814 -0:181 -0:390 -0:034 -0:866
(0:138) (0:639) (0:577) (0:979) (0:335)
Third birth -1:510 -1:490+ -1:327 -2:060+ -1:544
(0:160) (0:790) (0:660) (1:194) (0:376)
Fourth birth -1:599 -0:310 -2:257 -0:941 -1:907
(0:204) (1:077) (0:812) (1:408) (0:479)
Fifth birth or higher -2:084 -3:677 -2:114 -3:310 -2:087
(0:235) (1:235) (0:869) (1:398) (0:505)
Birth order missing -2:191 -3:677+ -1:040 -0:544 -2:503
(0:880) (1:909) (1:070) (1:091) (1:994)
Unknown smoking status -0:674 -1:780 2:871 4:637 -2:173
(0:556) (0:837) (1:008) (0:748) (1:892)
Smokes 1–5 cigs per day -1:449 -3:358 -0:971 -1:017 -1:778
(0:271) (1:295) (1:226) (1:761) (1:105)
Smokes 6–10 cigs per day -0:845 -0:614 -0:479 -2:461 -1:868+
(0:214) (0:972) (0:858) (1:820) (1:060)
Smokes 11–20 cigs per day -0:749 -0:186 -2:369+ -0:967 -1:411
(0:283) (1:536) (1:293) (3:084) (1:684)
Smokes 21+ cigs per day -0:574 -1:338 -0:230 -4:435 -1:682
(0:737) (4:332) (3:740) (7:745) (3:610)
Smokes unknown amount -0:696+ -1:816 2:451 2:764 -0:568
(0:390) (1:939) (1:698) (2:223) (0:449)
Control group Baseline Minor Major Military States
Deviation, p 115; 708 6; 764 9; 991 3; 236 16; 524
Cells 1; 646 94 139 45 240
Clusters 0:342 0:602 0:626 0:480 0:273
Notes. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by county. Omitted categories are “age < 20”, “race missing”,
“education missing”, and “non-smoker.” Statistical significance symbols: + p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
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TABLE 3.15: Effects on birth weight (grams), additional control variables printed
Jan.–Apr. ’04 10:892 8:302 12:170 6:519 11:905
(13:063) (13:615) (14:213) (13:812) (13:374)
May–Aug. ’04 6:672 4:474 9:396 1:931 6:656
(10:234) (10:403) (11:952) (12:509) (10:666)
Sept.–Dec. ’04 -22:256 -28:334 -21:263 -22:385 -18:047
(7:797) (7:775) (8:742) (10:232) (8:908)
Jan.–Apr. ’05 -16:726 -22:711 -21:188 -23:612 -8:784
(16:896) (16:271) (17:161) (17:756) (17:076)
May–Aug. ’05 -32:263 -37:982 -44:928 -43:625 -27:658+
(14:736) (13:090) (13:123) (16:495) (16:066)
Sept.–Dec. ’05 -20:359 -29:911 -31:153 -34:121 -10:563
(24:397) (22:641) (24:745) (27:802) (25:000)
Age 2 [20; 24] 5:914 26:508 9:435 39:277 -21:474
(6:384) (28:717) (23:531) (32:259) (17:212)
Age 2 [25; 34] 19:997 36:622 22:694 44:567 -6:268
(7:095) (31:386) (24:904) (37:617) (19:435)
Age > 34 -2:123 2:654 52:335+ 63:681 -31:083
(8:554) (37:645) (28:302) (51:297) (22:279)
Non-Hispanic White 9:423 -21:650 62:909 35:430 17:983
(8:170) (24:578) (19:481) (25:700) (19:153)
Black -233:944 -267:033 -212:612 -216:154 -212:789
(11:789) (32:386) (22:060) (40:860) (41:766)
Other rage/origin -1:536 -113:182 -120:877 -34:356 58:311
(12:793) (33:662) (37:153) (50:207) (25:694)
Race/origin missing -17:706 -43:434 44:928 -29:558 15:651
(15:856) (31:090) (41:143) (38:989) (29:833)
High school 26:563 -24:361 12:474 72:394 23:033
(5:448) (26:386) (18:365) (29:286) (14:379)
Some college 55:133 7:423 64:045 84:243 66:382
(6:293) (32:850) (19:914) (31:895) (16:355)
College 86:273 29:177 88:400 80:645 75:414
(6:958) (32:927) (20:306) (36:185) (17:879)
Edu. missing -21:401 -135:547 18:188 3:170 -61:176
(19:562) (56:823) (35:993) (37:884) (47:589)
Married 41:181 84:388 14:265 14:860 40:124
(4:187) (19:408) (16:178) (24:454) (11:095)
Second birth 74:575 76:754 90:432 93:847 87:004
(4:400) (18:007) (14:632) (26:292) (11:696)
Third birth 85:641 84:925 80:878 71:601 85:325
(5:213) (18:459) (19:182) (29:585) (12:408)
Fourth birth 82:650 131:506 91:884 74:049+ 82:172
(6:416) (27:047) (25:606) (42:418) (15:496)
Fifth birth or higher 86:626 75:285 70:622 47:977 89:514
(7:115) (27:519) (25:566) (38:152) (16:337)
Birth order missing 40:127+ 103:683 -11:445 48:962+ 12:469
(23:128) (34:714) (35:216) (25:718) (32:831)
Unknown smoking status -35:385 -22:725+ 63:045 36:728 -29:377
(7:201) (11:686) (28:765) (18:030) (36:860)
Smokes 1–5 cigs per day -171:140 -186:345 -196:978 -169:708 -158:584
(7:915) (31:582) (34:066) (43:746) (28:092)
Smokes 6–10 cigs per day -220:913 -180:154 -200:615 -195:778 -247:434
(6:757) (34:455) (24:517) (46:281) (28:591)
Smokes 11–20 cigs per day -260:817 -313:414 -267:910 -260:923 -266:078
(8:719) (47:149) (36:934) (73:408) (44:702)
Smokes 21+ cigs per day -277:677 -495:309 -203:458+ -298:916 -301:618
(23:473) (134:987) (116:722) (213:243) (122:666)
Smokes unknown amount -200:448 -115:091 -49:268 -110:725 -212:003
(11:265) (54:589) (51:007) (49:774) (12:907)
Control group Baseline Minor Major Military States
Deviation, p 115; 708 6; 764 9; 991 3; 236 16; 524
Cells 1; 646 94 139 45 240
Clusters 0:524 0:796 0:762 0:780 0:479
Notes. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by county. Omitted categories are “age < 20”, “race missing”,
“education missing”, and “non-smoker.” Statistical significance symbols: + p < 0:10,  p < 0:05, p < 0:01.
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FIGURE 3.11: Estimated birth rate effects by month
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Explanation of individual-level estimates — The individual-level estimates use the same sam-
ples as the main analysis except that the data are not aggregated into county-month cells and the
year 2006 is included.23 The states and military samples are used for computational tractability.
Each birth is assigned a birth date corresponding to the midpoint of the month of birth. A nom-
inal start date is assigned by subtracting the gestational age from the birth date (without adding
two weeks). Exposure to the BRAC announcement for each birth was calculated by comparing
the nominal start date with May 13, 2005. Exposure in the first trimester was defined as having a
nominal start date within the period starting 13 weeks before May 13, 2005 and ending on May
13, 2005. Exposure in the second trimester was defined as having a nominal start date within the
period starting 26 weeks before May 13, 2005 and ending 13 weeks before May 13, 2005. Expo-
sure in the third trimester was defined as having a nominal start date more than 26 weeks before
May 13, 2005 and being born after May 13, 2005. In addition, exposure calculations also required
that the pregnancy reached the trimester in question. The full-term instrument is defined for each
birth by calculating the exposure for a pregnancy that started on the same date and ended with a
gestational age of 39 weeks.
For each birth indexed by (i; c; y;m), which means birth i in county c in year y in calendar
monthm, the outcome x is modeled by
xi;c;y;m =
3X
t=1
(tD
t
i;c;y;m+ tB
t
i;c;y;m)+
0Zi;c;y;m+c+ y+ m+mfc 2 GAO-6g+ i;c;y;m
(3.1)
where
 Bt indicates if the pregnancy was in trimester t on May 13, 2005,
 Dti;c;y;m indicates if the pregnancy was in trimester t on May 13, 2005 and c 2 GAO-6,
 c; y; m;m are county, year, month, and interacted month fixed effects, and
 Z is a vector of mother characteristics (as described in the main text).
23South Dakota contains a GAO-6 site and switched to the revised birth certificate in 2006. So some non-comparable
items related to complications and abnormalities are not considered in the individual-level results.
200
Thus, the estimate of t is an estimate of effect of exposure to the BRAC announcement in trimester
t. These estimates are reported in table 3.17. In the instrumented models, the variables Bt and Dt
are instrumented for by the full-term instruments ~Bt and ~Dt, respectively. That is, ~Bti;c;y;m takes
the value that Bti;c;y;m would have if birth (i; c; y;m) occurred at exactly 39 weeks gestational
age. The two variables are identical for all births that actually had a gestational age of 39 weeks.
Models that put any characteristic of the mother on the left-hand side do not put any demographic
characteristics on the right-hand side.
201
TA
B
L
E
3.
17
:
In
di
vi
du
al
-l
ev
el
es
tim
at
es
of
ef
fe
ct
s
of
ex
po
su
re
to
th
e
B
R
A
C
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t
G
es
ta
tio
na
la
ge
(d
ay
s)
B
ir
th
w
ei
gh
t(
gr
am
s)
Si
m
pl
e
ex
po
su
re
In
st
ru
m
en
te
d
Si
m
pl
e
ex
po
su
re
In
st
ru
m
en
te
d
Si
m
pl
e
ex
po
su
re
In
st
ru
m
en
te
d
Si
m
pl
e
ex
po
su
re
In
st
ru
m
en
te
d
Tr
im
es
te
r1
0
:5
3
3

0
:4
9
3
+
0
:4
4
7

0
:4
4
5

6
:9
2
2
6
:3
9
0
1
2
:6
1
2
1
2
:6
9
5
(0
:2
6
2
)
(0
:2
5
9
)
(0
:2
2
4
)
(0
:2
2
1
)
(9
:1
5
4
)
(9
:2
8
9
)
(8
:7
4
8
)
(8
:9
3
3
)
Tr
im
es
te
r2
0
:0
6
0
0
:0
7
5
0
:2
8
6
0
:2
9
9
2
1
:1
2
2
2
1
:1
0
2
2
2
:0
7
3
+
2
2
:0
1
9
+
(0
:3
9
0
)
(0
:3
8
4
)
(0
:3
5
1
)
(0
:3
4
9
)
(1
3
:0
4
4
)
(1
3
:0
0
5
)
(1
2
:4
5
1
)
(1
2
:5
3
6
)
Tr
im
es
te
r3
-1
:6
0
9

-1
:1
0
4

-1
:2
4
3

-0
:9
1
7

-2
2
:4
1
6
-2
4
:9
4
8
-1
6
:1
6
2
-2
1
:5
9
5
(0
:3
9
5
)
(0
:4
6
2
)
(0
:3
2
9
)
(0
:4
5
2
)
(1
6
:5
4
7
)
(2
0
:9
1
5
)
(1
6
:4
1
9
)
(2
1
:0
0
2
)
C
on
tr
ol
gr
ou
p
M
ili
ta
ry
M
ili
ta
ry
St
at
es
St
at
es
M
ili
ta
ry
M
ili
ta
ry
St
at
es
St
at
es
B
ir
th
s
87
2
;0
37
87
2;
03
7
1
;3
45
;3
83
1;
34
5
;3
83
87
2;
03
7
87
2
;0
37
1;
34
5;
38
3
1;
3
4
5;
3
8
3
C
lu
st
er
s
4
5
4
5
2
4
0
2
4
0
4
5
4
5
2
4
0
2
4
0
A
dj
.R
2
0
:0
1
7
0
:0
1
4
0
:0
1
6
0
:0
1
3
0
:0
4
4
0
:0
4
4
0
:0
3
9
0
:0
3
9
N
ot
es
.
D
iff
er
en
ce
-i
n-
di
ff
er
en
ce
s
es
tim
at
es
di
sp
la
ye
d
(r
aw
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s)
.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
,i
n
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
by
co
un
ty
.
Sy
m
bo
ls
of
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
le
ve
l
p
:+
p
<
0:
10
,
p
<
0:
0
5,

p
<
0:
0
1.
202
TA
B
L
E
3.
18
:
In
di
vi
du
al
-l
ev
el
es
tim
at
es
of
ef
fe
ct
s
of
ex
po
su
re
to
th
e
B
R
A
C
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t(
pr
et
er
m
bi
rt
h
an
d
lo
w
bi
rt
h
w
ei
gh
t)
Pr
et
er
m
(p
ro
po
rt
io
n)
L
ow
bi
rt
h
w
ei
gh
t(
pr
op
or
tio
n)
Si
m
pl
e
ex
po
su
re
In
st
ru
m
en
te
d
Si
m
pl
e
ex
po
su
re
In
st
ru
m
en
te
d
Si
m
pl
e
ex
po
su
re
In
st
ru
m
en
te
d
Si
m
pl
e
ex
po
su
re
In
st
ru
m
en
te
d
Tr
im
es
te
r1
-0
:0
1
7

-0
:0
1
7

-0
:0
1
5

-0
:0
1
5

-0
:0
1
1
-0
:0
1
1
-0
:0
1
3
-0
:0
1
3
(0
:0
0
5
)
(0
:0
0
5
)
(0
:0
0
5
)
(0
:0
0
5
)
(0
:0
0
8
)
(0
:0
0
8
)
(0
:0
0
8
)
(0
:0
0
8
)
Tr
im
es
te
r2
-0
:0
0
8
+
-0
:0
0
8
+
-0
:0
0
9

-0
:0
0
9

-0
:0
0
5
-0
:0
0
5
-0
:0
0
4
-0
:0
0
4
(0
:0
0
4
)
(0
:0
0
4
)
(0
:0
0
3
)
(0
:0
0
3
)
(0
:0
0
5
)
(0
:0
0
4
)
(0
:0
0
4
)
(0
:0
0
4
)
Tr
im
es
te
r3
0
:0
1
8

0
:0
1
3
0
:0
1
8

0
:0
1
4
0
:0
1
7

0
:0
1
8

0
:0
1
9

0
:0
2
0

(0
:0
0
7
)
(0
:0
1
0
)
(0
:0
0
7
)
(0
:0
1
0
)
(0
:0
0
7
)
(0
:0
0
7
)
(0
:0
0
7
)
(0
:0
0
7
)
C
on
tr
ol
gr
ou
p
M
ili
ta
ry
M
ili
ta
ry
St
at
es
St
at
es
M
ili
ta
ry
M
ili
ta
ry
St
at
es
St
at
es
B
ir
th
s
87
2
;0
37
87
2;
03
7
1
;3
45
;3
83
1;
34
5
;3
83
87
2;
03
7
87
2
;0
37
1;
34
5;
38
3
1;
3
4
5;
3
8
3
C
lu
st
er
s
4
5
4
5
2
4
0
2
4
0
4
5
4
5
2
4
0
2
4
0
A
dj
.R
2
0
:0
0
9
0
:0
0
8
0
:0
1
1
0
:0
1
0
0
:0
1
1
0
:0
1
1
0
:0
1
1
0
:0
1
1
N
ot
es
.
D
iff
er
en
ce
-i
n-
di
ff
er
en
ce
s
es
tim
at
es
di
sp
la
ye
d
(r
aw
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s)
.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
,i
n
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
by
co
un
ty
.
Sy
m
bo
ls
of
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
le
ve
l
p
:+
p
<
0:
10
,
p
<
0:
0
5,

p
<
0:
0
1.
203
TA
B
L
E
3.
19
:
In
di
vi
du
al
-l
ev
el
es
tim
at
es
of
ef
fe
ct
s
of
ex
po
su
re
to
th
e
B
R
A
C
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t(
pr
eg
na
nc
y
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s)
C
-s
ec
tio
n
In
du
ce
d
la
bo
r
M
ec
on
iu
m
st
ai
ni
ng
M
ot
he
r’
s
ag
e
To
ba
cc
o
us
e
(Y
/N
)
M
ar
ri
ed
Tr
im
es
te
r1
-0
:0
1
5
+
0
:0
2
1
+
0
:0
0
4
0
:0
1
2
0
:0
0
8
0
:0
1
6
(0
:0
0
9
)
(0
:0
1
1
)
(0
:0
0
6
)
(0
:2
7
8
)
(0
:0
0
6
)
(0
:0
1
0
)
Tr
im
es
te
r2
0
:0
1
1
0
:0
3
4
0
:0
1
9

-0
:1
9
9
+
-0
:0
1
2
0
:0
1
3
(0
:0
2
8
)
(0
:0
2
2
)
(0
:0
0
3
)
(0
:1
1
0
)
(0
:0
1
1
)
(0
:0
1
3
)
Tr
im
es
te
r3
0
:0
0
6
0
:0
5
4
0
:0
0
9
-0
:0
8
2
0
:0
0
7
0
:0
0
6
(0
:0
1
2
)
(0
:0
4
0
)
(0
:0
0
9
)
(0
:0
6
7
)
(0
:0
0
9
)
(0
:0
1
3
)
C
on
tr
ol
gr
ou
p
St
at
es
St
at
es
St
at
es
St
at
es
St
at
es
St
at
es
B
ir
th
s
1;
3
37
;0
74
1;
3
33
;4
22
1;
33
3
;5
80
1
;3
45
;3
83
1;
34
5
;3
83
1;
3
4
5;
3
8
3
C
lu
st
er
s
2
4
0
2
4
0
2
4
0
2
4
0
2
4
0
2
4
0
A
dj
.R
2
0
:0
2
7
0
:0
4
1
0
:0
1
5
0
:0
5
7
0
:0
4
5
0
:0
4
5
N
ot
es
.
D
iff
er
en
ce
-i
n-
di
ff
er
en
ce
s
es
tim
at
es
di
sp
la
ye
d
(r
aw
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s)
fr
om
in
st
ru
m
en
te
d
m
od
el
s.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
,
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
by
co
un
ty
.
Sy
m
bo
ls
of
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
le
ve
lp
:+
p
<
0
:1
0
,
p
<
0
:0
5
,

p
<
0:
01
.
204
TA
B
L
E
3.
20
:
In
di
vi
du
al
-l
ev
el
es
tim
at
es
of
ef
fe
ct
s
of
ex
po
su
re
to
th
e
B
R
A
C
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t(
ra
ce
an
d
ed
uc
at
io
n)
R
ac
e/
et
hn
ic
ity
E
du
ca
tio
n
H
is
pa
ni
c
W
hi
te
B
la
ck
<
H
S
H
ig
h
sc
ho
ol
So
m
e
co
lle
g
C
ol
le
ge
Tr
im
es
te
r1
-0
:0
0
9
-0
:0
0
5
0
:0
0
3
0
:0
0
4
0
:0
3
0
-0
:0
1
4
-0
:0
2
0
+
(0
:0
1
1
)
(0
:0
1
5
)
(0
:0
1
1
)
(0
:0
0
6
)
(0
:0
1
9
)
(0
:0
1
2
)
(0
:0
1
1
)
Tr
im
es
te
r2
-0
:0
1
4

0
:0
2
5
-0
:0
1
7

0
:0
0
0
0
:0
1
1
0
:0
0
1
-0
:0
1
1
(0
:0
0
7
)
(0
:0
1
8
)
(0
:0
0
7
)
(0
:0
0
9
)
(0
:0
1
4
)
(0
:0
1
1
)
(0
:0
1
1
)
Tr
im
es
te
r3
-0
:0
1
9

0
:0
3
5
-0
:0
0
6
+
-0
:0
1
1
0
:0
0
7
0
:0
0
7
-0
:0
0
5
(0
:0
0
5
)
(0
:0
2
4
)
(0
:0
0
3
)
(0
:0
0
7
)
(0
:0
1
7
)
(0
:0
1
1
)
(0
:0
0
9
)
C
on
tr
ol
gr
ou
p
St
at
es
St
at
es
St
at
es
St
at
es
St
at
es
St
at
es
St
at
es
B
ir
th
s
1;
34
5
;3
83
1;
34
5;
38
3
1;
34
5;
38
3
1
;3
45
;3
83
1;
34
5;
38
3
1;
34
5
;3
83
1;
3
4
5;
3
8
3
C
lu
st
er
s
2
4
0
2
4
0
2
4
0
2
4
0
2
4
0
2
4
0
2
4
0
A
dj
.R
2
0
:2
0
6
0
:2
2
0
0
:0
9
4
0
:0
4
6
0
:0
2
2
0
:0
0
9
0
:0
7
7
N
ot
es
.
D
iff
er
en
ce
-i
n-
di
ff
er
en
ce
s
es
tim
at
es
di
sp
la
ye
d
(r
aw
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s)
fr
om
in
st
ru
m
en
te
d
m
od
el
s.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
,
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
by
co
un
ty
.
Sy
m
bo
ls
of
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
le
ve
lp
:+
p
<
0
:1
0
,
p
<
0
:0
5
,

p
<
0:
01
.
205
TA
B
L
E
3.
21
:
E
st
im
at
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
of
B
R
A
C
lis
ta
nn
ou
nc
em
en
to
n
co
m
pl
ic
at
io
ns
an
d
ab
no
rm
al
iti
es
in
th
e
G
A
O
-6
A
bn
or
m
al
co
nd
iti
on
s
of
th
e
ne
w
bo
rn
C
om
pl
ic
at
io
ns
of
la
bo
ra
nd
/o
rd
el
iv
er
y
A
ny
M
ec
on
iu
m
as
pi
ra
tio
n
sy
nd
ro
m
e
V
en
til
at
or
30
+
m
in
.
V
en
til
at
or
an
y
A
ny
B
re
ec
h
D
ys
fu
nc
.
la
bo
r
M
ec
on
iu
m
st
ai
ni
ng
Ja
n.
–A
pr
.’
04
0
:0
3
1
0
:0
0
0
0
:0
0
0
0
:0
3
3
0
:0
2
7
+
0
:0
0
1
-0
:0
0
2
0
:0
1
5
+
(0
:0
2
6
)
(0
:0
0
2
)
(0
:0
0
4
)
(0
:0
2
5
)
(0
:0
1
4
)
(0
:0
0
7
)
(0
:0
0
8
)
(0
:0
0
9
)
M
ay
–A
ug
.’
04
0
:0
0
4
-0
:0
0
4

-0
:0
0
3
0
:0
0
8
0
:0
3
2

0
:0
0
3
0
:0
0
0
0
:0
0
8
(0
:0
0
6
)
(0
:0
0
2
)
(0
:0
0
8
)
(0
:0
0
7
)
(0
:0
1
5
)
(0
:0
0
2
)
(0
:0
0
4
)
(0
:0
0
5
)
Se
pt
.–
D
ec
.’
04
-0
:0
0
6
-0
:0
0
2
-0
:0
0
5
-0
:0
0
2
0
:0
2
5
0
:0
0
4
0
:0
0
5
0
:0
2
2

(0
:0
0
8
)
(0
:0
0
2
)
(0
:0
0
5
)
(0
:0
0
8
)
(0
:0
2
4
)
(0
:0
0
4
)
(0
:0
0
5
)
(0
:0
0
8
)
Ja
n.
–A
pr
.’
05
0
:0
0
9
-0
:0
0
2
-0
:0
0
1
0
:0
0
9
+
0
:0
3
1
+
0
:0
0
6
-0
:0
0
3
0
:0
2
0

(0
:0
0
6
)
(0
:0
0
2
)
(0
:0
0
7
)
(0
:0
0
5
)
(0
:0
1
9
)
(0
:0
0
4
)
(0
:0
0
9
)
(0
:0
1
0
)
M
ay
–A
ug
.’
05
-0
:0
0
6
-0
:0
0
4
+
-0
:0
0
1
-0
:0
0
0
0
:0
3
7
0
:0
0
1
-0
:0
0
2
0
:0
0
7
(0
:0
1
3
)
(0
:0
0
2
)
(0
:0
0
9
)
(0
:0
1
4
)
(0
:0
2
6
)
(0
:0
0
5
)
(0
:0
0
9
)
(0
:0
0
9
)
Se
pt
.–
D
ec
.’
05
-0
:0
0
9
-0
:0
0
2
-0
:0
0
1
-0
:0
0
7
0
:0
5
1

0
:0
0
5
0
:0
1
1

0
:0
2
2

(0
:0
1
2
)
(0
:0
0
3
)
(0
:0
0
3
)
(0
:0
1
3
)
(0
:0
2
1
)
(0
:0
0
4
)
(0
:0
0
5
)
(0
:0
0
4
)
C
on
tr
ol
gr
ou
p
St
at
es
St
at
es
St
at
es
St
at
es
St
at
es
St
at
es
St
at
es
St
at
es
PT
T,
20
00
–2
00
3:
p
0
:1
9
0
0
:4
2
8
0
:2
8
2
0
:2
0
8
0
:0
0
0
0
:1
9
9
0
:0
0
8
0
:6
7
2
SI
T:
p
0
:0
0
0
0
:0
0
0
0
:0
0
0
0
:0
0
0
0
:0
0
0
0
:0
0
0
0
:0
0
0
0
:0
0
0
E
qu
al
ity
te
st
:p
0
:3
1
5
0
:1
4
8
0
:9
7
9
0
:3
2
5
0
:0
4
2
0
:6
4
7
0
:0
0
5
0
:0
0
8
M
ea
n
de
vi
at
io
n
te
st
:p
0
:4
9
4
0
:0
5
1
0
:9
4
1
0
:8
9
2
0
:8
8
1
0
:5
4
5
0
:6
2
8
0
:1
9
1
C
el
ls
1
6;
51
4
16
;5
14
16
;5
14
16
;5
24
16
;5
18
16
;5
18
16
;5
18
1
6;
5
1
8
C
lu
st
er
s
2
4
0
2
4
0
2
4
0
2
4
0
2
4
0
2
4
0
2
4
0
2
4
0
A
dj
.R
2
0
:6
0
1
0
:2
2
1
0
:2
2
4
0
:6
1
6
0
:7
6
8
0
:1
3
9
0
:4
0
8
0
:5
1
8
N
ot
es
.C
oe
ffi
ci
en
te
st
im
at
es
di
sp
la
ye
d.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
,i
n
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
ar
e
cl
us
te
re
d
by
co
un
ty
.A
ll
m
od
el
s
in
cl
ud
e
ye
ar
an
d
ca
le
nd
ar
m
on
th
in
di
ca
to
rs
.S
ta
tis
tic
al
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
sy
m
bo
ls
:+
p
<
0:
10
,
p
<
0
:0
5
,

p
<
0:
01
.
206
TABLE 3.22: Estimated effects of BRAC list announcement on unemployment in the GAO-6
Unemployment rate Log of unemployment rate
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Jan.–Apr. 2004 -0:012 -0:063 -0:115 -0:169 -0:092 -0:028 -0:038 -0:047 -0:049 -0:031
(0:175) (0:180) (0:178) (0:184) (0:197) (0:035) (0:036) (0:036) (0:037) (0:039)
May–Aug. 2004 -0:150 -0:134 -0:247 -0:315 -0:196 -0:066 -0:063 -0:086 -0:088 -0:054
(0:339) (0:346) (0:347) (0:350) (0:359) (0:079) (0:080) (0:080) (0:081) (0:083)
Sept.–Dec. 2004 -0:421 -0:345 -0:495 -0:594 -0:522 -0:122 -0:108 -0:139 -0:145 -0:125
(0:499) (0:506) (0:508) (0:517) (0:529) (0:121) (0:122) (0:122) (0:124) (0:126)
Jan.–Apr. 2005 -0:204 -0:176 -0:438 -0:578 -0:607 -0:096 -0:086 -0:141 -0:145 -0:145
(0:493) (0:506) (0:502) (0:511) (0:535) (0:107) (0:109) (0:108) (0:110) (0:114)
May–Aug. 2005 -0:181 -0:130 -0:401 -0:630 -0:577 -0:103 -0:090 -0:148 -0:165 -0:152
(0:546) (0:564) (0:553) (0:564) (0:593) (0:123) (0:125) (0:124) (0:126) (0:130)
Sept.–Dec. 2005 -0:292 -0:268 -0:539 -0:778 -0:657 -0:123 -0:112 -0:172 -0:190 -0:169
(0:616) (0:629) (0:626) (0:636) (0:671) (0:144) (0:145) (0:145) (0:147) (0:153)
Control group Baseline Minor Major Military States Baseline Minor Major Military States
Equality, p 0:674 0:572 0:479 0:450 0:783 0:775 0:750 0:702 0:528 0:846
Deviation, p 0:381 0:299 0:227 0:529 0:485 0:677 0:563 0:553 0:856 0:732
Cells 79; 008 7; 200 8; 496 2; 976 11; 520 79; 008 7; 200 8; 496 2; 976 11; 520
Adj. R2 0:836 0:864 0:859 0:884 0:794 0:854 0:879 0:884 0:912 0:807
Notes. Difference-in-differences estimates displayed. All models include year fixed effects, calendar month indicator variables interacted with
treatment group, and group-specific linear trends. The equality test has the null hypothesis that all three coefficients in 2005 are equal. Deviation
test explained in main text. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by county. Statistical significance symbols: + p < 0:10,  p < 0:05, 
p < 0:01.
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TABLE 3.29: Birth rates around the BRAC 2005 announcement
1 2 3 4 5
Jan.–Apr. 2004 0:042+ 0:055 0:045+ 0:036 0:027
(0:024) (0:024) (0:024) (0:025) (0:024)
May–Aug. 2004 0:023 0:033 0:027 0:012 0:017
(0:024) (0:024) (0:024) (0:024) (0:024)
Sept.–Dec. 2004 0:030 0:035 0:034 0:008 0:027
(0:024) (0:024) (0:024) (0:025) (0:024)
Jan.–Apr. 2005 0:037 0:047+ 0:043+ 0:030 0:032
(0:024) (0:024) (0:024) (0:025) (0:024)
May–Aug. 2005 -0:010 0:002 -0:004 -0:008 -0:010
(0:024) (0:024) (0:024) (0:024) (0:024)
Sept.–Dec. 2005 0:028 0:041+ 0:026 0:014 0:020
(0:024) (0:024) (0:024) (0:025) (0:024)
Control group Baseline Minor Major Military States
Equality test: p 0:329 0:363 0:369 0:553 0:444
Mean deviation test: p 0:142 0:158 0:185 0:323 0:217
Cells 118; 512 6; 768 10; 008 3; 240 17; 280
Clusters 1; 646 94 139 45 240
Notes. Coefficient estimates from Poisson conditional fixed-effects models. Models include terms for year and group-interacted calendar month.
The equality test has the null hypothesis that all three coefficients in 2005 are equal. Deviation test explained in main text. Standard errors, in
parentheses, are clustered by county. Statistical significance symbols: + p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01.
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